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ISTROOOCtlOS 
fh@ chronological seop© of this study eoTsrs the 
period from July B, l$75 to July 16, 1878. On th® fora#r 
date an Insurrection occurred in th© Ttirklsb provlnee of 
Herzegovina and rapidly spread northward into tb® fyrklsji 
provlnc® of Bosnia. Tin® two provinces. Inhabited by a aalaly 
Serbian population, were Turkey's oat®r»oat Suropeaa terri­
tories. Serisla and Montenegro, lying to "the west s.ad south­
west of Bosnla-israsgoTlna, w@r@ part o-f the Turkish Saplr# 
in lurop®, but ©aofe was practically lBd«p#ndent, toeing only 
under tbt© suseralaty of tb.® Sultan, fh® Serbians aad Mon­
tenegrins, b#ins of the saae nationality aa the Bosnians 
and Serz®govinlan.s, aided tU® lasurreetlonists. Turkey 
failed In her attempts t© r«stor® peace, so the European 
Fo-wers lnt©rv®iied. fh.«lr InltriJil intervention was unsue-
c©asful. Tht0 situation b«c«»© sore and aor© aggravated, 
eventually oaueing two wars. fh@ crisis, as vl@w@d by Brit­
ain, ended on July 16, 1878 with Lord B#&coiiafield'b announce-
aent to the Bngliah people that he had brought them **P©ace 
with Honor.* 
This study Is confined to a consideration of British 
policy in so far aa It was prosptsd by Balkan ©vents, 1875-
78. Maturally, the diplosacy of this brief period aust be 
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considered in the framework of Britain's -rital interesta in 
til© B&lkane and l©ar East, ©specisllj- in relationship to 
Russia. Doaestic considerations, in so far as they gtr®iigth-
efii»d or weakened Disraeli's hand, also lie within th® seope 
of this surrey of British diplomacj. 
Bosnia-Ber^^PSOTlRS in Britiah Diploaacy. 1875-1876. 
in Ti©w of Beajaain Maraeli's domiaant rol© in BritislJ 
policy, i® eentered T©ry Miaeh about the figure of the Con-
servativ© Party L©ad#r. 4,» Prim® Minister, Disraeli wa» 
alffiost solely reaponsibl© for British foreign polisy in 
the period from 1875 to 1878. If It were not for the con­
stitutional right of Englani's monarch to advis© and b® ad­
vised, this history could not hAT« b@en written. Much of 
th® material was eontain«d in th© letters froa the Prise 
Minister to Queen Victoria. During th# period, th® a@ab©rs 
of the British Cabinet wero not allowed, by custo», to keep 
aiinutes or records of th® Cabinet aeetings. Th®re «r« so®® 
standard sources which th® author did not use, such as Die 
Grosse Politlk der guropftiaehen Rabinette. 1871-1914. In 
plac® of th® latter, h® used Gteraaa Diploa&tic Docuffients. 
1871-1914. an English translation of ths docuffients from 
Pi€ Grosa® Folitlk which bear laost directly on English 
history. A coaparleon of th» doeu«®nts appearing in th@ 
two collections deaonstrates that no Tital o®lsslons ap­
pear in the shorter Qerm&n Diploaatic Docuaent®. 
-Yi««. 
CMAPfSt I 
mmcoESBwuh diplomacy 
In July , 18?5, tM© Slair Inhabitmnts of Hers^govlna, 
SQutlieni Bosisla, p@fm6#A to psy tS3E.®s or to p#rfora labor 
services, A fiarki^to. t^rm was disprntobed to eo«pel %b& 
peasants to fulfill tb@lr otoligatlona, but» on July 24, it 
met vith d#terisln©d reslstsa## aad was defeated. fh@ initi­
al succsas of tlie peasants eaeouraged a spreading of the 
in©tjrr@etlon, and aid rapidly cam® fro® Bosniejas, Serbians 
and Mont«3a«griiis. Tb® eau®#s of the uprising *»r® sore @eo-
noaic and social than, politieal, with unbearable fiscal bur-
d®as aad religiotaa oppr®ssiO-n b«ing th@ sabj€ict of tb® ffiost 
loudly voiced complaints, and with laiB@iitations of corrup­
tion b«lGg often heard. For long®r than a d®eade the area 
had been th© scene of aerioua tturest. Mr. Holffies, the 
British con#ul in Bosnia, reported. In i860, that th® 
conduct of the Turfeish authorities in these proviaees hstd 
been aufficient, in conjunetion with foreign agitation, to 
bring Boenia to the very verge of rebellion, whilst the 
Herzegovina was in a state of war.'**^ In 1867» '?lt and *73 
1. J, A. R. Marriott, The Sastern Question: to Historical 
atudy in European. Diploffiaey (Oxford. 191?), 282ff. 
th® British Foreign Offie® received additional report® 
froii Mr. Holmes describing '*Hh® open bribery and corrup­
tion.,"* and saying that **of all case® of Rustic®, whether 
between Mussulmans alon®, or Turks and Christians, ninety 
out of a hundred are settled by brib«rj alone.• 
fh® fsst spr#ad of the r#v'olt in, Bosnia and H©rz@-
goTitia oaui«d soa® concern in th® capital® of Surope. Loadon 
was content, at first, with instructing h®r Minister at 
to r®preseRt to th® Awitrian goY®ra»®nt that: 
Her Majesty'3 •Cioir®rn®®iit would be glad to learn 
that th© CJoT«rEiffi«iit of Austria-liaagarir had tak®Q 
steps to secur® th# p®ac® of th® frontier and to 
present th« distmrtoaBe®« ia Hereego-vina froa r»-
celving support or eneourag^aeat from Austrian 
t«rritorj.3 
Th# British ageat at B«lgrad« wae instructed in a similar 
«ana®r, ®.nd Sir H. Elliot, the British tobasandor at Coa-
etantlnople, was a8k.#d. to dissuade th® Prine® of MoRtenegro 
fro® helping thos® who had struck for freedoai.' At this 
point England was much In favor of noii-int®rv©ntiom. Dis-
rn.®!!, th© Pri®e Minister, desired that Turkey should re­
solve the sltUfttlOR. The coatiaeatal powers, however, were 
desirous of joint action, by the consuls, and England adhered 
reluctantly, as es« be seen in a telegram frosa Disraeli to 
Derby, th® Foreign Minister, August 24, in which h© said; 
2. Ibid. 282ff. 
3. H. C. Thoffison, The Oitmolnp^, furk; Impressions of a 
Journey through the"tfestero Balkans (London, 1897), 214. 
4. Ibid. 214. 
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Is- no alteraativ®, bwt 1 don't like It,'^5 vh®n 
ag,re«lGg to a Cotisalar ffilsslon B®rbj used these words; 
H«r Majesty's Qo:vernm0nt ©onseiat^d to this step 
with r®l«cta,ac©, as they douht®d tJae ®:Kpedi@n©y 
of th@ l«t«rT©Btion of Foreign Qonwytln, Such sm 
int®rirentl©ii, I r@«&rk&d, was scare^lj ©oapatibl® 
with th® independent a«tth©rltj ©f th« Port©; it 
offered mn lnduc®i!©iit to in«urr®etioii as a ®#aiig 
of appealing to ferelga syapathy against ftarklsh 
rule, and it sight not improbably ©p@ii th® %fay 
to further diplomatie lnt-@rf@r@B-e® ia th© iater-
aal affairs of th© #aplr®.^ 
tfe® p#»,swat l@«td«'rs, ill S®pt#«to»r, presented th®lr 
cas® to th® consuls, d^aandiag rellgloue freedoa, taxation 
reforms, the right to gl^@ ©vldsnee In the courts, and the 
formation of a local Chrlstlsa .aiilltift, Thej suggested th® 
followliag alt#raatlv® r#»®dl@@: (1-) land to which-jtrhaj" istght 
®mlgrst®; (2) Bosnia and H«rE«gorlaa %o b® aa sutonoaous 
state und»r a Christian prlne®; or (3) a teaporsry foreign 
oceupittlon..'^ furk®y would a©t »cc«d® to the deaaads of the 
insurgents, fh® lstt®r, %n turn, would not accept the pro-
ails#® of Turkey. Persuasioas of the consuls availed riothl.iis, 
so th© aedlatloii of th® Powers failed to restore peace, and 
the revolt continued to spread. 
The British desire that the Powers remaia aloof 
fro® the new situation is easily understood in the light 
of Brltala's tradltioaal Balkan policy. Her Near-Eastern 
5. W. F. Moneypeimy and Q. 1. Suckle, The Life of Benjaatin 
Disraeli. £&rl of Beaconsfield {2 vols., rev., R.Y., 1929), 
II, 884. Tol. II is used exclusively ia this study. 
6. fhoffisoti, Qutgoiag furk. 214. 
7. Marriott, Eastern Queatloa. 285f. 
dlploaaoy was b»®®d upon tii® fre&ty of Paris of 1856 as 
Q 
sodlfled by the freaty of Loadon of 1871, e, cosbinatlon 
of treaties aalnly significant ia that It represented a 
d^clsiv® eh®cl to Russia'© advaac® into tli» Balkatis. Aa 
important aspeet of the Treaty of 185€ w®-® the provision, 
contained im Article ¥11,. wfaieb secured for the F&wern th& 
right of coasid®riag aay violation of furkisii integrity to 
to® ®a question of general interest.fMs right was af-
firaed by Article fill of thm Treaty of 1871.^® British 
policy aft«p 1856 was on® of isoa-ln.t«rTe-ntion in. the Baliteaas, 
H©r d@»and that the eoiatln®nt&l Powers follow ths san® polley 
was valid fro® the point of vl®w of th@ Law of Hatloos, It 
was, in addition, ideally suit#<l to Britain's sajor iater-
©sts. fh® ©hl®f of these wss th® ffiainteasnee of b^r e»pir@, 
and, sine® Britaia viewed RbissIr as a pot#ati«il dissturber 
of her Asiatic X»plr®> this sad® England highly deslroas 
of a &krop®ai3. furte@y standing h®tw©®n Bussia and tb® 
Straits. H»ac« the attempt of any Power, hut particularly 
Russia, to aeddl® In Turkish affairs In such manner as to 
threaten her territorial iotegrlty was Ixjund to coaeern 
Britain. The British fear of Eiissia was hased upon theh 
Bfltl^sh eonception of Russlaa laperialls®, the Russian 
threat to the balance of power, Russian autocracy, and 
8. T, E, Holland, ed., The European Concert in the Eastern 
Question; A Collection of Treaties and Other Puhlic Acts 
(Oxford, 1885), 241-255 272-277. 
9. Ibid. 245. 
10. Ibid. 275. 
Rasalan resetion,^^ bat more #specl®lly upon Britlsb, 
und«rst«it41ns of Russia's trade problexs. 4s long as 
the Straits w®re controlled bj fur&ey the trade to and 
from Russian Blaok S®a ports was Ywlnerable. Ineld^tits 
coatiBually farmsd the fl&®es of British fear, Mo^seow, 
In 1S6T, pla.y®4 host to a Paa-Slaf congress, glvlag to 
th© «ov®s®nt a tt#w energy; Patt-Slav llter&tur© was ctr-
eulat®d eTeryvhare ia the Balksnaj Russian unl¥@rslti®s 
attracted «or@ SerblaBS, Montenegrins, Bofflnli.ns, and Bu.l« 
gmrlans than preTlously, The Bov@ii®nt reeQived ftsassian 
official support.^® Russia took advantage of the Franco-
Fruaaian War to r«pudlate th# Black sea clauses of tha 
Treaty of 1856. fhough this was a violation of the Law 
of latlons, S«@si& w&a a'ol@ to force her will on Brit­
ain &nd th© Fow®r® at London, where th© latter signed th® 
Treaty of 18T1 wfeieh legmllaM th® Rttssian action,2-3 
These_actloas and othars toy Russia gave Britain little 
hope of a rapprochement. 
A second British Interest was her trade. British 
liiv@«tor8 had looked to th® S@ftr Es®t and wmrm aaeoclated 
th®r# with rsilroada, »ftrtE®t8, aad general commerc®, furk»y 
had procured m&nj lo&as fro« British financiere. If Russia 
shoald be allowed to conquer Turksy, British subjaots, aad 
11. M. ¥» Tyler, The European Powers and th® Near Saat. 
1875-1908 (Mirmeapolls, 1$25), *6-50. 
12. Marriott, Eaetera Question. 283f. 
13. t. P. Oooch and J. H. B. M«at®raan, A Century of Britiah 
Forelmi Policy (London, 1917, 18), 24. 
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thus Britain, uroiald lose bug© »umm of »oney, and Britlsto. 
trade would b© ©©verelj daaaged.l^ Saturally, In tiaes of 
crisis iB the lear East, money and trading interests exer­
ted pressure ia t-ii® rigbt places in favor of the s&inteti-
anee of furkish integritj and the status quo. 4t various 
times am opposing pressure was torougbt to bear upoa the gov-
em»ttt toy tkat section of th®- po'pulace vhlch was usually 
syiipathetic to tfe® nationalities im th® Balkans, wanted to 
see Turkish alsrul© removed, and other political and ter­
ritorial arraagements aade. However, money and trading 
interests were more powerful and closer to govemaeatal 
©ireles, ®o their will prevailed, and Sagland dedicated 
beraelf to tb® cause of »mliitalning furkey in Europe. 
By Octo^r the Imrde.a of coato^t la Bosala-Herssegoviaa 
is.ad overtaxed Turklafe. fins-aces, vMcib, becsus© of ttoe misrule 
of th.® Sultan,̂ 5 were In no eondltlon to stand a ®illtary 
eaapslgn in it® outersoet provinces, furlcey had received 
nine foreign loAss prior to 1875.^^ When she announced on 
October that sb® could not pay th® interest oa th® public 
14, fyler, Europ®«a Powers. 48. 
15, A. Debidour, Histolre dlploaAtlaue de 1*lurope; Depula 
1' ouverture du eonf^r^a de ylemae Jusqu [ m 1&~fermeture du 
eotmrhB 4e Berlin. lBi4»l8yW' (2 roi&,. Paris, I891), II» 478. 
Where be s&ysT'^bd-ul-Azis . . . iilourdie chaque Jow 
peu plus par les grossiers plalalrs du bare®, auxquels 11 
sacrlflait avec une psrfalte insouciance tout aon teaps et 
toutes lee resources du tresor public.** 
16, R, ¥. Seton-Watson, Britain in lurope. 1789-1914; A 
Survey of Wormlm. Policy (Caffibridge ,""19387» 512. 
17. Tyler, European Powers. 56 
debt, ths csfdltors, of wfe©® aaaj were Sigllsh, deaand®^ 
action to taring an ®nd to ii©stilltl©a in the proTlnc^s and 
to put furklsk fInane©® In order.M@ra#li realized tfe&t 
th® S&8t«rn Qusstiou a©w fft©@d hia* Xn a l@tt@r to l,ady Brad­
ford, written lov®«'b8r 3j h& esid: 
Matters ar« larg© stod pr#®#ing# PIT® wemka ago 
Russia, and indeed all th® Or«®t Powers^ agreed 
'the H®rs, quest!©a was settled.' fh& Frlnm of 
Sarvia etoangsd bis Ministry, mt their dietation, 
to ensur® that result# But this extraordisaary, 
and quit# nmforeaeen^ bankruptey of the Fort® 
has set ©Terytbimg ag&lu in fla«.®, ®ad I really 
bell^v® Hh# last@ra. Quastioa,' that has feauiat®d 
Europe for a c@ntury, aad wli[leh] I thought the 
Crlaean War had adJoum#d for half .another^ will 
fall to ay lot to ®tteou»t®r-»dar® I say to 8«ttl«?^" 
It fflight to® henaficial, at this point, to exmrnlnm 
brl#fly th® poliey advoeated hy Diara©li, fh© last#ra 
Question wa® only a part of th® problem of proteetlag th« 
British S»plr®j whioh was Blsr«©li's for«®ost conesm.^® 
In desliixg with this probl@«,, h© was »otlvat®d by a fear of 
Russia, which *asiount®d to a aonoaariia. Conmqwstiitiy, his 
every action wa» for th® porpose of restraining Russiam in-
fluesic® a»oag th® Balkan Slave, and praventing any Russian 
advance toward Constantinopi®. He believed that this could 
he best aceoapliehed by a strict adherence to the treaty of 
Paris of 1856, aad it was on this principle that he aade his 
18. W. S. Davia, A Short History of the Hear East: Froa the 
gomdins of ConBtantinople (330 A. D. to 19^S) {l.l., 1925), 351. 
19. Moneypenny and Buekle, Life of Disraeli. 886. 
20. Ibid. 875. 
21. Davis, A Short History. 332. 
stand.22 Disraeli's traditional fear of Russia was subfitaia-
tlated by reports fro® Sir Henry Uliot, ths British Ambas­
sador at Constantinople, who *la@lft®d that th® rebels wrm 
sneouraged by Russia in every possible way; that the l«ad#ra 
*©t at the hous® of Yonln, th® Eusslan oonsul at Eagusa; and 
that they wer© ald®d bj Inforsatlon supplied by Igsatlef M®-
8#lf.'*^5 R@port» of thl.s natiir# strengthened Disra.@ll ia hie 
d®t©rainatlon that th®r® ahoold be no rearr«iag®»®ats »ads 1q 
th0 Balkans, at l®it,st aot without his coassat. fh« craatloa 
of independent &l&r states, he thought, would slaply throw 
th«ffl Into th# hsKds of Russia, or, at th® rerj laa«t, greatly 
increa®# Russian str«agth.^^ Ia th® light of th® faji-SlaTlst 
Boveaent, this Hn« of reasoaing was well grounded. fh©n 
too, Oisra®!! did not b©ll@T® in the capacity of th® Balkan 
p#opl«8 for self-goT#rM<fent» fhls 1® illu«trat®d in a letter 
of October 1 to Lady Bradford in which h® eoaaents on the 
Augtrlaa proposal for autonoaiy for Boaaia-Herxegovlnas 
*Faney autonomy for Bosnia, with a aixed population; autonoay 
for Ireland w[oul3 d b® l®ss absurd, for there ar® more furk® 
in proportion to Xtlaos in Bosnia than Ulster r, the three 
other proviaeea. , . .*25 
22. Moaeypenny and Buokle, -Life of Msraell. 881. 
23. Cited in ¥. L. Linger, European Alliances and Alignments. 
1871-1890 1951), 69. 
24. fyler, European Powera. 59. 
25. Mon«ypenny aad Buckle, Life of Diaraeli. 885. 
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toother factor tak^n Into eoBsideration by Disraeli 
at all times was tli® greater liBportsnee of th@ Eastern Ques­
tion to England as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal 
In 1869. Tbls b@ea»e th« shortest rout# to India and wist be 
protected above all ©Is©,^^ Tbls protection h» intended to 
secure by an individual actioa, and »anlfeated a r®luetaao® 
to eo-op®rate witb. the Powers,m wtts ©laarly shown dur­
ing the period of «@4iatioii bj the Consuls, X®t, tbla lack 
of eo-operation on hi® part was aot to b# construed by tb® 
Powers as an invitittioia for tb@a to act without bia in the 
Balkans, fo s«k.@ sur@ tbst this waa elearlj understood h® 
ftddr®ss®d a warning to thsa, Sov«»to«r 9, in a 8p®@eh on 
Lord Mayor'a Daj. 
Sow that tb© fimfljaeial catastro-phes in furk^j had 
r«viv@d tb0 struggle in Bosnia, it could not b« 
denied that cireu®staae@» w«r® eritical. The 
0r®at Powers iaaedifttely lnt©r@st#d, toowaver, 
had e3c®rels@d, and h@ b#li@-r@d wjuld coritinu® to 
©x©rois«, a wi®® forb#ar®.ne# s and h® was there­
fore eoiiYlae#d that p«ac« would b« ssintftined and 
ths public opinion of lurop# a&tisfied. But he 
significantly added that, though th® interests of 
th® I»p@rlal Powers in this question were aor® 
direet, they vere not aore coMiderable than those 
of Great Britain; aad 'those to wfeos the conduct of 
your sff&irfi is now entrusted are deeply oooscioue ' 
of the nature and magiiltude of those British iater-
ests» and those British interests they are resolred 
to guard and ffiaiataln.'2o 
4s if ia verification of hi© atinouneed forward policy, Disraeli, 
on the twenty-fifth of Sovesber, startled the Powers by 
26. L&nger, l^ropean Alll&aeea« 73. 
27. fyler, European Powers, 59-
28. Cited in Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 888. 
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annowicing ttoat th.® British ao¥©ra*®Bt bad parehased- th© 
S]aediv®''s sharss in th@ Sues Canal,̂ 9 g® was, IMeed;., 
cons clous of the nature and. magnitude of thofie Brltlsli 
Interests." 
On Jaauary 3, 1876 Count Beuat^ Austro-Hungarlan 
Ambassador la aigland,_, delivered a diepatob to Beffey froa 
Count .iMdr&BSf, th# Austro-HiinsaFiaB. Foreign Mlnl«t©r»50 
This dispatch, coattoaly referred to as tb« Andrassj Not®,. 
wa» issued on D©e«i!ber 50, 1875» as the product of tiie Joist 
efforts of Cl#rfflamyj Ruasiaj and. toetria,^^ It ©xpfeased s 
d®alre of th« pQw«rffi to restore p@ae» In Bos?ila-H©rz®goflnas 
and to effect this p#aee It Invited the Gu&raGteelBg ?ow#r® 
to Join In th@ preseot&tloa of the aot@ to Turkey. It 
stat#d tliat S©rtei« and Ment^aagro wer® to b@ pr@T@at@4 fro-» 
Joining in tfe# ln»urr®ctlon. Speolflo demands were mm&» 
upon Turkey to grant religious llt>«rtj, to abollsb tb© far»-
ing of taxes, to turn some of the r«venu@ from direct tax­
ation back to the proTlnc®8, to better the condition of the 
rural population, and to allow the establlshsaent of a coa-
ffiiSBlon to OY©rs©@ the raforas. It ended wltb a request that 
Turlcey furnisli the Pow«rs with s forsal notification of 
29. Britisli and For#ig:n. Stat® Papers. 187'^-1875» ¥ol. 66 
(Compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of tb® Papers, For@ign 
Office, London, 1882), 670, There wer« 176,602 ehares pur­
chased for 4,000,000 pounds sterling less the proportlon&ta 
yalu® of l,o4o shares. 
30. Sir Edward lertslet, ®d., fhe Map of Europg by Tremtj; 
Showing the Varioue Folitlc&l snd ferrItorial Changes which 
have Taken Place Si.ac0 th« General Peace of 1814 ' (4"volg., 
London, 1^91), 24l8. Only ¥ol. rf la used in this studj. 
31. Marriott, Eastern Question. 286. 
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aeeept&nce.^^ Derby's Incllstatlon was to adhere, 
Dls!ira®ll, f»©lins slighted toy th® action of the Three Powers 
liid®p@nd®ntly of lagland, and f©@ll».g tteat adh,®r®ne® mlglit not 
b® in Englaad's beat later®sts, s®at a t@l®gra» to Derby on 
January 9, In which he saldi 
. . . W® shotild pans® before assenting to tli® Austriaa, 
proposal.... 
I t-Mnk it will IftM .^s iH & f»l»® po®ltloa, and it 
wottld b@ pref®r®bl® to app«ar Isolated,, wh[l0h] 
I «8w«llf depr#eat#, than, for th# sake of a. si®-
ulftted anion, wla[lebj will laot last aanj montfes, 
eabaras® ottr®#lir®g, whea iad@p«ad@.iit aetlon «ay 
b® accessary,5^ 
A r«qtaest that Britain Join tfee other pow«r» in tb© 
pr«s0ntatiom of the lot® w«» delivered by Masmrtis, fxitklnh 
representat!•«, to Derby om January 17.^5 speech from 
the throa® on tM« op^fiing of Parlisffl:0nt iadleated Britain's 
adherence, but warned that sh@ womld not disturb furklmh. 
liidepen.d®Be@-.5^ Ob th# tweaty-flfth Derby dispatched a re­
ply to thi© Aadrassy Mot® which r®presented a formal sdher-
«ne®,37 a.a<i alao pointed oat that preTious Turkish Irad»8 
bad already promised to earry out th© indicated reforms.36 
fh@ Andrasay Mote was pr®8©nt®d to furkey on Janu&ry 31, 
32. Hertal^t, Map of Eurom, 2418-29. 
33. Tyler, guropean Powera. 60. 
34. Moneypenny and Buckl«, Life of PiBr&ell. 891. 
35. Ibid. 891. Dlsraall to Bradford. 
36. Ibid. 891. 
37. France and Italy had readily given adherence. 
38. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2430-40. 
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1876,^^ and In two weks Turkey issued & oirculsr to the Powers, 
accepting all poiiite of refora but one, tbat being releveut to 
direct taxatioa,^^ Tbis att««pt of the Powers to restore 
peace to th® proTln©#® in failtir®, baeause ''tb® iasar-
gents refused to accept tbe prograa laid down and deaanded a 
aor© extensive sch#»© ©f refora® as wll as guarant©-®® by 
tb# Powers that tb® reforms would b@ ©arried 
Tbis failtir® waa quickly followed bj another, tbat 
of an stt©iapted rapproaebm®nt between Q®r®anj and Saglaad, 
wbicb. If it had b«en suee©ssful, algbt ba^e av®rt®d the 
Rusao-Turkisb War, »i««strck initiated a conversation with 
Lord CNlo Biiss@ll, tb® British Aabassador at Berlin, on January 
2, 1676.^^ Tb® eonf?@rs®tion d®alt witb tb© ^attitud® of the 
Powers towards tb« Tttrkish qnsgtioa,* and expressed a hope 
harbored by Bisasrek tbat b© ®lgbt get *'lnto closer toucb 
with Lord D«rby,* tb«,s bringing about an ©xcbsage of idea.® 
betw®©ii England and his own eountry, Tb@ long con-s'ers&tloii 
a»ount®d to aa invitation to Britain to work »ore closely 
with Q^rmo-nj in finding sojb® solution for tb® problea pr®-
s©at®d by tbe outbreak in Bosnia-Herzegovina.on February 
39• Tyler, gar0P#an Powgrg, 60, 
40, Hertslet, Map of Europe. 244lff, 
41. fyler, ̂ rop@&ia Powerg. 60, 
42, Lang©r, Suropeao Allianees, 76, 
43. S,,f, S, Dugdale, J. W, Gerard and J. ¥, Headlaa-Morl®y, 
geraan Piploaatie DocMentfi, ly 1-1914 (4 vols., N,X. & Lon­
don, 1928), I, 20, bSIow'to Mtester, Hereafter referred to 
as geraan Pipiogatic Doeuiaients. Only vol, I is used in this 
study. 
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1, Bisaarek talked again, to Russell. He reiterated tela sitt-
cmrm deslr® for pesc©, a peac® which h@ thought mlgbt b@ ®or® 
©asilj ffiaintaiG«d with der^anj a«i4 England working together. 
fh® English Aabaesador, lo reporting hto»s» pointed out that 
"we should lose no time in glviag Priac® BieaarcM; to tander-
stand that we ehsll to® r®adj to act with Germany ."^5 fi^® 
seal with whieh Hmssell advocated that Snglaad work with 
Seraiany stirrM Queeji Victoria to action. On Fehraary 9, 
eh® wrote as follows to h@r Foreign Minister: 
fh® Qu®®n th#r«for« thinks thiit it is of the atmoat 
iaportaoee that w® should aeeept the proffered aid 
of Q&Tmmny, ». strong state whose interests ar« th® 
saa® aa ours and whos® poliej ean or should seldom 
b# opposed to that of an Inglish governaemt. . . . 
fh© Queen considers that tho la|»rtanc® of ®stat>-
lishing: a liiik between th© two countries CRimot 
to® OT#rrat@d, and desir®» e«ra®-«tlj to iapreas 
upon Lord Derbj tb© a^c^sglty of authorising Lord 
Odo Russell to enter Into fr©e and unrestricted 
coaffiumlcAtlOB with Prlae® Bls«arck upon E«.et#rii 
affairs,^6 
D@rtoj was not quite as eager ae the ,'though 
h© b@li®ved that th® offer was to be accepted, as th# 
assistance of Prine® Biflmarek in carrying into effect Bagllsh 
•riews on lastem subjects might under certain circuastaacea 
be of incalculable 'ralue.'*^? He warned, however, that ""more 
44. Langer, Suropeayi Alliaaees. 78. 
45. G. S. Buckle, ed., fhe Letters of Qamen Victoria; Sec-
onA Series t A Selection from her Xa.legtps' Correspondence 
and Journal Between the Years'TSSl" and 1878 (2 vols.. N.Y., 
1926'^, II, 443» (^een to Derby. Only vol. II is used in 
this studJ. 
^6. Ibid. 443f. 
47. Derby to Queen. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, 
893. 
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aiay to© Intended hj this coaiaunlcatloo than meets th® ey®,^ 
and. h.0 wondered "what assistance Eagland Is expected to glv© 
in. return for that which Is offered.In order that this 
auspicion would not jeopardize the posalMlity of a working 
sgreeaent with G-epasBf, Disra®!! urged upoa. Dmrhj that h© 
co-operate "with the offers and overtures of Prine® Bis-
ffiarck.**^9 g® as is'#!! as Darby, realized that Blsaarclc was 
a dangerous aaii, but h@ h®lie¥©d that "if a concerted aetloTi 
on public affairs hetweeti (Jermssy and England toe established 
. . . th® ehatic®® of so great a ©alaalty as s general, or 
(tfen coasiderabl©, war would . . . b® infinitely r#duc#d.**50 
fhus, Derby drafted a reply to Blsaarok, which h0 submitted 
to Disraeli for approval. Th© old ma®t@r added a fin&l 
paragraph and th« r@ply was dispatched, but it pro"9«d in­
sufficient to briGg about th@ hoped-for agreement. Blsffiarck 
reaained with th® fhr®© Saperora L@agu», and England worked 
al©n«.51 
Th® chiefs of th® rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
c&5B« together on February 28 and decided to resume with 
double vigor th© battle which, in th® cold of the winter, 
had been carried on at a slackened pace.52 gy March, 
48. Xbld. 893. 
49. Disraeli to %ueeii. Buckle, The Letters. 444. 
50. Disraeli to Derby. Money penny and Buckle, Life of Ma-
raell, 893f. 
51. Ibid. 894. 
52. Debidour, Histolre diplomatique. II, 485. 
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approxlmately 156,000 r«f«g©«s from th© provinces had 
©nt®r©d neighboring states, and, with tb® increasiag pop­
ular agitation in Serbia and lont@a,©grt), the situation was 
beeoalns critlesl.53 Sortebakoff ®x©rt©d preasur® on Austria 
for another seating of the l»p«ror®, but Aadrassy ref-used. On 
May 7, how®irer, an Incident occurred Ctb© marder of tb® Frencb 
and G-erisan consuls by m fanatical »ob) which proiroked Andras-
gy to aoe-ed® to the demands of Gortcbakoff for a ffi#«tlng,5^ 
^ecordlRglys on May 13, the note, .r«f«'3?r#d--'to-..aa-tbe"-B»rl't& ^ 
M#»orandii», was isauM. fh® t@xt of tb© H^morsndus ̂ as in 
stronger language tban tbat of tb® pr©vlou® Andrassy -Not®, 
It contained: proposal® for co®bia®d n&v&l mor&mentM for 
protection of Turkish aubj«cts, and for a reatorstlon and 
»aint©nanc© of peac#; a proposed aralstlc© for two »ontb@; 
a plan of furkisb reconetructloa of bouses and ebureb«s, 
and of Turkish subslstene® for returnees to tb® provinces; 
provisions for tb® ©etablisbMent of a r«ll@f coismigsionj 
ffietbods for ceseation of hostllltl#©; and a stipulation 
permitting consular ©uperTlsion. Mor® laportant than tb® 
tK)dy of th© Meaaorandua was tb« concluding note, which stated 
that If the tsras of the note were aot fulfilled at the end 
of the two-month araslstice it would be necessary for the 
Powers to *suppleisent tbeir dlplotcatlc action by the sanction 
of an agreement with a iriew to such efficacious saeasures as 
53. Langer, European Alliances, 81. 
5^. Debidour, Rlstolre diploa&tique« 48?. 
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lalglit »pp«8.r to be d#m®nd®d In th« laterest of generRl peace, 
to check the evil and prevent its development.*55 
fb.® British Ambassador in Q@Tmsaij was presented 
with the Seffiorandytffi, oa tke d&t@ of l8s«@,56 lavlt^d 
to proGur® Britlsbi adher®ae® wltMn two 4ajs»57 Disraeli was 
onrag®d; be abfflol«t«lj was not a .saa to b® so slighted. On 
Maj 16 h® r®ftd a long aote to tb® Cebinet, giving tli« fol­
lowing reasons for aoii-adfe®r@nc»: 
(1) H® Disraeli b©ll@v©@ It is laposslbl# for tb® 
Suitaa to r@0oa8traet tb@ houses and ebureii©® of 
the lnsurg@istsor to find food for th@ r@f'age®a, 
(2) fb® distribution of relief by »ans of such 
a Coffi«issioa ss tbat proposed, would b® a bug© syst®* 
of iadlserlaiaat© alasgiving, totally b#yond tb® 
power of the Fort© to «ff®ot, and utterly d®aoral-
ising, to aay eouatry. 
{ 3 )  Tb® coBeentration of tro<>p.s In certain plsees 
would b@ A«liv®rlag up tb@ wtiol® country to sia&reby, 
partieularly wb®a tb« ia-sitrg®at» are to r®talB th@lr 
arms. 
(4) fbe 'consular supervision' would r®duc® tb@ 
authority of th@ Sultan to a aulllty; and, without 
a fore© to support it, supervision would b# l»pos-
glble. 
(5) Tfc© bop© of restoring tranquillity by tbes« 
asan.® b^lag, in Mr. Disraeli's opiaion, grouad-
leas, w# should tb»a b« asled to 'Join in taking 
ffior® efficftclous aeaaur®# in tb« i»t«rest8 of 
peace,' wbieb, it is supposed, aeans taking more 
©fficaclous laessures to break up tb@ EiBpire.SS 
Disraeli infortaed the cabinet, moreover, that b® thought it 
would be fftr better for furlE;@y to give up Sosaia-HerE^govliia. 
than for England to give adb®sloa to tb© Meaorandu®, and tbat 
55. Hertslet, Mmp of Surojge, 2459-63. 
56. Ibid. 2463. 
57. Lsttg«r, Su.rop@an Alll&neee. 82. 
58. Moneypenny and Buckle, Lif# of Disr&ell, 896. 
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also it aight be better for TurM®j to surrender th® pro-
Tinees ^thaa adopt th© alterfiative now offered.**59 fjj® 
sltuatioa was iiad®®d serious wiien Dlsr®©!! woial4 agre# to 
a possible <liss@ab@ring of Turksj. Consistent with Ma poll^'ej, 
above all, h@ intended to hold Russia, ®T«a if nee^ssary to 
S'iT® up the provlaces to Austria. Tbe Gabinat stood solidly 
behind their Frlm® Minister, bat the Qaeea was Imrd-won-oirer. 
She wrote to Disraeli tiiat she disliked being separated 
froia th® Powers and that she f@ar@d that "Turksj will looM 
to ttB to b.®lp her ^g4ftaat the rest of Europe, and that ws 
shall thus preclpitat# rath«r than prevent th® cataatropb® 
ET®ntually Disra®!! was able to eonvlrice h@r, and Brltala 
sent a foraal reply to th® Me-morandu® on May 19*^^ This r@*» 
pi J was a bl«.Qket r®fusal to Join th© Fow®r» is th® j^norand-ua, 
The May murders &t S&loaika created great alara among 
th@ Christians at Constmtlaopl®, so, for the purpose of dl»--
pelllng th© fear, Sir Henry Elliot inforffl®d Mffllral DruamoM, 
at Jaffa, "that his «arly presence at Constantinople sight 
b© very useful, and that h@ would be glad if he would bring 
the squadron to Besika Bay.*'^^ ord®rs were transaitt«d to 
the fleet on the twenty-fourth.^^ fh® Pow«rs were prone to 
connect this event with Britain's defiance of the Powers in 
59. Ibid. 896. 
60. Buckle, Th® Letters. 453. 
61. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2464-68. 
62. Ibid. 2464-68. 
63. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 898. 
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refuslBg to co-op0rat» with the® in a preaentatioa of tb® 
Berlin M@fflorand«ffi. Cotisequantly, there was uneasy feeling 
in the Capitals of Europ®, bat less than a week lapsed be­
fore th.©r® occurred » aajor ev#at, which completely altered 
the situation. A pal»e« revolution la furk#y placed a new 
Sultftn, Mttrad, at tb© hela. B-e pr©f®saed. prograffiae of 
eoastitutlonal reform and of fri©-ndly co-operatioa witli for­
eign Powers.'"64 Ingland, tli.«r©after, ©asllj- persuaded th® 
Powers to wlthirmw th® B«rlia Memorandiia. On Jun® 9 Dis­
raeli aanounced; **'fher@ is & coaplet® uaderstandlag be­
tween us and th,@ Qr̂ mt Powers that ther© should b# no uadu® 
pressure put upon tk@ new So-fereigii of Turkejrj tha,t md 
fctis couBsellop® should h«T® tie® to astur© their sasaur®®.'*^5 
Tlaus, Brltlsli d,iplo»acy was to hav® & r@spit©. It 
®u8t fcua-sfe b«#ii w®leo»«, for a#®trly » f®sr had been, spent la 
eontinual negotistiott. In July tJa© insurrection had. occurred. 
Sngl&nd would hav© pr®fer®d « policy of noa-int«rf#r®ne®, but 
external pr#88ur«s bad been too groat and reluctantly she had 
joined the Powers in an att@»pt to mediate the dispute through 
the Consuls, fhe dciaaad® of th© insurgents having b«®n @xe#8-
slv®, ffiediatioa had failed. In October the Sultan had an-
nouncad his repudiation of the isterest on the Turkish for-* 
eign debt, so asany Bjigllsh financier®, as >f®ll as those of 
other nation®, had begun to deaand active interventtlon. At 
the turn of the year, the todrassy Mote was being studied in 
IMd. 900. 
65. Ibid. 900. 
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England, Turkish lr).sist©nce that England Join the Powers in 
the presentation of the note, had brought England into th© 
European concert. The note, though accepted by Turkej, had 
proven no more effective than mediation by the consuls. fh@ 
following month England had experienced another failure, an 
attempted rapprochenent with {Jermanj. The Salonika murders 
and the Berlin Memorandu® occurred in Maj. England, had re­
fused to join the Powers at that time, and had sent her fleet 
to Beslka Bay, an action somewhat misinterpreted bj the Powers. 
The Berlin Meaorandum had never been forced on Turkey, because 
of the palace revolution whioh had placed Murad on the throne. 
Truly, it had been a busy period for the British statesmen, 
who could show little for all their work—only that they had 
aade the Powers awar® of the fact that there was still an 
England, that she would have to be reckoned with as in the 
days around mid-century and before. The fleet at Beeika Bay 
was the proof of this. Yet, up to this point, diplomacy 
had been unsuccessful, for the insurrection was expanding, 
an ever present danger to the existence of the Turkey-in-
lurope which England deemed essential to the maintenance of 
her Empire, 
CHAPTER II 
¥AB MD MASSACRE lU fHE 
Less than a month passed sftsr th® dispatcfe of the 
British Fleet to Bay before tfo© British Foreign 
Office had warnings of ImpeMiag danger in the Balkans. On 
June 20, 1876 Bertof wrot#, relatiY« to th®s© warnings, that 
'^in-deed if th# report be true that the Princ# of Serbia has 
asksd for the (iovernorship of Bosnia, the real troubles ar© 
^unt about to hegin. The demand is so absurd that It can 
be put forw&ra onlj as an excuse for a quarrel; a»d I doubt 
whether ®fen Russian Influence could prevent war. If it were 
sad© and refused.Disraeli, having r®e@iv«d verification 
of the dlsturblag report, realised th@ need for iaiiediat© 
action. y«t the course® of action open to him were f©w. 
In his analysis of th® situation, Russia waa the k@y pover. 
If she were willing to co-operate with the other powers, war 
sight be averted. Thus, representations were mede to th® 
European Powers to bring their Influence to bear upon Serbia 
to maintain peace, Dieraell's instructions to Deroy, on 
June 28, were that the British Foreign Office should dispatch 
1. Derby to Ponsonby. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Dis­
raeli , 905f. 
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a d©clarstioB to Eusaia, statlag that '*if war takes pl&c© 
between Turkey and S®rirla, and th© Porte ia vletorious, 
and seeks the legitiast© consequences of victory» as, for 
©xaapl®, th® restoration of Belgrade . . . that if Russia 
Interfere under th®s@ eircuastane®s, the position of affairs 
will be considered bj England as »o8t grav®.'*^ Also, th® 
instructions suggested that d@t@r®la©d and quick efforts b© 
»ad® to det&eh, Montenegro froo Serbia. In Disraeli's words 
—**Ev®n feoura ar® precious. 
fo understand Serbia's deaand that sh® be allowed 
to occupj Bosnia-Hi@rz©goTiaa, It ia nesessary to survey 
briefly the preceding dec&d®, Serbia had long nurtured 
a hope to acquire th« two provlneea, coffiposed of a aaialy 
Serb population. Ov«r th.r«e-fourths of the 1,100,000 
population w©r» Clariatlaa Slavs fh« altern&tiv© to west­
ward Serb expansion was ©xpanslon lato Macedonia. This, 
Serbia did not d®sir®, because th© population was so slxed 
that it was ^Ifflpoaslble to say where th© Serb population'* 
ended and the Bulgarian began.^ As early as 1866, when 
Crete roae in revolt against Turkey, Serbia agreed with 
Euffianla to work mutually for independence. On Septeaber 
25, 1866, a Serblan-Monteaegrin Treaty was signed, followed 
2. Disraeli to Derby. Ibid. 908. 
3. Ibid. 908. 
Ibid. 886. 
5. E.W. Seton-Wateon, The Balkans. Italy and the Adriatic 
(2nd, ed., London, 1916127i~" 
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by *& tentative Gr^ek-Roumanian Treaty (February 1867), 
th« crucial Ssrblan-dreek Treaty (August 26, 186?) tfo® 
military eon-rention between Gr®©oe and Serbia of February 
28, 1868.'*^ Tbe teras of the 0re®k-Serblan Agreetaent pro­
vided, among other tblngs, tiiat Serbia was to acquire Bosnia-
Hersegovlna,'^ Tbe pliins not maturing, Serbia, in 1871 »• S-P-
proacbed the Powers with tbe **propositi©n that tbe two pro­
vinces be occupied by Serbia under tbe suzerainty of tbe 
Sultan,"® Heltber Auetrls nor Russia dared open tbe E®st« 
era Queetiori at that ti»e, «o Serbia gained nothing ®ore 
tban vague proislaes tiiat at so®® future date #be .^®lgbt•tb#•"•• 
p®rffiltte«3 to aake soae "»CQUiaitions in. tbis direetlon.^^ 
f&® Ineurreatlon in Bosnia «.ad Heraegovina appeared 
to the Serbs and Monteaegrlas to be tbelr golden opportunity. 
It was impossible for tb® goveraaeata of the two countries to 
prevent their subjects fro® aiding their oppressed brothers 
in the neighboring provinces,Only the concerted influ­
ence of the Powers pi^veaated Serbia and Montenegro from 
entering the war. In the latter part of May, 1876, after 
the failure of the Berlin Meaoranduffl, one of the more able 
Russian aray officers, fchernayeff, placed himself at the 
disposal of the Serba. Be was given the coaiBBand of the Serb 
6. Langer, Kugi5p«&n Allisncea. 6lf. 
7« IMd. 62. 
8. fyler, Suropean fowers. 65. 
9. Ibid. 65. 
10. Langer, luropeaa Alllancea. 81. 
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srasj.^^ On Jua© 9 Iwrkey dsasaded of Serbia that sh@ explain 
her recent arolng and make her intentions known. Tii© Serb 
army, under the new coffi®and®r, was eager to Initiate a cgjBi-
paign, HO the govemaent, recently assured of aid by a treaty 
of allianee with Mont©n®gro, w&© scareely disposed to bow to 
the daaands of furk«y. Instead, It countered with tb# dsaand 
that the Turkish troop© ®vaeuat®. th« provinces and permit 
Serbia to occupy Bosnia, Mont®n@gro w&a to b© p@nBitt®d to 
occupy Herzegovina.^-2 
It was thla demand by Serbia, that stirred th# Britlak 
Foreign Office to action. Though th© Powers eo-operated with 
Britain In attempting to indue© Serbia and Montenegro to ab­
stain fro* so drastic a move as a declaration of war, failure 
resulted,Serbia was counting h«a¥ily upon revolts, which 
ahe belle-yed would break out #Y®rywhere in the Turkish Empire 
following a Serbian attack upon Turkey, and upon an antici­
pated disintegration of th© Turkish army.^^ She was eon-
fident of Tletory, so, on June 50, 1876, she declared war 
against Turkey.Montenegro followed with a declaration 
11. Dsbidoar, aiatolr® diplomat!qu^, II, 491. 
12. Ibid. II, 491. 
15. Moa«yp@nny and Buckle, Life of Piaraell. 908. 
14. French A»bassador at Constantinople to French Foreign 
Miniater. Affaires etrangeresi doeuaeats dlplosiatlques; 
affaires d'Orient. 1575-1576-^877 (Paris, 1877), 157f. 
Hereafter referred to as French Piploaatlc Documents. 
15. Eertalet, Map of Europe. 2471-74. 
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of war on July 2.^^ ¥©ry slioptly thereafter, th© insurgents 
of Bosnia-Heraegoviaa declared, tlieir provinces to be annexed 
by Serbia aad Mont©aegro.^7 fhls «©at certainly would not 
b® aoeept®d by Austria. Russia would not allow Austria to 
Bid© with. Tu-rkey. Th© Eastern -Question was still open. 
Wfeil# th® furkish-Ssrhlsa sltuatioii had been devel­
oping, mttother Insurreetlon had taken plac® in the Turkish 
laplr«.. Oa May 4, 1876, Sir H®ary Elliot reported that em 
insurrectioa&ry &OT@m.mnt had broken, out in Bulgaria at th® 
tillage of Otloukeui aot fur fro®. Philippopolis fhls 
informfttioa w&s aot so worded as to esuse alar®, the Po-r-
«lsn Offie® regarded it lightly, for, after all, such dis­
turbances w©r® r&th»r co«Bon. Th« Bulgarians had ®ade at 
l#ast thre# attempts, in th© sixties, to '*thrt>w off th® 
Turki«l3. This Insurrsetlon, which earn® to be toown 
as the "^Bulgarian Horrors,** was not directly related to that 
of B08nia-H«r£®g0Yia&, but it is part of this study, bec&us® 
th© ©xtdnt of the popular reaction in Britain was such that 
it tt&d© complet® freedom of action by th® governaant latpoa-
sibl®, and it Influeaosd th© gowrnsant to modify its Balkan 
policy. It is not euggestsd, howerar, that the Bulgarian 
Horrors were th© sol® cause of this modification, 
16. Ibid. 2475ff. 
17. Debldour, Histoire diplomatique. II, 491. 
16. Hertslet, Ma^ of Europe. 1471. 
19. W. M.. Qewehr, fhs Rise of Sationallsia in the Balkans. 
18Q0-193Q <N.Y., I831I, 36. 
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Tfae British people were first ffiad® avrare of the 
ffiftssacrea on Jun® 25» 1876, by a Daily Mews artlcl®, based 
on ft L9tt#r fro® Mr» Mwla Pears, a resident at Constanti­
nople.^^ lv®situ&llj it itf&s learned that th© storj was 
gr®atly exaggerated, t^t, upon publleation. It was b©li©vefi 
toy hug# nufflb®r8 of the British populaoe« Thrm® <3,»ys after 
publication, Disraeli was questioned in th® Hous® of Comisons, 
and again on July 10.^^ H© took the position, on both oe-
eaeions, that ^'th® Information which the aovernment had re-
e@lv#d did not Justify the stateaento amde in the Bally 
lew."22 Articles contia«i«d to appear in the Daily Sew, 
but Blsr&ell, though eon<s®rned, aaintained a rather calm 
attitude, hecftuse the paper was the leading Liberal organ 
and had be«n hostll® to hla in th© past. Wheti, howaver. The 
Tiaes printed elmllar articles, he becea© worried, 4 special 
envoy, Walter Baring, was charged with finding out the truth. 
His preliminary report fixed the nuaiber of Bulgarian vlctias 
at 12,000,^^ This report, by comperiaon with the newspaper 
report, per«itted Disraeli to isalntain that "^hls seepticis® 
had been Justified.It was an event, he said, *which no 
20. R. B, Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1815~191^ 
(London, 1922), 225. 
21. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 915. 
22. Ibid. 915. 
23. Ibid. 919. 
ibid. 919. 
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OB© c&n thlaJc of without ||@ it clear in 
hie last spetcii in th® Hous® of CoaJBOos that his foreign 
policy was still headlined bj tto© fflai»t®aanc@ of th@ British 
Sspire: 
But Sir, a«st »ot jump m.% eoncluslons so qalckly 
__as ._i8 Jiow_ fl3B@r® Jl®-jio-tMag~ to-Jttfttl-fy --
ug in talklag in such a v«la of turkey as has 
an,a is being &t this meaent, entertained, fh® j>re«-
«nt is a state of affairs wlileli r#Qulr@s th@ most vi­
gilant exsaination and th® most caref«l fflsaftgeaent. 
But tho®,« suppos® tfeat Engl&ad @v@r wo^Xd up­
hold, or tbls ®o®eat partio«larly is uphoiaiag, 
Ttirkey fro» blin<l sttp®ratition, »bA fro® a mat of 
sympa.tfey wttb. tM« higb©«t aspirattens of laiaaaity, 
sr® dec«lir©d. Wbat omr duty is at this erltieal 
®o»en.t is to saintsin tls# Eapir© of Knglsnd, ior 
will w agr®9 to ftaj at®p, tbotagh it may obtain 
for a aoffi«n.t ooapsratiir# quiet and a fals® pros- ^ 
peritj, that bazards th® ®xlat©iie® of that ^plvm, 
Thm agltmtloia of tbe Brltisb peopl# rea^hedl a boiling 
point; public aettlngs w@r« idealistic ®«a appeatraA on 
public platforas; and e'y^ri'wber® tbe erj to ©xpel tb# Turk 
was beard. Glads ton® eaae out of retir#a®nit to l«ad tb® 
@ra3ad$« On S®pt#aib«r 6 b® bsd published & paaspblet en­
titled *Th© Bulgarian Horrors,'* la which he called on the 
turks to quit the Balkans, '^bag and baggage."2T situation 
for the goTemaeut was serious. Disraeli was greatlj aided 
by Derby during the crlaie, and together they were able to 
survive, but aot without sose coaproffllse, Derby's words, 
in speaklug to the City deputation, express this wellj **I 
25. Ibid. 919. 
26. Ibid. 920. Disraeli was elevated to the peerage as 
Lord Beaconafield. Heaee, his last speech. 
27. Ibid. 931. 
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do not at all wisla to dlsguls® th« fact that what has hap­
pened iQ Bialgmrls ha® to a certain extent- changed the pos­
ition, not only of our owa Qoirernaent, bmt of every European 
OoTeriment.^28 returolag, bow, to the S®rbo-Turkish War 
It atist to® k#pt In mliid that, duriiag the whole period of 
the war., th© British goTeraaent fac@d thl® prohles of 
popular hysteria, and eons®qu»iitly had to proceed with 
eatatioiii 
SertoisB ar»les suffer®d defeat from th® "beglrmlng 
of th® conflict, a fact which cau»®d no little surpri®© 
in th® European eapitals. It had bsen thought that S«rMa 
and Montsnegro, md®r Hwsslan generalship and with th@ aid 
of large rmabars of lusslaB voltmt©#ra, »fOttld be successful 
against furkey, whoa® l®pot@Eic® was supposedly pro¥#a by 
her liability to restore ord#r in Bosiila-H®raego¥laa» It 
caanot be doubted that th® British rrime Minister and his 
Foreign Minister w«r^ soffiswhst pleased at th© turn of ©vents, 
but, bec&us® of th® hostility eTioc®d by the British public 
against Turkey, no public utterances to this effect ware 
possible. Montenegro achieved eoae ainor successes, but 
Serbia suffered oiae disaster after another. S^t only vere 
they unable to enter ^he furklsh provinces, taut they were 
hurled back upon their own territory, fhe fanaticis® 
of the Turkish soldier was as Intense as ever, and terrible 
atrocities took place, in all parts of the Empire, against 
28. Ibid. 941. 
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th@ Christian population. **Boenla an<3 HarKSgovlna. were 
literally deluged toj fir© and blood. 
From the beginning of tli© conflict, tii© Brltlsb 
Foreign Office adopted a pollcj of **non-Int®rt&rmnae and 
aeatr&lity Tim Bowers followed this lead. On July 31, 
British tensions having Inersnaed with ©acfe Turtelefe Tiotory 
and atrocity, tb,® British go¥#ra®ei4t b&rsly aurvl¥®d a great 
debate upon th@ g«E©r«l East«ra policy. At the eloee of th® 
fi®bat#,. Bartinnton, th® leader of tfe@ opposition, stated %hm% 
In general he agreed wltb the goir®ni«©nt's policybttt tbat 
h© objected to th® »®aias used to oarrj out that polley.^^ 
TMs %*aB not th® #nd of tJje goir@raae»t*s troubles, for» on 
August 11, th@ opposltioa launehed an inspirad attaek. 
Hareourt shouted tfaat Mrop@an opinion ''would support any 
Power that vould ©aan^ipst® Birop® from tk® cure# which 
afflicted her, and r©d«@a Christendoa froa th» 8iia®«'bj 
which sh® had too long dishonoured.This attack had 
its effect. If ths goT®ratt«nt were to remain in power, soae 
course of action would ha^e to toe initiated. 
Derby instructed Mr, ¥hit©, the British agent at 
Belgrade, to inform Prinee Milan that a request fro® hiai 
that the Powers extend their good offices for aediatlon 
29. Debldour, Histoire diploieatlque. II, 492f. 
30. Beaconsfield to Bradford. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life 
of Digraeli. 909. 
31. Ibid. 910. 
32. Ibid. 919. 
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would b@ favorably r©e©iv«<3 by df^at In two 
weeks, Milan acted upon this suggestion, and asked the 
Powers for their help In r®-»«tafelisbing peae®, H® stag-
gestftd that It would to® d©air&bl© to iaclud© Montenesro.^^ 
TMs country r®q««st«d Austria to act in h.®r toahalf in s®-
earing the ®id of tla.® Powers.This being aecompll«bed, 
th® Powers agreed that '*the c^s-sation of hostilities aiioald 
also apply to Bosnia mn& M@rs®govlaa. **^6 
S#soti«tiom® w«r« not interrupted by the palaee 
resolution whiels occurred at Constflintlnopl® on August 31#^'^ 
The new Sultan, 4bdul Saald, influenced by his First Minister, 
Mldhat, a d#fifilt® Angloplill®, s®©*@d to offer hope. Beaeons-
field, for one, was in a. ®ood of «latioa. H@ wrot^: **fha new 
Sultan, I h®sr, really proaisss. H© has got the Co»«ons' 
blu« book translated for Ma—a«d Forster's speeeh on 
* atrocities. It was not to b« vary long befor® Beacons-
field would regretfully »#« hia mistake, Just one day after 
the revolution, Derby instructed Elliot to propose to the 
Turkish govemaeat that it ̂ rsnt an araiatlce of not less 
33. French Diploffiatic Docufflents. 176f. 
3^. Ibid. 160. 
35. Ibid. I87f. 
36. Ibid. 188. 
37. Mowat, European Blploaacy. 226. 
38. Beaconsfield to Salisbury. Koneypenny and Buetele, Life 
of Disraeli. 9^3ff. 
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than a month's duratloa.^^ furMey did not accept the plan of 
an, armistic©, tout sent a m@uor&.ndum to the Pow«rs on S@pt#ab©r 
14,^0 It contained th® eoadltlons of peao® that would be 
meceptabl© to b«r. Upon l@a.Tniu^ from tb® Powers tbat a 
suspeMion of bostillti®-® was ace#pt«ble, furkej put an »aA 
to bostilitl®® until Sept@®b©r 25."^^ 
Botm of til® eo«€itlo»8 of p®ac® w«re eonai-
d«red iBftdMimsibl® by Britain. H#a.C0, Derby entered lato 
a series of negotiations witb the Powers for th© ptirpos® of 
d@Ylaing a pr-ogra® -wMoh would b® suitable to tb® Pow©rs a® 
a basis of pacification, the thr®© following point®, finally 
agreed upon, wer® presented to Turk«y s (1)' the statys quo for 
Serbia and Monteaegro; (2) adainistrativ# autonomy for Boenla-
lerssgoTisaj and. {31 a siisilar arrangeaeat for Balgarla-
details to to® worked out lat©r.^2 Turkey would aot agr®e to 
an araiatice, but prolonged tb® suspeaslon of boatilltl#a 
until October 2.^^ Priaee Kilan, thm Barbian ffionareb, would 
aot agree to a »©re suspension, but continued to deaand an 
araistice. 
On September 26 Russia proposed that, if Tus%ey 
should reject the teras of peace offered by the Powers, she 
should occupy Bulgaria, Austria should occupy Bosnia, and a 
39. French Dlploaatle gocutsents. 214, 
40. Hertslet, Map of Surope. 2482-87. 
Fygnch Diploaatlc Pocuaents. 215. 
42. Ibid. 198. 
^3. Ibid. 218. 
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united fl@@t of tfe# Powers should enter th© Bospboras.^^ 
Lord B@aeonsfi@ld r®aark#d that "England looks upon. th@ 
proposed occup&tlOR by Russia as a r®a.l Bulgarian atroeity. 
Til© British Cabinet rejected tix@ RussIrq proposal. It was 
ob-srlotts that Russia ted counted upon public opinion In 0rest 
Britain <01ad8ton®'s putsphlst tead appeared shortly before} 
to sufficiently iaflueoc® tlm go-rema»nt that it would f®el 
bouad to aid© with th® Russians. TMs was s ibIstake. 
ly October 3, Turl:@y had act aoc©pt«d th@ psoifica-
tion proi^raa eubaitte-d by th# Powers, and an additional 
suspensloa of hostlllti®®. had not b«@B arraaged. Consequent" 
ly, tbe w@r w«s resumed. ̂  Russia proposed to th@ Powers that 
th® bloodahed b® stopped laaediately by tli® iapositloa of a 
slx-w#®k true®.'^'^ fh@ Brltisli Cabiaet d®cid@d to «ce#pt 
th® proposal, llliot was instructed to infora Turkey that 
«h@ liuat either accept th® terms of psac®, or grant an i®-
B®dl8t0 araistic® of not l#ss than a Bonth; that, if sh® 
refused, he would be recalled and no further aid wuld be 
given to Turkey.^® How drastic a step this actually was can 
be 8©©a In the words of Besconsfleld: 
IMd. ai9. Se® also, O'« W. Ohrystal, tra^^lator, 
Meiaolrs of Friaee Chlodwts of aohealohe-Schillliai^sfuerst; 
Ml ted by Friedri eh Curtlus for Prince ^lejeaader of 
Hohenlohe-'Sehillinp.gfuerat {2 vols., Loadon, 1906T7 II, 181. 
45. Beaconsfield to Bradford. Moueypeimy and Buckle, Life 
of Siaraeli. 951. 
ya*®nch Siploaatie Docuaeats. 201. 
47. Ibid. 201. 
Ibid. 202ff. 
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Th©r« vr©r® great, and jiiat, otojeetions to this course, 
because, -when an Amteassator retires, h« cannot reap­
pear. All p«rsormal lnfluene« is lost, and in 1829, 
th« last tiffl© when the Effitoassles left Constantlnopl®, 
war hetwe-en. Russia and farkey instantlj ensued. 
tod j0t affaire had oo»e to such a pase, thro* th© 
coBduct of aiadstone and Co., that it was neces­
sary to try this l&st es,r<i—and it succ®«d@dl'^9 
Wh«n 8@acongfi©l€l wrote to Lady Bradford ®xpr®seing 
his Joy over th© Turtelsh aeceptano© of (m arntlstlce, h# knew 
th&t furltey had accepted with th« pro-vision that the armistie# 
was to b# of six-ffionth^'s duration, this pleased hl» for as h® 
s&ldg **this will giv® ue fer®sthing It didn't ocotar 
to hlffl that the Turkish provision alght he rejeetsd. Y©t, 
reject«d It was, on th® grotaoS that Serbia ^eould not keep 
its aray on a war footing for s«eh a length of tlaa© without 
putting too sever® a strain on its resources. "^Sl British 
pressure on Russia to induce her to force acceptance of th® 
slx-aonth sraistic® on Serbia availed nothing. Rusala felt 
that she now had the upp®r hand, and, by leading the way. 
Bight b« stole to procure the support of Britain. Once again 
Russia ®isjudg@d Lord B®aeonsfleld, He refused to bring his 
influence to b«ar on furltey that sh@ accept th© six-week 
aralstice, but added that he would not oppose any such de­
mands that other Powers might desire to aake.52 Before this 
49. Beaconsfleld to Bradford. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life 
of Disraeli. 952. 
50. Ibid. 952. 
51. Ibid. 952. 
52. Fi*eneh Diplomatic Docuaente, 212f. 
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r®ply had givan to the Russian Affibassador, & diploaatle 
attempt In another dlreotlon had l>®en made. Althomgh It 
failed, it aierlts narration, since it so aptly desct-th®® 
the extent to which Be&corisfleld was wllliBg to go in search 
for a solutioa to th« Eastern Question. 
H© b®ll®¥©A that Russia was th® r««.l threat to the 
psae® of Surop®j that sh®, alone, was reaponslbl® for th® 
present stat© of confusion, in th@ Bslk&nsj that, if h# eoulA 
find some me&ne short of war to thoroughly intlaldat® her, 
his subsequent filploaacy would he successful, fo hi®, there 
app@ar@fi tout on® method of aceoaplishiEtg this: the League of 
fhr«@ laperors aust h® brok@n, so that Russia would he d®-
prlved of that s®curity wMch per«itt®fl h©r to act so auda-
elously a® ®h® had in th# reeeat p«.®t. H@ knew th»t if he 
could effect a treaty with Q^raanj he would ha-r^ nullified 
th® efficacy of th© Thr»® Emperor's League. Derby, Sallehury, 
and th® Q«e®» w®r@ **g@a®rallf syspathetic** to the plan.53 
Blsfflsrcfc wa« approached without success. Beacons-
field felt strongly that Gladstone and Low® were responsibl® 
for th© failure. In a speech at Aylesbury, Beacoasfleld had 
®a<3e the stateasent that **the Qor&rament had not the 'unani­
mous' support of the country, but that a large party in the 
country was using the 'atrocity cry' for party purposes,**5^ 
Gladstone and Lowe changed the wording of the statesent so 
that it sounded as if Beaconsfield had a&ld that the 
53. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Plar&eli. 953. 
54. Ibid. 955. 
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Sovsmaeat was opposed to the feelings of tb® majority of 
the country, fhes© assertions, Beaconsfield said, ^had done 
r 
iamens© Ijara. in retarding oegotiatloas with Foreign. Powers on 
this qu@etion.*55 g® believed that Bisiaarck rsfused to enter 
liito a treaty with England on th# assuaiptlon that the country 
would not go al©ng with tti® 0ov©rBaent; sad that th# following 
"built up by Q-ladston# bad becoa® too pow«rful for the <}o"7era-
fflsnt to b® able to salntaiii its@lf. ¥fest®v©r the truth con­
cerning the reasoQS for BisMarok's reftasal might the 
fact reasln® that he respond®d to th® British proposal with 
only a polit® not®, >i'hieh stated that, whil# he sight have 
vishad that Russia -would ha-re accepted th© six-sonth arsls-
tice, h© didn't feel Justified in ©xercising a pr®asu3r^ on 
her.^ 
When th« furkish proposal for s six-moath araistic# 
was officially rejected by th© Russians, the Turkish arity was 
given orders to attack, fhe reeietsnce offered by the Serbe, 
heavily supported by Rueeian volunteers, rapidly collapsed. 
Town after town fell, until even the road to Belgrade was 
without defense.57 Ignatieff learned of this critical pos­
ition of the Serbian army Just when Lord Loftua, the British 
Affibaesador at Saint Petersberg, delivered a British note, 
stating that Britain had no intentions of advancing any 
fresh propositions.58 on the next day, October 31, Russia, 
55. IMd- 955. 
56* French Diplomatio Documents. 226. 
57. Debidour, Hiatoire dlploaatique. II, 496. 
58' French Siploffiatic Poeuaents. 227* 
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fearlng that sli© mast act st one® in order to s&ve Serbia, 
delivered an ultlaatuffl to Turkey.It dera&nded that Turfeey 
grant an armistice of fro® aix weeks to two Biontha, If 
this was not done wltMn forty-eight hoxars th® Russian 
Kffibassy was to be withdrawn. When Beaconafield r@e#iT©d 
this R®ws, lie adopted, for the ao®ent, an. extremely pessl-
aistic attitude. He ©atpreaeed Ms f«©ling.a wry plalBly 
In the excerpt of th© letter to Ladj Bradford which follows; 
A little after noon caa© th© awful news that 
Q^nl. Igiamtleff 'had r«e®iT®a ord«rs fro® Llfsdla 
to deliY@r tbe aad hostile ultiffiatum 
you ar# »ow w®ll aeq«alat@d with*. 
fMs was th@ eonaeq'aene® of th® ,furkiato victories, 
and tbe huslllatlon Emperor felt at tl3« 
probability of the farks reaohlng B«lgrad#. 
The pretext that th© Turics e»rrl©d on hostilities 
during negotiations for ar«lstl«® le quit® hollow, 
fhe Rsisso-SerTiitn arsy fess nev«r ceased attacking 
and har&sging th© Turks d'arliig the whole tia®. 
Besides,- negotiatlona for armistle© never suspend 
hOBtllltles as a matter of pablic law. 
What will happ»n now? I thlnlc it looks as black 
as possible. The whol® affair hae toe@n a coa-
spiraey of Russia from th© beginning, and sh» 
has failed in everything—even in active warfare 
the Port© haa defeated her. I don't think ah® 
can stand it, and she will rush to further reverses,®® 
Turkey accepted the conditions of the ultlBatum on Novaaiber 
1,^^ the armistice to be for two »onths rather than six 
weeks. 
59. Hertslet .v-4S»p^ 6f" Starop#, 2502f. 
60. Moneypanny and Buckle, Life of Plsraell. 958. 
61. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2504f, 
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fh® ©-rent of the armlstic© did not permit British 
diploaacy to r®st, Tfe^r© was th® matter of arrangiag for 
m conference of th» Powers aad tli© conference itself to con-
tto© British For«i-gn Offlc© and th® Pria« Miiii«t@r. TM®, 
however, will be diseuss«d at leogth in the next chapter. 
For th© pri&s#ntj it is well to r«view hrleflj th# 
dlploaacj of the tour aonth period Jiist passetft, Wh#ii it 
was affirmed that Serbia »®a«t to iesake war^. Britain requ@gt@<i 
of th® Po¥?®ra that they attempt to Indue# Serbia to »ala.taia 
p®ac#. In sMltiOD., a st®im waraiag w®8 giv&n Ruasis that, 
in th® «-?®nt of a furkieh victory, Britain wotild coBsid^r 
gravely any interf@r©no« by Eussia ia th® settleaent demand­
ed by farkey a» th« victor. fh®se steps did not prevent 
S®rbia and Montsaegro froa d#cl®riiig war. Britaia adopted 
a policy of '*non-i»t®rf@r«n@@ and neutrality,** and was sup­
ported in this policy by th® Powers. In August Britain 
auggested to Serbia that she ask for the mediation of the 
Powers in securing peaoe. Mediation followed, and a sua-
pensioR of hostilities (applying to Bosnia-Herzegovina also) 
was aade effective until Septeisber 25. Turkey subssitted a 
list of conditions upon which whe would willingly isalce peaG». 
The Powers devised a program of peace that would be acceptable 
to them, since some of the Turkish conditions were inadmis­
sible, Turkey did not accept, Imt granted an additional 
suspension of hostilities.^ This tera expired without any­
thing definite having been decided upon. War was resumed. 
Russia proposed that the powers iapose a six-week truce upon 
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the coatoatants, Britain and tfee other powers co-operated— 
Britain even golag so far as to threaten Turkej vlth a 
Britlah withdrawal of lier £®bsssy if furkey declined th© 
true®. Turkey accepted with th® proTlslon that the true® 
be for a slx-moTitto, p#rlod. Serbia, backed toy Russia» found 
this unacceptable to h#r, so tti« furkish ar«y pressed for­
ward successfully, Russia* fearing for Serbia, dlspatcbed 
an ultlaatua to Turik®y on th& last day of October. fJae terms 
of this ultifflatuia, tba.t furk«y grant an laaedlate ar«lstioe,s 
wer© accepted by T«rit®y. Tbus figbtlng ceased, fb® out­
standing fa.et tb&t ««©rg#s fro® tb® British diplomaey of 
tbls period 1# that Britain's first point of h®r Eastern 
diploaaey—that tb^re b@ & f»r^0y-ln-lurop@—was still a 
fact in. spit# of prsssur® froa tb® opposition, fb© Russian 
deslr# to adTaaee on tb® Straits was thwarted, Th@ British 
Ssplr® was not really threatened. 
CHAPfER III 
COSFEBENCl Am PROTOCOL 
file Goaferenc® of Coastantlnopl® wna a long time 
b«ing t>oTO. As early as M»j, 18T6, B®aeonsfl®lfi w»s Aware 
of a d@8lr© on th® smrt of momm of tb-e Powers for a Congr«8s 
or Conf®r«nc®. 1® wot#, on May 291 Is »o doubt 
ttiat Fr«.Tice Is strongly urging s. Coagr«»s, and, 1 aa 
ftssiired, at th® iBStsne® of Eussia,**^ a®, too, was In 
favor of a. gstlierlag of tto« Pow®rs, sM luforaed Derby 
that lie f#lt tfast & Goagress would to® "*tlae only practiesl 
solution In tfe© long run.^^ Despite this desire of thr®® 
of the Powers for & Conferene© it was not then brought 
about, beeause tis© Palae© rsTolution at Cons taut Inopl® 
and the subaequent witMr&vral of the Berlin M®BJoraiidum,3 
while not restoring order to Bosiila-H®rs@govlna, had ef­
fected a temporal^ eession of dlplomatie atteapts by the 
Powers to solre the lastera Question. The Serbo-Turkish 
War revived the Conference idea. On October 5» 1876, the 
British Foreign Office suggested to tbe governments of the 
1. Sir Sidney Lee, Kin^ Mward VII: A Bioj^raphy (2 vols., 
M.X., 1925), I, 418. 
2. Disraeli to Berby, iiay 31, 1876. Money penny and Buckle, 
Life of Maraeli, 902. 
5. Above, 18. 
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Powers that a Conference 1>@ This suggestion was 
initiated by D®rby after learning fro® Schouvaloff that 
•^this course would ffi@«t with the approval of his govern-
fflent.*'^ Andrassy expressed rslnctauce to agrse to a Con,f#r©ac® 
which Im thought could only lead to "abortive or dangerous 
results.Inetruetions *«r® forthwitli dispatclied to 
Buchanan, tb® British Aabasssdor at Vienna. He was to 
explain to tedrassy that the Coiaferenc® should aot as8@mtol« 
''until a basis should have been. arrarig@d which should de-
fin© the subjects to to-® eoaslder^d and secure their being 
confined witMn certain liaits . . . and , , , that all 
that is S8k@d of faim at present is that h@ should not 
ohJ«ct to th@ priaciple of a Conference. Andrassy, of 
cour®«, did not objeet. furkey, however, st tlils tia# 
advancing on the road to Belgr&d®,^ informed th® British 
Poreign Office that she absolutely protested against the 
proposed Conf©r«nee.^ fhus the Conference idea was again 
suspended. 
On November 4 a Cabinet Council decided that the 
British Foreign Office should issue a Circular inviting 
State Papers. V, 6?, 269ff. 
5. Ibid,. V. 67, 269. 
6. Buchanan to Derby. Ibid.. ?, 67, 270f. 
'«'• Ihld.. V. 67, 272f. 
8. Above, 34. 
9' State Papers. V. 67, 280f. 
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the Powers to a Conferonee to be held at Constantinople.^® 
Each governiaent was to appoint two Pleoipotentlarles, fli@ 
basis for the deliberations was to b@ as follows; 
1. Th® lad©p®n<3@nc@ and tb« t©rritorl&l 
integritj of tts® Ottoman Smpir®. 
2, A d©elaratiOB that th® Powers do not la-
tend to &@®k tor, and will not s@«l: for, any ter­
ritorial ad-^antagas, any exelwsiv® Influence, or 
any conoe-ssion with regard to th© comaeroe of their 
subjects, which thos© of #v@ry other nation aay not 
aqually obtain. . . . 
3« fh® bft8#e of pacification proposed to th© 
Porte on the 21st of 8#pt@«ber, vis.:— 
(a.) The status quo. gp@a«ing roughly, tooth 
as ragards S®r"fia and }ioiit®n®gro. 
(b.) That the Port® should siaultaneouslf 
undertake, in a Protocol to b® signed at Constanti­
nople with the Representatives of th® Mediating 
Powers, to grant to Bosnia and H€?rz@govlna a syst®® 
of local Institutions which ah^ll give th© popul­
ation Bom® control over their own local affair® and 
guarantees against the ©xerclse of arbitrary author­
ity. 
'fh®r® is to b© no question of th« creation 
of a tributary Stat®, 
Suarantaies of a slsilsr kind to b« also pro­
vided agalnat -»alRdalnlstratlon in Bulgaria, fhe 
refoms already agr®®d to by the Porte in the not® 
addressed to the Representatives of the Powers on 
the 13th of February last, to be included in th© 
administrative arrangeaent for Bosnia and th© 
Herzegovina, and so far as they say be applicable 
for Bulgaria.11 
By Moveaber 20 all the Powers had accepted the 
invitation to th© Conferenee.^^ Russia had expressed a 
desire to oalt the word "territorial'* froa point one of 
the basis, since she thought It would still be necessary 
10. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli« 959. 
11. Kertslet, Map of Europe. 25l6f. 
12. State Papers. V. 67, 297-322. 
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to occupy certain Turkisli provinces.However, sh# 
finally accepted the British progr&a as it stood Ctel 
quel)Turkey accepted thm invitation to the Goaf«renee 
only after Britain vamed ber that a refusal would result 
in th® witiidrawiil of ''all support snd eouriteneac© froo 
the Porte.**^5 
Mone of the Fow®rs west to tfe@ Conf©r®n.€® with 
much optiaisffi. fh# British and Russian pre-Coaf«r©uee 
attitudes wer® clearly revealed in spemehes and diploa&tic. 
exchanges. On Lord Mayor's Day, iovember 9, Beaconsfield 
spok© in a, tone that i^&s described by Ms domestic critics 
as on® of "warllfc© deflanc®.*^^ H® said that th© object 
of the Qovemffient ^&b to secure psace toy obserranc-e of ttae 
frsaties of 1856 and 1871» and to s#eure ma aaelloration 
of the condition of the Turkish subjects.^*^ The passage 
which caused so aueht ®xcitea®nt follows; 
I affi bopaful, in the pr#s©»t t#®p©r of Europe, 
we sfaall atol# to accoapllsh the objects we bav« 
in view without thot« terrible appeals to war, of 
whicto, I think, we have beard too frequently and 
too sucb. . . » fteer© la ao country so interested 
in the ffiaiatenanc® of peace as &igland. Peace is 
especially an English policy, Sbe is not an 
sggreesive Power, for there is laothiag which she 
desires. She covets no cities and no provinces. 
What she wishes is to saititsiia and to enjoy the 
3-3. Ibid.. V. 67, 299. 
14. Ibid., V. 67, 303. 
i3. Ibid.. V. 67, 317. 
16. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Msraeli. 9^2, 
IT. Ibid. 963. 
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unexampled eapire which she has built up, and which 
it is her prid© to remeober exists as much upon 
sympathy ss upon force. But although the policy 
of England is peace, there is no country so well 
prepared for war as our own. If ah© enters into 
conflict in & righteoua cause—and I will not 
believe that England will go to war except for a 
righteous eaus@--if the contest is on® which con­
cerns her liberty, her independence, or her empire, 
her resources, 1 feel, ar® inexhauatihle. She is 
not a country that, wh®n she enters into a cao-
paign^ has to ask herislf "whether 8h© can support 
a second or a third campaign* Sh@ enters into 
a campaign which she will not teriBlnate till right 
is done.lS 
On tb© following daj^ without .knowing of Beacons-
field's ap®®eh, Emperor Alexander addressed the nobility 
and Municipal Council of Moscow, fh® European Press 
erroneously reported the sp©@ch an answer to Beacons-
field, which, of course, caused a alslnt«rpr@tatlon toy 
the public. Comparing th© following passage of Ssperor 
Alexander's speech with th® abov® pAssage fro® Beacons-
field's, one can readily a©© th® tenseness of Europe at 
this tiffi®. 
Negotiations will coffioence shortly at Oon-
stantinopl® between th© Great Powers to bring 
about a peaceful arrangement, My ardent wiah 
is for a peaceful &gre«sent. Should we not 
obtain from th® Port© such guarantees for carry­
ing out th® reforas w@ hav® a right to deaand, 
I aas firmly d»terffiln®d to act independently; 
and I aiB oomrineed that the whole of Russia 
will support »e, should the honour of Russia 
require it, and that Moscow will give the ex-
aaple. May God help us to carry our sacred 
ffllasion,19 
IS* Ihid, 964. The **app«als to war" of which Beaconsfield 
spofee were those of Russia, 
19. Lord Augustus Loftus, Th© Biplofflatjc Reasinlacences of 
Lord Augustus Loftus, P.O., a,C,B.. 1662^1879 (second series, 
2 Tols., London, 1894), II, 194. 
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As if in substantiation of the Sasperor's speech, 
the British Foreign Office received information concern­
ing Russian war preparations. It was reported that 8,000 
tons of lead were "being toroiight to Russia, and that the 
Russlsn Army had placed an order for 800,000 pairs of 
boots. The ton© of the Rwseian press was depicted as 
being exceedinglj hostile; & large section of societj 
was supposedly dlsappoiated at the eouclusion of the 
Armistice I and a desire for war was **eTln.ced by a great 
portion of the mrmy On Sowatoer 18 Derby learned that 
a portion of the Russian Army had been mobilized,Ar®@d 
with this knowledge the British Qo-vemfflent was scarcely 
disposed to believe in the peaceful liiteations of Russia, 
which were convejed to Derby by Loftus, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He had had, on l^oyeaber 
2, a long talk with Isaperor Alexander, who, with great 
detail, had gone into the matter of Russo-British relations. 
The dispatch did not reach the British Foreign Office until 
Sovefflber 18.^2 it did little to allay British suspicions 
of Russia, though it is true that the British Oovemaeat 
believed that the Eussian krmj would not march until 
spring. 
20. Doria to Derby (received !4ovember 13). State Papers. 
V. 6T, 307f. 
21. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2519. 
22. Ibid. 2506-12. 
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On Moveiaber 20 Lord Salisbury, the Indian Seer©-
tarjj was appointed to represent Sngland conjointly witli 
Sir Renry Elliot at the Conference of Constantinople, His 
formal instructioas stated that the isisedlate necessity was 
**to restore tranquillity to the disturbed Provinces.fhis 
•was going to be a reel chore. The crux of the tblng lay la 
©.sta'olishing *^religious liberty** and ''administrative raforas. 
The Powers wer© to he pemltted to demaad that sseurity he 
provided "for carryiag those aeasurea into operation. In 
addition, "it would b© oecessarj that soaa© steps should be 
taken to establish an equitable aystes of taxation before 
deciding on the distribution of the funds to be a&d© appli­
cable to local purpos®s.**26 aost iaportant phr&s© of 
the instructions was the last sentence, which read—'"should 
the Turkish Government reject these proposals, the British 
Government will reserve to itself entire liberty as regards 
its policy.**27 Salisbury left England early enough to per-
slt hiffi to oake a tour of the European Capitals. In Paris 
he saw Deoases, the French Foreign Minister, and Marshal 
MRCMahon;28 Berlin the Eisperor William I, the Crown Prince 
23. Stat® Papers. ¥. 68, 1064-80. 
2^* IMd. 1064-73. 
25. Ibid. 1064-73. 
26. Ibid. 1064-73. 
27. German Dlplogatlc Documents. I, 44, 
28. French Diploaatlc Document, 256. 
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and Princess and Prince Biaiaarcki^^ in Vienna Count Andrassy;^® 
and In Rome Prince Huabert and several Italian minlaters.^^ 
fhe tour went far toward establishing a sociable ataospher# 
for the Conference. 
The Conference was preceded by preliainarj discus­
sions lasting fro© Decem'ber 11 to 22. These discussions, to 
whleli Turkey was not admitted, ̂ eve under the Presldencf of • 
Senersl Ignatleff, the Russian Plenipotentiary.52 g© easily 
brought Salisbury under his influence, and to® Prellmlnai^ 
discussions reflectad more Rusaiaa thinking than British. 
Elliot attributes this to Salisbury's lack of knowledg® of 
Turkish affairs.33 Salisbury, it is true, felt the need of 
Britisfct-Russlan understanding and was willing to aaJg:© eon-
cesaious.^^ These concessions were not all in accord with 
Beaconsfleld's viewpoint. As a matter of fact, h© waa quit® 
disgusted vlth his representative and said, ̂ *Sal. seems most 
prejudiced, and not to b© aware, that his principal object, 
in being sent to Const., is to keep the Russians out of 
29. German Siploffiatie Docuaents. I, 59. 
30. state Papers, V. 66, 1082f. 
31. Ibid. 1084f. 
32. French Diplomatic Docuw^nte. 267. Contains a 153 pag® 
appendix covering the pr®liffiinitt^ and regular mestings of 
the Conference. 
33. Sir Henry G. Slllot, Soae Revolutions and Other Diplo­
matic Sxperlences {London, 1922), 276ff. 
34. Langer, luropean Alliances. 105. 
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furk«y, not to ereat® an Ideal ©xlstenc® for Turklsb Xtlans.'^^S 
The demands formulated by th© Powers were, brleflj, as follows; 
Serbia was to be left as before the war, Montenegro 
was to gain a port on the Mrlatie, two states were 
to be formed to include the Bulgarians in the eastern 
Balkans and these states were to have soae control 
over their local affairs; for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
a thorough scheae of refonas was proposed. An in­
ternational cotBisission was to supervise these change® 
and an international gendjiraerie of 6000 sen was to 
secure their execution.56 
Ignatieff referred to these demands as the "irreducible »in-
isiuffi,"^*^ because he had had to surrender the Russian occu­
pation plan, and would surrender no more. The demands were 
to be subaltted to Turkey at the first meeting of the Con­
ference; she could accept or reject, but she could not ne­
gotiate. Such was the will of Ignatieff. On the last day 
of the Preliminary Dlscusalon I>®rby sent a dispatch to Sal­
isbury warning hi® that England would not consent to coer­
cive aeasuree against turkey. Turkey was to be told that 
she could not expect assistance from Britain in ease of war. 
In the event of a Turkish refusal to accept the demands Sal­
isbury and Elliot were to return home, leaving the Efflbassy 
in the hands of a Secretary.^ 
The flrat meeting of the Conference, under the 
Presidency of Safvet Pasha, Turkish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, took place Deceaber 23In the midst of 
35. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 983. 
36. Tyler, Euf^pean Powers. 75. 
37. Dlllot, Some Revolutions. 285. 
38. State Papers. ¥. 68, 1090. 
39. Qeraan Diploffiatic Docugents, I, 44. 
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<liscussloRs the delegates were interrupted by the booming of 
canaon.^ Safvet Pasha explained that a new constitution had 
Just been promulgated. This constitution was the work of 
Mldhat Pasha, who had toecoia® <Jran<3 Vizier only four days 
pre'riouslyBeacosasfield, speaking of Midhat's ascension, 
indulged in undsrstatenent when he said, ^ther© was a ehsnge 
of Qovernment yesterday at Constantiaopl©, but I doubt whether 
that will help He w&Sj of course, antlclpatiag the 
proiaulgation which had been reported in the aaking s® early 
as October, Haturally this e'fent greatly disturbed th® nor-
aal course of th© Conference, Midhat desired to present the 
Constitution to th® Conference in a formal way, but th® dele­
gates would have rK)n» of that, Elliot 8Ug6®sts that this was 
a grievioua error on th© part of tha Powers, because as h© asld; 
. , , if the offer had been accepted th® Powers 
would hav#- obtainsd an eiigag«»®nt llttl® less 
binding than & formal treaty, and would have se­
cured the right of authoritatlYely inslstlns that 
its provisions should be reapeeted; and, though 
the Sultan mi^t, perhaps, endesTour to evad© it, 
h© could not have ventured, as he afterwards did, 
openly to repudiate it; for he would have known 
not only that the Powers would sternly reailnd him 
of the engagement he had taken towards the», lm% 
that they would be supported in their protest by 
th© ioaense aajorlty of hia own subjects.^3 
An examination of Beaconsfield's writings at this tlae clearly 
reveals that the British CfOvemsent had little hope of suc­
cess at the Conference. Beaeonsfleld was striving to get 
4o. Langer, European Alliances. 107. 
yrench Piploffiatlc Pocuaeots. 267. 
%2. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 960. 
43, Elliot, Borne Revolutions. 250. 
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ffiilitarj preparations under way, and seemed to be a.i»ing 
at the protection of Constantinople againet Russia and the 
acquisition of a post in the Near East.^^ Russia had aot 
stopped her program of military preparations. In fact, Franc® 
was the only Power which seeaed to believe that the Conferenc© 
might b® successful.̂ 5 jt is quit© certain that the Powers, 
believing and acting && they did, were reasonably confident 
that Turkey would refuse the '^Irreducible ainlaum," When 
th® Turks offered the quit® liberal conetitutlon (providing 
for a Legislative Body of two Houses» and coaplst© religious 
libertythey offered their aaxiaus. It would seem to 
the author that Elliot was right in suggesting that the 
Powers made a aistska in not settling for the Constitution. 
As waB expected, the Turks refused to accept the de­
mands, even though Salisbury strongly m^'ged acceptanee and 
told them that England would withdraw all support in ease of 
refusal.Safvet Pasha proposed a prolongation of the Armis­
tice until March, Ignatleff acquiesced, and the Powers gave 
their adhesion to the proposal, Serbia and Montenegro were 
kB. notified of the additional armistice. Odian Sffendl was 
eent from Turkey to confer with the British Foreign Office. 
He told Derby that Turkey could not accept the demands, not 
44. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 970-86. 
45. Tyler, European Powers. 80. 
^6. French Diplomatic Docuiaents. 272-83-
^7' Ibid, 270. 
48. Ibid. 292. 
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because of the proposed refortas as mucli as because of the 
guarantees deaanded for their exacuiion. He added tbat 
Turkey had 600,000 men under arms and would face a campaign 
with Russia rather than accept dlshouor. Derby imiaedlately 
informed Salisburj of th« contsnta of this coirimuiiication, 
Th® Powers then, resorted to negotiation with Turksj. On. 
January 12 they submitted a modified plan to Turkey and as­
serted that this would be the last reduction of desaads., 
that, if the latter were not accepted^ the Conference would 
b© at en end,50 f^e roodified plan still contained the '^points 
relative to the International Gommiesion, and to the aoalnation 
of the Valis (Governors) with the previous consent of the 
Powers."51 fhss© were the guarantees for execution which 
Turkey had InforiBed Derby that they would never acc«pt. On 
January 17 a Turkish Grand Council rejected the plan. Sal­
isbury reported that **the Sultan was anxious to accept the 
terms of the Powers, but the Grand Vial@r was resolved upon 
resistance, and brought the proposals before the Council in 
such a for® that their rejection was a foregone conclusion.**^® 
fhis was not very accurate reporting. The Grand Council of 
237 persone^^^ coaprlsed the laost laportant personages of the 
Empire, including Mahometans, Christians, Greeks, and Araenians. 
49. State Papers. V, 68, 1094ff. 
50. Ibid., V. 68, 1105. 
51. Ibid.. Y. 68, 1102. 
52. Ibid.. V. 68, 1103. 
53. Ibid.. V. 68, 1103. 
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*¥lt1aout a slngls dissentient voice the Council pronounced 
an unequivocal rejection of the Pro.posals conoernlng the 
noailnation of Governors and the international CoMlssions. *5^ 
On the ninth and last meeting of the Conference, January 20 
Turkey agreed to accept a proposal put forward toy Andrasey, 
which called for the astablishment of "tv;o Comsilsslons coifi-
posed of equal numbers of Christians and Musaulffians, freely 
elected by the Inhabitants of the provinces. "^5 fpiie powers 
refused to accept this last possible chance of conciliation. 
Thus^ the Conference ended in coffiplet© failure. Salisbury 
and Slliot returned to England, leaving Mr. Jocelyn as 
Charge d*AffaIr«s. 
The failure of the Conference left Russia and Turkey 
oppoaed to one another, Seither, in her position^ had any 
visible support froa any other power. Russia could march 
Into Turkey, or sha could wait to see if Turkey would grant 
the desired reforms. Sh# decided to wait, and, in the »ean-
tirae, try s^jain to gain the support of the Powers for her 
anticipated venture, 
Turkey's rejection of the Conference proposals 
placed Russia in a serious position. Very strong pressures 
were being brought upon the Governraent by various organs 
of the Russian Press. The original outburst of national 
feeling had become, by this tiae, a fanatically religious 
Elliot, Some Revolutions, 289. Loftus, Olploffiatic 
Realnieceneea. II, 201, Is In sgrseaent with Elliot. 
55. Slliot, Some Revolutions. 288. 
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ffioveaient, wfelch waa deaaoding Euasian Interventloa to al­
leviate th© suffering of the brothers in the furkisb Sispire.^^ 
It would be difficult for tli@ Qovernffieiat to satisfy its sub­
jects with any action short of war, but (k>rtcliakoff intended 
to try. On January 19, even before the last meeting of the 
Conference, he issued a Circular Dispatch. Be noted that 
the Powers had reached agreement at the Coaferenc© as to 
the measures relative to condition® of peace and to reforas, 
wbich were subaitted to Turkey and subsequently rejected by 
her. This rejectloa called for further action, but he de­
sired to know what the other Powers Intended doing before 
originating an iadividual Hussian action. He still believed 
that, if there were any possibility, the Powers should pro­
ceed in common.57 it was obviously difficult for Britain 
to answer this dispatch, since her view ws^ that nothing 
further could be done, that the Powers should at least wait 
to see what progress would be aade under Turkey's new con-
stitution. Derby drafted a reply which was wholly unac­
ceptable to Beaconsfield, whose inatructions to Derby for 
a revision of the draft follow; 
. . . There runs throughout all Qort {chakoff]} ' s 
circular an assuaptlon as to the raieon d* etre 
of the Conference. 
fhe Powers were mediators: they were invited 
by the Porte to mediate: by no one was the pos­
ition of the Powers, as mediators, and the char­
acter and object in which, and for which, they 
36. Loftus, Piploiaatic P.effiiniscencea. II, 137, contains 
a good account of the ffioveeent. 
57. State Papers. V. 68, 1104. 
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ffiad© tli©s® proposals to Turkej, more clearlf de­
fined than hj the PlenlpoftsntiarleQs of Russia at 
the Conference. 
As w© were all Be^iators only, the refusal of 
the Porte to adopt oar r©coam©n<iatlo»s was no of­
fence to the dlgnltj of Itirope. 
tlffie would aot allow »@ to attempt a ®t;etch, 
even were I physically capable, but I throw out 
the8® rough iln®6. 
If the draft is to reas-la, s@© that the word 
reform J ete.» do not occur too often» and too 
slangishlj.58 
The reply» as flRally subaltted to Russia, was eonstrueted 
along the liaes desired by Beaeoasfleld. It po«itl¥ely re­
jected the supposltioa that furk«y had Insulted the Pow®r® 
by refusin.g to &cc®pt the Conf@r@oe© proposals.59 
Qortchakoff was persistent in hia attempts to re­
vive the concert of Pow«ra, or, probably better said, in 
his att®fflpts to rec@i"ve a. «an4at# froa the Powers for In-
di'Tidual Russian action, fowrd th© last of February he 
sent General Iga&tieff on «.ia ©xtraorfiinsry alssioii. Ara@d 
with a Protocol, Iguatieff mad® a roundi of the Capitals of 
lurope seeking to indue® the Powers to sign th® Protocol 
when it would b© presented in London.On March 5 Bisaarck 
announced that (Jermany was in agreement with the «ch®a© and 
would cofflEunicate this fact to London and Vienna.England 
was little influenced by the action of Bisffiarek, Ignatleff's 
alssion was not welcoffl© in England, and Beaconsfield expressed 
58. Beaconsfield to Derby. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of 
Disraeli. 999. 
59. Langer, European Alliances. 114, 
Qerman Diploaatlc Documents. I, 48. 
61. Ibid.. I, 49. 
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bis views In these wr^s: **111© I^atieff arrival is a 
thunderbolt; nothing e [oul] d ba aor® inopportune . . . ,'*62 
Ignatieff was in England froa January 16 to January 22.^^ 
During this short stay hm fouad supporters among the oppos­
ition and th@ (3overttffl.#nt mssibers who^ had shown an @sp®cial 
Interest In th# caus® of the Eastern Ghrlstiari®. This caused 
the Cabinet to giv® a aor# careful consideration to th® Pro­
tocol than jBlght otherwise h&v® beam given. Queen fictorla 
a little worried, that tb® Cabinet might wsak«», so 
she wrote the following to her Priae Minister: 
Th« qu8©» . , . trusts th@ Cabinet will b# verj 
firp, and Lord D^rby eeaaed so jasterday. She 
is prepared to apeaM or write to goo<S but u«rvou« 
and @o«@what weak, and s©atl««atal Lord Carnarvoa, 
if necassary, as wall as to Lord Salisbury. This 
isawteiah sentifflentality for psopl® who hardly de-
eerre ths nam® of r@al Ghristiaiis, as if thoy ware 
fflor® G-od's cr®atur®8 sad our fallow-eraaturas than 
every other nation abroad, and forgetting th® great 
interests of this great eountry—is really 1q06»-
pr^hensibl® 
fhe Cablnat reBstalnad flra. It rajacted tha Pirotocol as sub­
mitted by Ignatieff, because of the Russian desire that Tur­
key demobilize while she reaalned armed.^5 
After th© departure of Ignatieff, Schouvaloff revised 
the Protocol and resubaitted it to the British Cabinet, 
negotiations ensued. Finally, on March 31, the London 
62. Beaconsfield to Bradford. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life 
of Disraeli. 999f. 
63. German PiploBiatic Documents. I, 48. 
64. Moneypenny and Euekle, Life of Pisraeli. 1002. 
65. Gera&n Blploffiatle Docuaients. I, 50. 
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Protocol was signed by the repr-esentatlTas of the six Powers. 
It stated that the Powers desired to aaintaln the agressent 
established between th«m at th© Conference of Constantinopi© 
as regards the proposed reforms for Boania-HerzegOTlna and 
Bulgaria; that they "take cognlxanee of the conclusion of 
peace with, Serble^ 28th February, 1877'^*j that they consid@r 
a rectification of the frontier of Montenegro to b® d«slratole; 
that they inifite th® Port^ to place ite araies on a psac® 
footing; that they hope furkey ®will apply energetieally 
such ffi©aa«res a,s will cause . . . effective lmprovej®®at in 
th® condition of the Christian populations'*; that they in-
t«tid to watch over "the sarmer in which the proaissB of 
th® Ottoman Government are carried into effect**; and that 
if the condition of the Christians is not isproved they 
will consider In common as to the ffleaae which they may 
deem best fitted to secure the wllbelng of the Christian 
populations, and the lnt«r®sts of the general peace. 
The wording of this Protocol was such that it appeared that 
the Powers were truly united, and determined to force their 
will upon Turkey, but this was far fro© the truth. Three of 
the Powers signed the Protocol with reservations, Russia 
stipxilated that Turkey ®ust send a Special Envoy to St. Peters­
burg to negotiate disarmament, and stated that disaraament 
would cease if new massacres occurredItaly declared that 
she would be bound by the Protocol only "so long as the 
66, Hertslet, Hap of Europe. 2563ff. 
6T. Ibid. 2566. 
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agreeaent . . . all the Powers'* was aalntalned;^^ 
and Inglaud reserved the ris^t to eonslder ths Protocol null 
and void If **reciprocal disaraaiaen.t on. the part of Russia and 
Turkey, and peaee between ttiea** w«r© aot attained.̂ 9 
the reservations of tii© three Powers rendered the document 
practically worthless. D«rby etaluated th© Protoeol accur­
ately in. tills report to th# Qiteens 
Lord Derbj never has and is not now, sangMin© 
of the suceess of tbls domaent In ©nsarlag p®ac®j 
but as it la now worded. It can do no har.« even, if 
it falls to do any good: md it will at least pre­
vent til# Russlftti Qo¥enia#nt: from throwing th©. blaae 
on England, If war ensues; whlcb assuredly would 
lia"«r© been don,® If signature had h&mn refused. If 
th© Russian Effiperor Is sljie#r® In hi® alleged ds-
aire .for an excms© to ©nable Ma to disarm, he toas 
got what b@ wants; If not, we are oaly wh®r@ w® w®re, 
neither teetter aor wora® than l>#for«,70 
In th© saa® Cabinet asetlng in which it was decided 
to sign tb# Protocol, Mr. Layard w»» appointed Interla Aabas-
sador a t Coastantinopl© iti p l ac® o f  Sir Benry E l liot.This 
appointffleat was looked upon as sa unfrlandly deaonstration 
tov&rd Russia, because Lsyard was considered «v©n sor© Turk-
ophll© than Elliot, It was supposed that furkej would accept 
the appolntaent as an Indication that England meant to ^hold 
to her traditional policy of protecting Turkey.*"^2 schouval-
off was such disturbed by th© appolntaent, especially as It 
68. Ibid. 2566. 
69. Ibid. 2567. 
70. Buckl®., fhe Letters. 5^^. 
71• Qeraan Diplomatic Documenta. I, 50. 
72. Ibid.. I, 50. 
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occurred siaultftneously with the signing of th® Protocol. 
It was only natural that Layard gbould have received his 
appointment then, because th© Protocol charged the Powers 
to observe th© actions of Turkey through their representa-
ti'srea at Constantino pi®. What was not a generally teown 
fact was that B®aconflfi@ld had long d«sired to replace Elliot» 
and this wag an opportune time alnc® h@ was than In England. 
As ®arly as August 1^ 18?6, Beaconsfi@ld told Derby that 
**Slllot ["hsd^ shown a la«®ntatol@ want of energy and defic­
iency of information throughout. **'^5 A week later he told 
hi® that "Elliot has ®aay excsllant qualities, both aorsl 
and lntell®otual, but ha has not energy. This is probably 
the con8®qu®n©e of his wretched health; but, what[®v®jr the 
eaus®, the result i® the 
Turkey rejected th® Protocol, becauee, as she said, 
it was both an attack on the dignity of Turkey and, because 
of the stipulation calling for supervision of reforms by 
t h e  P o w e r s ,  a  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  1 8 5 6 . T h e  
Powers were now no further than they had been before the con­
vening of the Conferenc© of Constantinople. All the negoti­
ation at the Conference and concerning the Protocol was un­
availing. True—Turkey and Serbia were at peace, but not 
Turkey and Montenegro, and it looked as if Montenegro was 
being obstinate. The terms they offered for peace were the 
75. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 918. 
7^* Ibid. 921. 
75. French Biploiiiatlc DocuiEent®. 356-64. 
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proposals of the Confer®nce and the port of Spiaza, plus 
three islands in lak© Scutari On March 19» before the 
signing of the Protocol, the Ottoisan Parliament was opened 
for the first tlm©.'^'^ Russia still had two choices—to 
give the new constitution a chano© to bring about the de-
aired reforms, or to »areh her armies acroas th® Turkish 
border now that th© Protocol was reje0t©d, 
76. Ibid. 3^1f. 
77. Hertslet, Map of Europe, 2531. 
CHAPTSR IV 
BRITISH SEOTRALITY IE RPSSO-fURIISe WAR 
Saiperor Alexander, on April 19» 1877 ga'^© th© 
Russian ansles orders to eross the Turkish frontiers,^ 
and CSortchakoff, on tli® same day, issued a circular dis­
patch to the GoverBs«Bts of the Interested European Powers. 
This dispatch *iot®d th© fact that all efforts for a con-
ciliatorj agre@«ent had failed;, tliat the Porte had resisted 
@verj '*und©rstandlag established between the Gabiaets"; 
that the Porte had Juat refused to sign th© London Protocolj 
and that **in these circuastances, every chanc© is closed 
for efforts of conciliation.*^ Th® dispatch continiaed: 
There reaains no altern-atlf® but to allow the 
state of thiog# to eontinu® which the Powers have 
declared Incoispatlbl® with their interests and 
those of Europe in general, or else to seek to 
obtain bj coercion what the urianlaoue efforts 
of the Cabinets hare not succeeded In obtaining 
from the Porte by persuasion. 
Our august naster has resolved to undertake this 
work, which His Majesty had Inrlted the Great Powers 
to pursue in cosaon with hia. 
He has given his armies the order to cross the 
frontiers of Turkey. . . ,3 
1. State Papers. V. 68, 840. 
2. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2586f. 
3. Ibid. 2587. 
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Th0 Russlaa resort to war, foraallzsa by a declar-
atloia 4at®d April 24,^ was taken in spit® of the fact that 
Turkey and. Serbia had negotiated peace, Bulgaria was ©njoy-
iRg coBplet® trsnqulllitj under the surveillance of Turkish 
r^ftgular troops, and the devastated -rlllsges lu Bulgaria **w©re 
being rapidly rebuilt.Montenegro wse «till fighting des­
perately, but th® furks laad shown gr#at wllllagn«»s to graat 
peace og the statug quo aat®»^ ftee insurreetloa In Bosnia® 
Heraegovlna was still ragiiig. The furkigh ariaj, howster, had 
been greatly streiigthened'^ by this tlffi®, so that It appeared 
as If Turkey would bs abl« to resolve th© situation. In view 
of th#©© facts EnglaM f@lt th&t the war w«& unjustifiable, 
Loftus, British Aab&saador at St. Pttsrsburg, approaehed 
Qortchakoff with the pogelblllty of «@diatloB, but was told 
®that It was too lat®, as th# Russian troops. If sot already 
in aoT®a©iit, were on th® eve of aarehing.'^® 
The Russian advaac® against Turkey seeaed a bold 
and careless ao^®, because h«r flank was cospletely ex­
posed to Austria, who had definite interests in th© Balkans. 
It had heen reeogalsed for a loag tia« that Austria k#pt 
her ®yes turned southw&rd, and ®v®a harbored tha hof® 
that she sight one day be in Salonika. It was difficult 
French Dlploaatlc Boouaents. 
5« Elliot, SoffiQ ReTOlutiOB®. 274, 
6. Abo'^e, 56f. 
?. above, 49. 
8. Loftus, Dlploa&tle Re»inlecenc«8. II, 213. 
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to understand how Austria, with these aspirations, eould 
allow Russia to freelj inarch into tha Balkans. The aaswer 
to this ©nigsa was contained in a long series of secret 
negotiations b«tw#en Russia and Austria. On Julj 8, 1876, 
the two countries had come to an agreement in a Secret 
Conference of Helchstadt.9 The subsequent ©rents la th© 
Balkan tangle sad® it necessary that th® two couQtrl@s 
h&v® a new agreeaent. fhls was achieved hj th© Secret 
fr®atf of Budapest, of Jsnuary 15, 1877.^^ Under this 
treaty, Austria agreed. In eas« of war between Russls. and 
Turkey, ®to ol>g«rv@ &n attitude of benevolent neutrality 
in the presenc© of th® isolated action of Russia, and hy 
its diploaatic aotlou. to par&ljz®, bo far &s this ["lay] In 
its power, efforts at isterfsatlon or collectlT® mediation 
which ffllght be attempted by other Powers,In retura 
for this, Austria w&s to to® allowed to occupy Bosais-
Heraegovina whenever It d©sir®d.^^ fh©re were lifflitstions 
placed upon the radlue of »lllt«ry actions of both Russia 
and Austria, and Serbian and Montenegrin troops could 
join Russia in military action. On March 18 an additional 
conTentlon was signed. This validated th® agreeaetit of 
9. A. F, Pritoraa, fh® Secret freatle® oj Augtria-HaQF^ary. 
1879-1914 (2 volE.."gaabrldg©, 1921), II, iSff. Austrian 
and Russian texts ar« at variance, in ®xc®lient discussion 
of this agr«®ffi©n.t Is contained in Lan^r, Suropean Allian&ee. 
92f and Tylar, European Powera. 67f. 
10. Pribram, Secret Traatlea, II, 191-203. 
li* IMd.. II, 195. 
12. Ibid.. II, 197, 
-61-
January 15, eoaprlsed the territorial adjustaents to 
to© made If Russia were victorious.^5 fjirough these agr®®-
a®Bts Russia's flank was fully pr©tect®d. tootlier set of 
negotiationa had been n,©e®ssary. Russia did not h&v« a 
fl®®t in. th© Blftck 3@« suffiel»ntly largs to permit her 
to attack Turk#y from that direction* fhua she had to 
secure the prlYilsge of iWTin.g h®r troops through Sua&nia. 
On 4prll 16 Rui®aiiia aad Bussia sigaed two conizations 
which regulated th« passsg# of Russian troopa.^^ 
fh® Bussian dscl&ratlon of w»r, while not a sur­
prise in aasland, w»s a highly proTOcativ® ©Tent, fwo 
distinct resctioas occurred! on® captained by tJladston®; 
th® other, by %i®«n Yictoria aaid h©r Prlis® Minister. 
Gladstone su1»ltt@d a series of r«®.olutlon» to Parllaireat, 
which were alaost a plea that England Join Russia in h®r 
^uaanitarian ertts&d®-.^^ H® fomad littl® support for this 
ignoaiaious policy, Qn th« other hand, th® inaction headed 
toy th® ^##n and h«r Minister was aarkedly anti-Russian. 
Victoria's words to Beaconsfield mak.® this apparent: 
. . , there ought to h@ an und@rstandlng that 
we cannot allow the Russians to occupy Constan-
tlnopl», and that w« sast a®» that this is proa-
is@d or th@ coiis®qu,@ne®B say h® serious. To 
let It be thought that w# shall nevar fight and 
that En^andv irlll^suteStittto ̂ Igy^t :'fe#iggutmder 
Russia would h® to ahdlcat® th# position of 
13. Ibid. . II, 199-203. Cat© of si^atur® found in Tyl«r» 
European Pow#rs. 8lf. 
1%. Hdrtslet, Map of Surop®. 2576-85. 
15. Money penny and Buolcle, Life of Disraeli. 100$. 
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Great Britain as on® of th© Great Powers—to 
which she ii®T®r will aubalt, and eoother »ust 
wear th® crown if this is intended.16 
On May 1 l>erhj 8©nt a replyto th© Russian dis­
patch of April 19. H« stated therein that the British 
&ovmmmQn% was not of the opinion that the tsras of th® 
Turkish protest to th© London Protocol **nee®8garily 
pr®elud®d the posslhillty of th® conclusion, of p®ac® with 
Montenegro, or of the arraiig@!B©tit of mutual disarmament''*;; 
th»t It h®ll®ir®<l that p&tlene® anS moderation alght ha-r© 
obtained these obj®ct«; an<l that it could not agr«@ that 
th© ©ntrasc® of Eusslaa araies on Turkish soil would all®Ti-
at© the difficulty,, "or iaprove the condition of th® Christiaa 
population througlKJut th® Sultaa'e doainioas.'*^® Dsrby con­
cluded the note in saylag that, sine© l^saia assuaad that 
she was acting in th® interests of Great Britain and th® 
other Powers, it was B®e«8S&ry for Itogland to state in a 
foraal aad public aanuer that th© *d®ci8ion of the Russian 
<Jo¥ernfflent is not on® which can h&-r« [her^ concurr®nc« or 
approval,^19 fMs clearly word®d note warned Bassla that 
h®r action waa contrary to the wishes of England and could 
• IMd. 1005. 
17. Britain was th® only Power that replied to the Russian 
dispatch. 
18. Hertslet, Map of Kurope. 26(^7tf. 
19. Ibid. 2609. 
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hav© graT® co.nseQU#nc«a. England, declared neutrality, but 
a "watchful and condltloiaal" neutrality .20 
At a Cabinet «e®ting on May 5 It was decldafi that 
the not® already tlspatched to Russia w»s insufficient. 
Derby was to prepare aaother dispatch wMcb would warn 
Russia '*of tke elreutt»tane©6 which would render it iapo«-
slbl© ffor England] to continue & policy of abstention 
and neutrality.fii« not®, dated May 6, wMch was csrt'lM 
hj Seliowaloff to th® Eussias (loT«rns©nt, stated In @ff®cts 
Britain desired to «ake lier iaterest® clear at th« outset 
of th® war. Th.e ®ost l»portant oae was th® Bu&z Caaal, 
wad "ari attempt to bloekad® or otherwise to lnt®rf«r® with 
tbe Canal or its approach®® woulii ba regarded ... as a 
aenac© to India, said &a « graT® iujury to the comm&rce of 
th& world,'* Aa attack on Egypt, or tii© occapatlon of it, 
couM not he regarded with unconeem. Coaet&ntlnople was 
not to to© allowed to pass into hansi® other *'tli«:i those of 
its present possessors.* ffe®r@ would b© serious objections 
to the alteration of th© existing arr&nge.ffi®nts of tbe Boa-
phorua and Bsrdanellds. The Persian Giilf was another in­
terest, and th® eoure® of @v#ats alght r®v®al still other 
IntereetB. Qortchakoff's reply to this note was satisfac­
tory. Thus the first stag© of difficulty was passed. 
20. Moneyp«rmy and Buekl®, Life of Msraelt. 1006. The 
Powers followed th@ lead of Britain In deelaring neutrality. 
Se« State Papers. f. 68, 467f, T82. iSlf. 
21. B#«eonsfl#ld to Victoria. Moneypeniiy &nd Buekle, Lif® 
of Plsr&ali. 1007. 
22. State Papers. V. 68j 86fff. 
Other than th® war«lng giv#n Rassia by th© Brltlgh 
doterament th«T>© was little la tli« of a d@finit# 
polief, Th© Cabinet drifted wliil® B®aconsfl#ld gro,pe4 
for a possible cotirs® of aetloo.. Even had Be&consflslA 
»tu«bl«d upon, aome eowrse. It is probiable that the Cabin«t, 
at tMs tl»®, wowld ha.-?® to s&n^tlon It. Hortli-
c6t», one of th# Catoia#t iB@»b«9rs4 Ms left a aeaoraMua 
wliieh <5l»«rlf i«s«erlb«« tii# Cabinet division# An mxmrpt 
follow®; 
. . . Prim® Kitiister wa »OBt aoxioiaa to 
k®«p «tt all tos«tb®r, C#rbj w&® ehisfly 
b«nt orv k»mplm,g m out 0f war» tout wa» rasdf to 
go alaoat any l#agtii wMeli hi# eolleagweg 4«slr©4 
in writing de»pat«li@@, »ppsr®atly not p#re®l¥lag 
t&at th® »tr®»gt& of Ms l«jigwag# womld b# kel4 
to inTolv«j, under poesibl® aM probabl# elrei4®-» • 
stameet, tii# W'e#«»ity f^r e®rr#«poiw31ii.|5 aetioa. 
Is th« earlier ftays of aifflenltl#® th@ peae® 
party 1r tlia Cabls®t »&y b© »«1A to b»v# eoii«i®t®d, 
uiid®r Lortl ^rby, of Caira®» CrosB, the Buk® of 
HiclssoM, 3«llebary» Gara&nroa, and «y»«lf. A-s 
tlae wor® on^. Calms, Croais, an^ Mlehmond «e«a®<i 
soffiewbftt t© »o41.fy tiwiir view#. I w®.s much in 
coffiffluaieatioa with S&liiibtiry «id Camarvoia, and 
I wffc» al»0 iR cosiattiaioation wltii D«rby., b«twe@a 
whom aad the other two tb«r« was some ijoldness. 
Caraarven was strongly iapr^a#®# with tM« bell#f 
that th« Priffi® Minister was 4«sli»ous of il&r. 
D®rby, Judging mQT9 e©rr®etly, said to »@j *1 
don' t think la® d®»lr®s wari la# desires to plaee 
Eagland in & '^eoaaaitiding position.'*' TM® Frl»« 
Ministdr hi«««lf «iiid to avt »ore tJisn oae* tlmt 
hie gr®at f#®.r was that Serby^s policy wotald 1&&& 
us to war I and, looking back, I sub and more 
convineed that tb«r» w&a »u«li ground for tla« 
appreban s ioa.23 
On© of tbe postible eours#s of action explored by 
B«aeonsfield was an mttespt to get the Britisb Fl#»t fttatio-rwld 
23. Moneyp«ariy «nd Ittckl®, Lif® of Diara«li. 1011, 
at Constantinopi© and 20,000 British troops on th© P^nlasula 
of (iallipQll. It would b© necessary, Beaeonsfl^M wrot« in 
a «acret letter to Lajard,24 that tlie proposal com.® fro® 
Turkey. Wltlaout such aja inYitatloa, accoffiplishffl«nt would 
be liapossibl®. Th® Sultasi, by aow suspicious of Eaglftud,,^ 
did not weleo®® the plan. Mrlug these .negotiations, 
B®acon.sfl«ld turned a d«af ©ar oa a proposal by Blsaarek 
that the TurklBh Wmplr» bf psrtition.#d. The nub of tb® 
rather Involved aebem® was that laglaad was to take -Bgypt, 
other Fow«rs wer® to bsw t®rrltorlal eospens&tion®, aad 
Buesla w®s to b« allowed control of tbe Blaok S«s.^5 
Sych a plan as tbl® was not at all sultabl® to Beaeons-
fleld. Hot only did hm b@li®ve tiiat saeto a partitioalag 
would not briag p««e® asoKg tb# P©w#ra» but also be wm» 
Mghly suspicious of Blsatsrek. H« thought that SlsaArek 
would welcoae & Brltisb-Russian war as aa opportualty for 
Germany to msrsb hmr mrmi.es to Farla s^ala. Considering 
tb® history of tb« pr«Tio«» Beaeons field *» inter­
pretation of th® Bl»®areklan aeh«B® wa© act so sEurprlslng, 
Still anotber courg® of aetioa ®xplor«4 by B#Sk.©OQafi»l<i was 
tb® poesibility of m Britl«b-^«tri«un ullianc®. If tble 
eould b® aeco«plifili«€ Ryssla would be thoroughly intiaidatad 
and sight Bot pr©e®»d south of th® Balkan range. Austria 
replied to the BritiBh «ugg®Btloii ©oolly. Sfa® stated that 
sb« could not acc«pt aay one of th® followlag polatai 
Ibid. 10l4f. 
25* Langar, gurop«a«. Alllane#». 123f. 
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CD tteist @xc?l«siir« protectorate oT@r tli.@ 
Balfcaa Ckrlatlans sfeottld 'b# eoB©#<i®d to any on# 
Christisn. pow®r; (2) tiist th® ^sfinltlY® pe&e« 
aiaouia tak® plae# withomt the partlei-
patton of tbe powsrs glgaatorlea of tli® TF»Rty 
of lS56j (3) that Eassla skottld ftcqiilr® territory 
m% %lm rigtot bank ©f the BaRUls#; timt Ro«®aais 
should b# lneorp©i*«tr#d wttfe Eassla or sad© dep@ad«ttt 
upon fci®rj (5) that a prl»e® of @itfa#r the AustFlaa 
or %hm Rytsslsn r«lgiiin.® famllj sfe©uld fe® ««tablls&#d 
on a Balkan thron®; (6) that Russia should oeeupy 
Co«istaiitln.opl#j (7) tls»t a larg® Slmf atat® l>@-
@8t&l5ll©te»d la tii® SikllcaiaB &t the ®xp®iis» of tb® 
»on-Slair ®l#®«at8., @f» tkat th# r®<j.rg;siilS4tlonsS;iiaiald 
go b®J6a4 th® grantiag &f aato»oay ̂ to th® present 
proline#®, mBd#r & a«,tl¥® pritiee.26 
fills was act ©xaetly wfest B#s0oasfi#l<ft had want®d. H® ia-
qytlr^d If Aix»trla wstild otoJ«et to »« Sagllsh. oeetipation of 
Sallipoll. Andrassj replied tb&t hm had. no otoJ®etloai, and 
further, that "ii® woald r#gsM tb® retentloa of Co-ustafitiaQpl® 
by Bueslm as a ^mmus te#lll.*^'^ Any more thmn this, Aradrasay 
r«fus®d to graat. 
On Jttn® 8 Russia e0fflaittiile»t#d to Sngla»4 tli® t®m» of 
•p#ae« »fe@ would off«r If for pea«® to®for# tfe# 
Russian fore®s erosa®d tbe Tills offer was d®p«n-
d»nt upon tbe «&lfit93aaa#« of n«tatrallty toy tto® Powers. 
Btilgarla was to to® mutonomomt M®rit«a«gr© aad Serbia 
w»r@ to *rse»lv® aa lasi^a®® of t®rrltorf**f Bosnia aM 
i«i's©go¥lna vBTm to b® proirld®4 wltb institutions ^eoa-
patibl® with their Internal state®; Serbia was to **ra-
«ain under the suaaralnty of the Sultan"; Ruasla was to 
to® cospensated for tha costs of war by the aanexatlon 
26. 1m§. 125f 
2?. iMd. 126. 
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•of 8atou» and Bessarftblaj mA Austria to find any 
eo®p®nsatlon she alflit d«slr® Im Bosnla-Hsrs^govlaa.^'^ 
fegland di<5 not stjlalt tfa®#® term® to tb® Ttarks, b®c«tts« 
sh® regarded th^m to to® in ex©#«s of what th® furfes %rottM 
i,ee«Ept. 
Toward tfa# latt®r part of .Jiaa® the .Rtassiaas 
and® a susc®ssfw:l erossiag ©f tto.« Daaato^. Qtt©0R Iflctorla 
1>«ea©® aop0 dlstiarte«'d a# t&# advuneed, «a& se-sj'e#ly 
a weat tof thmt ak® did oat writ« t© b»r Prim® Mimist^r 
urglog M,s to aetiOB. After th« Baaub© erosslng, sb« wrot®? 
. .. , B# tooldl Wtef not #all joar follower# 
t©g®tli«r» of tfe« fio«3« of Cawsoii* a« will 
of til® of I^rdtf t«ll tliat thm Ister-
•8ta ©f ar#8t Ifltftta at «tsk«j tiA&t It i« 
Qot for %hm GhTlBtlsas {and tb®j ®r® quit# as 
eryt®l as t&« Tmr^s) toat for e©iiqw#®t tibet this 
era®l, wiekM w.ar la t&«t Hussia Is m 
tomrbaroas sn# tyrsimi©*! m» tfe» tark«l T#1J. 
%hmm this, ^nd. that tii®y iife®«ia rally round tte0lr 
S©v@r#i|pi aad foii will hiiir® a Isrg® 
sBi pow^-rfttl msjorltj. Ani' ©Jiljr say Eassi* 
sJ^&ll mt go fftrlft#r and sli® will atop. But if 
this lb® m% doa# ^oo« qttlckly it will soon 
to© too l«t®; and w# sb&ll then 3a®"?® to do sucfe 
sore than v» eti&ll h&T# to do now. .. . ,^9 
til® Russian angieis BOTSd rapidly, and, la «ld-J«ly, were 
jpasMng south tlirorngfa the lallcaa mottsitaias. On ^aly 16 th« 
^««n Bi»a«&aafi<(»ld to s@»d th« fl««t to Cooatan-
tlnopla. 7he fleat vaa mot diapatehad. flie C^aan baeawa 
frantic. 31^ panaad a lo»s lattar of wMeb ao«a parts followt 
28. Hertslat, Map of Europa. 265^-39. 
29. Qtaaen yietorla to l®aeo»«fi«ld, Moriaypauay asd Buekl®, 
Mf® of Msraali. 1020f. 
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, . . But uhm liifikTB of no troops moving or goi»g, 
and beeostt®® aior-# and nor® alawied. fli# Qa«®a 
alwajs feels liop®f«l aad eiiCGarag@ft when ®ii@ 
hm s@®B L©rdl B@seonsfl«ld, but aoasbow or otber, 
wh«tfear iatentlonally or thro' w«Qt of energy on 
th® part of ttoos® uiid@r M® or at th© offices, 
nothing ®at«rlal 1® don®M It alar®® her seriously. 
fh# Qti«®a «o®t #&rii«8tly urg®s or Lord 8«ac©nsfl@M 
to hold '^•«ry strong Imrigaag# to tli« Cabla®t to-
sorrow aad to insist on the sp®@dj despatch of 
th# troops to 3aer«fts« th« garrlmoM, as 6p®#dily 
us poaslble.SO 
Beaeon«fl#ld h«.d working earnestly to brlag 
the to <Ieel»loa. Th® position of Vietorla 
«iidOMbt®dly ftldet hi®» for sh# m# a strong aad 
eowanded siiiah r®sp®et. Flaally# on July 21, th© Cftblm#t 
agr@#<l un&ni»oytgly to declitre war against Eassla if sh® 
occ-upl«a Oonstaatinopl# arid r®f\j8«d to withdraw iBsaeii-
at#ly.5^ In addition, ordsrs w®r« glf«n to tlapateli troop® 
to th® M«ait@rr&ii®iua garrisons, 
Th® Rii®«i*a sdviMRfie w«§ cheeked &t Plevntt, a road 
center on th® Russiiua right flimk. It was i®p#ratl*« that 
Pl»vna be tak^n teafor® th® RM«ai«ne proc®»d#d with any 
eaapalgn south of th« mountslns, so,, by togast, it was 
apparent that Conatantlnopl® was in no i®a«diat« dangsr. 
This un©xp®ct®d d«if«lo|went eonalslarably r«ll«ir©d the 
tension in England, and llttl® was don© offlelally aboyt 
the Eastam Qaestloa. However, Baaconsflald, outsld© tha 
toowladg® of th© CaMaat and Poralgn Offlee, ®«nt an 
ealssary, dlract from th@ Quaan and th« Priae Mlnlstar, 
30» Ibid. 1025f, Safaranc# l« to M«dlt#rr»!4®an garrl»ong. 
51, Baaeonafiald to Qaean ¥ietorla. Ibid. 1026, 
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to Russia. As tills emissary, Beaconsfleld used Colonel 
Frederlclj Arthur W«llesley, British military attach®' In 
Russia, who had coa# to England In August, with a aesaage 
fro® the Tsar*s headquarters. Th© Russian difficulty 
at Pleima had shaken, its con.fldenee to the point wh@r© 
it was dsomed necessary to again assure the British Qov-
eraaent of the peaeefuln@«s aM purity of Russian int®n.tlo.aa. 
The war was being waged only for the purpose of aiding the 
Christians under Turkish rule; no annexations wer® being 
considered except Bessars^bia and eertain areas in Asia 
Minor; ao permaaent oecupation in Bulgaria was toeing 
anticipated; Con.stantlnopl® infOuM only be occupied If 
absolutely necessary; mn& British intereats la Egypt, 
the Suez Canal, and India would be respected.Rassla, 
of course, expected an offlel&l reply. Beaconsfield 
furnished Well@®l®y with s. Forel^ Office docuaseat 
written in the conciliatory ffimniaer usually eatployed on 
such occasions, but he also funilahed him with sofflething 
»uch more important, -rerbal and top-secret instructions. 
When delivering the official reply to the Russian eoaaunlca-
tlon, Wellesley was to personally confer with the Saperor 
and inform hi® of the actual British policy. In a ae®or-
andusi by Wellesley, that policy is stated to have been: 
The Queen and H. M. QoTernasent have a sincere 
desire to see the speedy re-establlshaent of 
peace on ter»s honorable to Russia and would 
be glad to contribute to such a result; should, 
however, the war be prolonged and a second 
32. Moneypenny smd Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1045. 
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campaign uadertajten, the neatrallty of Sngland 
could *iot malatalned and ah® would tak® h&r 
part aa a toelligarent.53 
In addition to British Policy, ¥«lleal@j wsa to let th® 
Effip«ror know that the Que®ii and her Prlsa® Minister w«r« 
In perfect agr©e»©iit, and w@r© the actual beads of » strong­
ly united Qovemffient, The rumor» of CaMnet dissension 
were absolutely fsls®. Siiould the Qovemm^nt d®cld@ oa 
action it would be supported toy %h® peopl®.. 
Tb® E®p«ror, aft@r bavlag beard Wellesl^y, «3s:pr«s®®d 
bis gratitud® for tb® fraak «8aaa®r with which he had 
treated. Bus#la forced th« war during th« winter of 1877-
78. It msy hmv® b#®a tii»t th® ¥«ll@sl@y aeasag« ©#n-yi.a@®d 
th® "Tsar that prolon^Sitloii of tb® war would b® dasg#rotia. 
Osa^ral Todletosn, oa® ©f tb,o top Swsslsa wllitstrj-atrateglsts, 
mm cii«rg®d with the t&sfe of brs&kiag tia© d®feas@ of PIs^hr, 
wMcii ls« was flMtllf ®bl« to do on D#^®b®r 10. fMs 
was irl«w«d wltb alarffl toy field, iiad iia auawiOJiwd th® 
Cabinet to ffi«©t on D«e»®b©r 14. Th« Foreign Offic« dl«-
p«tcli®d & not® to Eussia waming the latter tfeat aa occ^i-
p&tion of Con»t«&tiaopl® or tb® 0ArdaK«lle8 *®lglit eall far 
aeasuras of pr«e«uition on tb« part of Grt^at Britain frost 
which tfeay hav® kittierto fait Justified in atostaliilfig."^^ 
fh© Eussian asawar was far from satisfaetory. Qort«Makoff 
asa«rt@d that sueli ®m attitude on tlie part of Britain 
delayed the end of th« war. He aaid; 
33. Ibid. 1046f. 
3^. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2646f. 
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. . .  I f  t f e ®  T u A s  w ® r ©  t o  a c q t t l r ®  t l i @  e o B T i e t i o n  
that a or mi attsok dlr®ct®d stg&lnst Con-
stsBtlnopl® wqu14 csus® Eagliuad to d@p&rt fro® 
h®r aeatralitj, tli®tr r#®lstaa©@i la spit® of its 
©vl4®nt yi8®l©asB®ss, la sucli ft wmy m to fore® 
Htissia. to pttrs^t# la®r ®p®r»tioiiS a» far a« tji® 
espitsl,. It would to# sSiffereot, in all protoa-
bllltf, if th® ®ttitttS® mnd laagaag® of tb« 
Ca.tolm@t of Ijs'adoia w#r« eacfe m thorougiili' to 
convimce tb,« Port# tfest It b&e no is-sfiistaae® to 
bop® for fro® &fer©s«S.. 
lo Btteh ft ea®@ tl»» Porte would resign'itself 
©or© profflptiy to ab-aadon. s r®«i«tanc@ wtiieti can 
oalf aggrfiiirst© its po®ltioa.35 
•©ortehakoff aM®d tii«% tfe® qawstioa of tfe® posa®s®l©ii of 
Constantiiiopl# b@lomg@d to tli« P©w@ra, uot to anj oa® 
.Pow«r. Winmllf t h® r»q,y@.st#d Britain to »tat« »or« clearly 
whst th© Britlah lat»r«st« w«(r®, i.e. thos® tba.t algiit 
toucb.®d by tfe® «T®fittiialltl®s of the war within th® llBsits 
to nfMcJa the &B6ur«ac®s of thm Imperial C«bln«t re­
stricted th©®.**56 Sine# tMa dispateh was not c©»ynl«at#!l 
to D«rbf mtil J&im&rf 2, tfe® r«qu««t«d d«finitiofi of 
iat®r®at8 a©t feaadlad UBtil S&nu&rf 13. In %h® 
»®aattl»# mueh hsd fea.pp®aed» tootb on the war front and 
its, th© British Cfttoia«t. 
Or i>®c®ala®r 14 S«rMa d®elar©d war agaiaat f«rlc®j,57 
fhis tiffl® &h& was «3r«( suec«ssfttl, and occupied »oiatte#rn 
Serbia, inelMing Slab a»d Pirot. Moat®!»gro» nihleh h&d 
b««n fightiag cotttlmj©u»ly, was now in a position to {^»Ja 
forward. Sh» capt«r«d Dttleigno, Budua, and Antiisrarl on 
35. Ibid. 2653ff. 
Ibid. 2655. 
37. St&ta Paji3#rs. V. 68, 885. 
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elior# of the Mrlatie.^S Russia began s war of «ov®-
ae-Bt aow tbat her rlgkt flaink was protested, and Sofia 
wfl.6 i«ffi®di®tely @n.a«ng®r®di. It fell to (Jeaeral Gourko 
in tlie ©arly part of January,39 
Beacons field, on B«c#sb©.r 1^, placed a mrf strong 
progrsffl before his Cabinet. He proposed that Parliftsient 
suffiaooed iaB#dl&t®ly aad asked to graat a considefmbl# 
Incrsas® la th® araei forces, Siaultmeotielj, th® Brit­
ish Qofernffiest should "coffi»®»c0 negotiations, as «®<iiator, 
to«tMe«« the balligfreiatg.**^® Tfe,® Cabinet split lato 
factions over tbls isso©. It 8©®»i as if the rift w®r@ 
b«jond r®p»lring, bat B®acon8fi#ld, la » Cabinet seating 
on til© 8«v®nts@iitli, aa»oaHC®€ that be would resign if tb« 
Cabinet did aot «gr«# to his progri®. On th© following 
daj lile policy pr«T&il@tf. It was deel<i«d to eall Psrli-
aaent for Jmnumry 17. 
England suggested to Austria tbat she Join tfe® 
former in ft aot® to Russia offering mi^liition. Andraasjf 
declined to set mlomg th»s0 lioet^ arguing tbat it woald 
be b®tt®r if the furks obt&lned the p@am tmrms aad th«n 
&ppe«l#d to th@ Powrs to r^tduue B#aeotiefield, 
58. M«vill F&rh@B and @tli®r«,. B&lfeaits i A Hiatory of 
Bulg:yi&. SmMS*  SES&ESt and f u r k ^ w  J O x f o r d ,  
1^15}» 124. 
39. Laas«r, Earmmmn MMSBSSl* 129. 
40. B«®.coosfl®ld to Qu©@r. Motieypenay and Buekla, I^if# 
91 Pisra€li.. 1073f. 
41. Lang®r, Sarop®an llliaaees. 130f. 
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though dliappolnted by tfe# Austrian refussl, w«® 4@t®r-
aln®d to act alort®, ir this wes aided fey an appeal 
froa the Sultan CD®ce«to«r 24) for Sriglish aaediatloa.'^^ 
Tw®lv® days previously Tuvk^j bad r®qu»8t@d %hm Powers 
to mediate, tout, b«c®u«© of Blsaarck's rsluctane# to set, 
this g,p|5#sl 'toad resulted %n notMag. Th« British Aatoaasador 
®t St, Peteraburg was eo®»l»siosed to a«te the Russlaa 
ilo¥ern.»®iit if th® Sflap^ixsr voiald a®r@® to ov©rtwir®8 of p«se«. 
Ofi jD«c©.»'b®r 30 Q-orti§toiakoff said that Russia did not d«sir# 
through a iMrd party. TyErkey should eontaet tii® 
Busalati G@n@r®l8 in th® fi®ld and find o«t th# csndltioiis 
for teriBlnftting bostilitl®® On January 9 Turksy, 
hftvlag no other aimlm, approaetosd the Russian eoaaandera, 
but t®n addltloaal days wer© a®e#afiary for Turfeieli d«l®gat#s 
to arrlv® with pro'per er«d«ntlala, Th@ RiiSBlan advano« 
waa Bot halted t»y tb® Turklsb. p@ac® approach. Inglaad 
Bour answarad tfaa Busalan raquast^ ©oatalnad la tl:» Russian 
memorandisn of Daaeaber 16, for a daflnltlOH of Brltlab 
interests. All that was said waa that *aoy oparatloaa 
tandlag to place the passage of th« Cardaaallea yiodar th© 
control of Euasla would be an l«p#dlmarit to tb® prepar 
conalderatloa of the t®r»« of a flaal settlaaant,"^^ 
aortchakoff was aakad if ha -would assur© that no troops 
would b« seat to the Feiilnatala of 0alllpoli. H« aaswarad 
^2. Ibid. 131. 
^3. ganeant Slplogatie Poeuttctits« I, 58. 
44. Hertslet, Map of Europa. 2656. 
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that Russia would »ot Slmct operations on G&llipoll 
unless Turkish regular troops w@r® conc©ntrat@d there, 
and that Russia would eonatria® & British, occupation of 
tb© Peninsula m a -^fiolation of aautrallty.^^ 
On January 15 Baaconsflftld urged his Cabinet t© 
feuthoria® oM®rs for th« fl#«t t«> be s#tit to th® Dardanelles, 
©oaaualcatloaa to Auatrla attesptisig the creation of a 
elos#r worktag sgr@®a:eiit, aad cosaualcstioRa to 
4©cordlnglj Loftus wan instructed t© inform CJortchakoff 
that *aay Tr@atj eoaeluded tii« of 
Russia aad the Fort®, aff®eting fn@fttl«s of 1656 and 18?!,** 
would hav® to be a $ur©p®fs.n ?r«aty,, and ''would not Im valid 
witfaout the assent of tb® P©w®re •wbo w®r© Parties to thoa® 
frestl®®.*^7 fh» order for fl®#t i!OT®m#nt ws» ia#ir®r .gent, 
b#caus® L&jard t®l®graph©d th.® S«lt*n*s objections to 
suetoi a aoT« and tfci® Russian aasw»r eoaeerming Qalllp©.H 
bad b@®n recdived.^ 
Oct the same day (January 17 5 that Suleiman Pae^'^a 
aray suffered coaplete defeat,^^ the British Parliaaent 
convened. The speeeh from the throne ooatained on® 
paragraph of direet wamiag to Euseia. It follows: 
^5. Ibid. 2656. 
46, Moneypenmy aiad Buckle, Life of glBraell. 1093. 
47, Hertslet, Map of Europe. 265T. 
4S, Moneypeirny and Buckle, Life of Meraeli. 1093. 
49. Loftus, Diploaatlc Reglnls eenseeII, 226. 
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Hitherto,, so far as %h@ war .teas proceeded, 
a®ittoer- of tte.e •b'®llig®r@intg ba® Infringed th® 
coadltlOR® on wbleh «j n@atrslitj is founded, 
and I wlUlnglj belief® tbat teotto p&rtl«« ar® 
desirous to r@.sip@ct tfaw, ®© far a« it nay b® 
In th®lr pQ'^&T, So lottg as tlj®s® eoftditioas 
ar« not Infringed, my attitud# will eoatlaw® the 
8a». Bm% t c&ftuot coBe@«l fro® ays®If ttiat, 
should hostilltl®a be wifortuaately prolonged, 
»om unrnxprnetm^ occuit#q.cs« »ay r«nd@r it %n-
eu®b@at on »e to adopt «®ftsur#» of precaution. 
Sueli «@astt.r®s ©o-uld na% b« taken witfeout sd^qaat® 
preparation I tra.»t to tli» llbtrallty of 
mf Parllameat to mupplf the m@mim vMcb m&y to® 
r#qulr«d for tkat parpoa®,50 
In th@ debate conesralris tfe® Bp®®eb B^ajsonaflald spok® w®ll, 
and an UB«xp@ct«d aid eaae to the Qu«@is and Prlae Mlalst®!' 
tvom Salisbury» who spolt® In B®rbj*s mbseae®, Frois this 
point on Salistary »ov@d bm&j from tfee peae® faction of 
the Cabinet, aad alllgm^d himsslf mor# and »©!*« clos®ly 
with Beaconsfield until fiaallj b® tfe« latt®r's 
Foreign Minister. 
Th® oosffiimlcations vltli Austria had h@mn prec«@dliis 
satiafactorily, aad oa Jamaat^ 21 Inglsnd off«r«d her & 
d«f®n«iv« allianeo and pecuniary aid, the lattar on tha 
condition that Austria soblliase a force on h«r frontier 
and Joisa England in an Identic nota to Russia.51 On the 
saffie day Beaconsfield again pw)p©8ed to the Cabinet that 
the fleet toe sent to ConBtaatlnople. fwo day® later the 
fleet received its orders, and the Cabinet decided to give 
notice to the House of Goffisons that a Vote of Credit 
50. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1C^6. 
51. Ibid. 1099. 
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wcjuld l)« on th® followlag Mondsj.52 Derby a.u€ 
CamarTOn r©slgri©i3 tlaelr po@itloii» Imt.tfe# Catela«it. fh®»® 
two r@sii^«tlons laad been long ©xp®et#d. B«aeoG8field 
bad b«^n qmeatlonlng Derby'® stoility ais «arly as th© 
aprlug of 187?.^' Q«®@ia Victoria alisred her Prin® Riiiister*s 
¥l®ws, .and sseslnglj f®lt ewu aor® stroagly eoae®niias Imr 
WoTBl^ MlnLi®t«r. In Jiia« she wr©t©i 
The reports in Mr. Layard*» laet lettsr of 
tfee 13th last., %rhieli th# bam yesterday, 
mve v®ry alaraiagi Sur»ly Lord Berlaf esaaot 
indlff«r®nt to tli® a®,»g«T8 e,xpr@88«d tto#r®la? 
M&ming after w&ralfig arrli-^s mn6. b# 8«««s to t&k® 
It all with^ttt 8»yittg » word.I Sueb. m For«l^ 
Minister thm %i®®o r®ally ii«v®r r@me«t»rsl5* 
•On th© day aft@r %h» Catoiaet r«aigaation.s a t®X®grii» 
fro® Lay®.rd was r®c®l-v®d, lmfor®lag tte.® Cablii«t that tb® 
t#raB of p®&c® bad b@«B. agreed iipoa. Aaoag other things, 
the qtaestioa of th« Str»lt'S wag to to© settled b®tw«®ii tbe 
•liBperor of Eussia wa& a C©agr®ss.55 fhl# b#w« ebanged 
ffiuoh that had been d»cid®d apon the day befor*. fh® 
•ending of th® fleet to Constantinople resulted from a 
British fear that turkey and Ruiaia woald settle the qiaea-
tlon of the Straits between theseelveB, excluding the Powers.-
How that it was learned that this would sot happen, it 
was decided to coimteraand the fleet orders, fhe oi^er 
was too late to stop the fleet, but it brought it hmtk to 
52. ihia. 1100. 
53- IMd. lOllff. 
5^- Ibid. 1019. 
55. Ibid. 1102. 
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tb« ©ntranc® of the Straits. Th® next «5ay another t®l®gra« 
oame from Layard, stating that h® had been, alstateen as 
regards the Straits questioa. Th® position of Brltaia 
was 0xtreffielf emtoarraBing. Sh« coald @®nil a third Qrd#r 
to the fleet caueiag th® first order to be aet@d upon, 
or sh® eould le&vm th® fl#«t at th# »out,h of th« Straits 
iind h0p@ for th« l»st la h«r walaeaed po»ltl©ii. Jokes 
w@r@ begiimlog to b® heard la Constaatlfiopl® conceralng 
th© strange now.ffient®•of th# fl#©t. th« Powers sight w®ll 
los® r®speet for Britain, for .such a display of indeclsloa. 
U,ltlssat©ly it was d®cld@d t© avoid th© ®i8toarr&S8»eat l>y 
l«svlES th® fleet i» Its pr®s«n,t position. 
Derby was a popular ®an.. ,Hls reslgiaation o«.«8®d 
quit® a stir ia Eagl&ads for h» w&» toowra as standing 
for **pru,deac® and ©o®mon8@as@ In politics.**^ Th® Party 
Whips f#ar#dl that th« Qovmrmmnt woald b© defeated in th® 
coaing Vot® of Cr®4it if B®rby w®re i«3t convlne#<a thmt li« 
should retract his reaignation. Slac© Derhy had haaed his 
rssignation only on th# »0"?®«®nt of the fl@et, it aeeaed 
that there was no loagar any eausa for hi* to raaign. 
Sbrthcote was charged with th© taelc: of iMiiting D«rt^ ehanga 
his ffiind. A dlffleult day was sptut by Mortheot@, but 
h« was Bucc®«eful, Barby told th© Rouse of Lords, upon 
hi© r®twm, that hi© raslgnation and aubsaqaent retraction 
had bean th# ®ost aattaral thl«g in the world, fh© caus© 
having been r®»ov©d, ''h® had no hasitatlon la withdrawing 
5<5. Ibid. 1104 
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Ms resignation.**5? Csmarvon's resl^iation, iioweverj, 
was fln&l, toecaus® h.® had objected to th® Vote of Credit 
as ¥©11 as tb# ord#r» to tlem fl««rt. 
At th© ti»® that Ingl&nd firat spproaelied Aiastrla, 
January 15» the treaties feHCtween Russia aia€ Austria 
to AndrasBj a safftel®nt gwarant®®, and hm told tte® British 
A»ba»®ador that %hm 8p«®eli fro« tk« thron# opening the 
British Parllaffl#nt h«d a sr#«t di®«ppoliitm«at to hi®.^ 
All things coii»t<d»r#d, hm ifeougJit b# elioald prevemt a breals: 
b0tw««n Aufttrlm SQd Russia, 'but lie wmld not object If th® 
British sent tto.® fl»#t to Coastantioopl#, As far its Awstrlan 
ffioMlizatlon was coa«@rw®d» th»t w®,e too expenslv# to **b» 
undertRkdn ub1«s8 absolutely luperatlire.''^^ w©wia 
aot IpIb iu li,®atle not® to Rassla warning b»r against 
the eoptlnued occupation of Bulgaria, or th© occup&tioa 
of th© 8bor«# of th# Bosphorus, %h.m S@a of Maraora, or th® 
D«.ria»®ll«a^ to««au#® it aigtot to® ii4t«rpr®t®d by Russia to 
mean tlaat Ingland aad Awstria did sot object to aay acts 
but tb«s9. 
SebouYaloff, on January 25^^ eoiwsiimlcated tfea Russian 
peace teras to Bartoj. For ma answer to th© Brltisfe note 
of the fiftaentb, which, stated tfaat modi float ions of treaties 
would haire to be ««lMiitted to the Powers, BeboMirAloff said 
that be was iustfnAeted by Oortebaloff to add a proals© to 
57. imi- 1105. 
58. Lauger, European Alll&ncea. 132. 
59. im> 133. 
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tb® p#»0@ t«r«s that '*all pbases of th© treaty that con­
cerned Europe would 8uto®ltts<l to the review of ths 
Pow#re,"6® This wor^lBg was aot tbe saa® as that contained 
in tb® British not® aad was, tii®r®for«, unsatisfactory.' 
fli® t©r®» tbeassl-^eR v@r© r@gRrd®<l toy tfe# Cabinet a® *mor© 
studious of British thm. of tostri&n interests.The Cabinet 
eolisidered that it wan ia#e®as«ry, feowsfer, to proe®©^ with 
the ¥at® of Cr®dlt, and Derfey h&nAê  &no%b&r ®©Borajaduis to 
Sebouv&loff.. It stated tliat Englsad would not p®r»lt tli® 
oacupation of Coastsatlnople toj Httseiaa troop®. In tfm 
@¥©nt that this bapp@a®d England wowld find h®rs©lf "eom-
p®ll®d to t&k® #ii@rg®tle measures to protect th@ thr@at#n®d 
interests.^®^ 
Sua-sla te.&d eoa«4ialest@€ tfe@ p®«.e© t®r»3 to Aastria 
and England at the »9m& ti»#, Th@ Austrian reaetion w®s 
wii€h dlff#r®nt from that of Stigland. the term® were in 
aapy instanees « violation of tfee Raaeo-Austrian «gr©©ffi«iit, 
and in others thay w©r« so YSfp^® as to cause Andraeay to 
to® gusplcious of th® Rttssiaa intentions. Con8®qu@Btly, 
li® orderad B«uat, th# Attatrian Ambassador in Londoa, to 
gat in touch with I>©rby. Sine® this was the period in 
which Derby had r««igsaed, Bawst «sw Baacoasfield on th® 
twanty-sevaath, who raportad that th® Austriana vara 
"terribly alar®«d, and balieva thay hava baaa ©ntiraly 
60, fylar, Suropaao Powera, 96. 
61.. Moneypaaay and Bwckl®, Life of Disraali, 1103. 
^2- Qef^aa Diplo«fttic Doeuaaata. I, 63. 
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decelTed by Russia,Austria even went so far as to 
ask England for armed aid,^^ but this was not granted. 
An understanding between th© two countries was arrived at^ 
however, and in the coming period they worked together 
against Russia. 
In the ffioantiadf Eusela had occupied Adrlanopl® 
and had aarcbed oa toward Constaatinopl®, Th© Turkish 
delegates accepted th,® Ruasian terms on jaauary 2T.» and 
signed an arHilstice on January 31. Tlie terms of th® aralatie© 
©nded only hostilities, not tli® diplomacy of tbe Powers, 
63. Moii«jp®rray and Buckl®, Life of Sisraeli. 1109. 
64. Laiig®r, Surop^ma All lane® a. 13^. 
V 
CHAPTER ¥ 
A SHOW OP FORCl MD DIPLOMACY 
It would ee©ffi, aow that tli# armistice was signed, 
that England could hsT© sat toaek and rejoiced over h.®r good 
fortuB® ia haTirtg avoided a sajor war. Such, how#v®r,: was 
not tb.® e&se. ,4etu«lly, was ©staring a period that 
\ 
was to b@ on® of tb« aost trjl»g in. her p«ae®-tise Mstorj. 
The »onth of February op«n®d rather serenely, but few days 
passed in this ®ais.ii#r. On tb# s«v®Rth th® streets of ¥«st-
ainster w«r® filled with "«xelt©d and pAtriottc erowda,**^ 
and the London Stoek EsEehang* 9xp©rl©ne®d a mlaor paale. 
fh» night b®for« this day of aaxlety, news had cob© tpom 
Constantinople that th® Russian® wer® ia "the defensir® 
works^ of the city, and had cut th« wires so that news to 
Lottdon had to be diapatched via Bombay,^ Thia report, 
later found to b® exaggerated, had imffiediate results. 
Opposition to the ¥ote of Cr«dit, which had been intro­
duced January 28, collapsed, and a credit of six aillion 
pounds for allltary preparations was granted.5 on February 
1. Mon«yp®niiy:-and Buckle, Life of Sigraelj. 1114. 
2. B«aconsfield to Bradford. Ibid. 1114. 
3. Langer, SuropeaR i,lliaBC«s. 135• 
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8 th® Cablaet r®®olv©<a to send the fleet to ConstantlBOpl©. 
iButr®,! Powers were to "b® iavlted to do likewise.^ TMs 
iBOv®, wMcli had previously produced two Cabinet resignations, 
wa@ now received by the eountry as fitting and proper. 
Bsaeonefield was pleased to h«ar that th@ "announceaent 
was r®eelT®d with much cheering in the Sous© of Coaoons,** 
and roaftrk®d that "th® couatry is greatly stirring mt last.**5 
Truly, the peopl© of Eaglaad w®r® "stirring.-* They lifted 
their ¥olC9S in a a®w song, which contribut®d the word 
Jingoisffi** to th© English languagei 
¥@ don't want to fight, but by Jingo if wa do. 
We've got the we've got th® shlpe, we've 
got th@ aoaey too.6 
Snglaad ajad Austria had been thinking for a long 
ti«e of th© ®T@Btual e®ttl©®@iit of th« Suaso-furklsh war 
In relation to a Confereaee. In May, In reply to the 
British off®r of an allianc#, todrassy had stated, as ome 
of seven points, that h© would not agree to th© definitive 
peace settlement's taking place without the participation 
of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of 1856.*^ Derby 
informed Russia on January 15 that ^'any Treaty concluded 
between the Qovertxaeats of Russia and the Porte, affecting 
Treaties of 1856 and 1871 • . • would not be valid without 
4. Beaconafleld to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Dieraell. 1116. 
5. Ibid. 1116. 
6. Langer, European Alliances. 135. 
7* Ibid. 125. See above, 67. 
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tlia assent of th© Fowere wlio were Parties to those freaties,*®' 
4s soon as Austria learned that Turkey aceeptad th® Russian 
p©ac@ teras (January 27), sh® suggested s Conferene®.^ 
Eu-ssia quickly agreed, to tba principle of a aieetiag of 
th# Powers, feat with reservations which abe did not ®ake 
knowQ to Austria. She would refuse to take part in a eon-
fereno® if it wer© to be held in either fisnna or London; 
Berlin, how©¥®r, would b® acceptable,^®' Austria proceeded 
with til® preliffllnsrj jaagotiation® with th® other Power®, 
and, finding th#® agr©@abl®, extended an inTitatioa for 
a conference to held In Vieana.^^ On February T, th® 
day of cheering cro*ds and sigtilflcaat decisions, IDerby 
aecspted the iavltatioa, agreeing to Vienna as the sit®,^^ 
In aeeordanc® with th® decision tak©n by th@ 
CRtolri«t on. Fftbruary 8, th© fl®®t, linder Mairal Hornby , 
coBm«nc«d its jomrney to Constantinople. The fl®@t stopptd 
at Chamak. Pewfeisliion. was supposed to be given by th® 
Turks for th© fleet to proceed, but, since permission was 
not granted, after waiting several hours Hornby ordered 
the fleet to return to Besika Bay, The English Aabassador 
at Constantinople failed to get this permission, beeaase 
the Russians warned the Sultan that they would occupy 
8. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2657. S®« above, 75. 
9. Laager, European Alliances. 13^. 
10* Qeraaa Diplomatic Bocuaents» I, 61. 
2-1. State Papers« V, 69, 79^f. 
12. Ibid., ¥, 69, 795. 
-84-
Constantlnopl© if the Britlsla fleet arri-red, England 
was Iti an ®xtr@«ely e»bsrra8Slng position. One® befor®^ 
tbe fleet had been th® B^toject of ridicule. TMe tia® it 
was reported th&t placards had bdsn posted on the Brltisb, 
effltosssy at Coastantinople, reading: **'Lost—b«tw@©i3. Besika 
Bay and Gonstantinopl®—©n.e fleet,. Reward- to anyone funi-
isMng lnfo»atloa. Obviously, Britain had to carry 
through h®r original ord®r, with or witiioiit peraission. 
Orders w#r® seat for the fl®®t to go to Gonstantiaopl© with-
oat peraission, -and to fir® oa any shore batteries that 
fired first. <ki February 13 the fle#t entered th® .S®« of 
Marffiora.l^ The Sultaa #amestly appealed to England, with 
the r«8ult that th# fl®et ws.b ermntxx&lly withdrawn to the 
Asiatic sida of the 30& of Marsora. Russia did not «ak® 
goo4 h©r threat of occupation, bat the situation was 
p©rllou«. Englaftd and fhissla ©xehang^d s®Treral notes wMeh 
ultimately resulted in an agreeaent that Russia would not 
occupy Gallipoli nor enter ineld© the lines of Boulalr as 
long as England refrained froa landing troops on th® 
European side of the Straits. AI0O, th® agreeaient was 
extended to the Asiatic side, both powers agreeing not 
to "occupy that side of th© Straits. 
Just before the agreeaents with Russia had been 
concluded, England had made another attempt to bring Austria 
13. Langer, European Alllaneea. 156. 
Diplomatic DocuRente. I 64, 
^5. State Papers. V. 69, 731f. 
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oloser to Kngland. TIaes® negotiations bad b@#n conducted 
by Beaconsfield, b®caus® froa the date of Derby's first 
resignation lis bad tak#n or&r searlj all of the first-lln® 
For®i^ Office duties. Dsrbj's position was siailar to 
that of an under-seer®tarj. Austria, was urged to plae© 
300,000 ®©n into the fl#ld, mi& Join England in &n ideatie 
not® to Rasaia. The eot» would announce that neither 
Austrie. nor Britain would attend the proposed coafereo©® 
ualess Russia withdrew frota Constantinopl®, or coasented 
to aallipoli's being placed In th@ cuetodj of Q-reat Britain 
or of other n@«tral powers.Andraasy tried to pttsb th© 
plan iQ Austria, biat, b«caus@ of the opposition brought 
forward by the ailitarj aleaent, h& failed to eoavinc© 
Ms government of the aeeessity of bo bold a aove.^'^ 
Meantiffi®, Sortchakoff had protested againgt the 
selection of ¥l«naa as the slt« of the conferene® and had 
forced a postponsaent. With th@ fleet in th.9 S©« of Mairsora 
and the Fussians at S&n Stefano (only ten miles from Con­
stantinople), the situetlon was critical. Rusasll, the 
British ^sbassador In 0®many, and Monster, the German 
Afflbasaador in Sigland, believed that war was not far off.^® 
England urged Germany to arrange for a conference at an 
early date, since this was ^the last reoaining chance of 
16. Beaconsfield to Queen ¥ictorls, Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 1120. 
17. Langer, Suropean Alliancea. 137. 
18. Bisifiarek to Schweinitz. Ser»an Piploaaatie Docqaenta. 
I, 65. 
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staining off war.^^^ Blsaarck inforaefi Oortchakoff of tta@s@ 
facts, and on February 21 It was learned that Kussla would 
•^accept Badaa-Bsden as the s®at of the Congress, tout not 
the second week of March as ths opening date.^^O 
fhottgh England wm trying to avert war bj 0v@rf 
mB&ns poBslhl®, sh® cobtinned her allltary preparations, 
Ob February 16 Laya-rd was authorized to purchase *Hbe cM®f 
ship® of the Turkish fleet.Mothlng caae of this plan, 
but th® fleet w&e b«lng coastaatly enlarged by hos® btalld-
Ing. Beseonsfleld, In early March, told his (^eea that 
"your Majesty will sooix have a navy superior to all th© 
navi-e® uaited of th® world, and, la a short tla®, an sr®y 
«OBt efficient, not contemptible la nuaber, &nd with a 
body of Officers superior to th&t of any existing forc®.*^^ 
An expeditionary fore® was being built on paper, and Lord 
lapl«r was appointed ©ossander-in-chief, with General 
Wolselay as chi»f of staff.23 
Another plan, elois«ly allied with the program of 
ffillltary pr#parsti©ae, was launched at this time. Aa early 
as the precadiag November, Beacoasfleld had toy©d with th® 
Idea of acquiring a place, either port of Island, in the 
19. Ibid.. I, 65. 
20. Meaioranduffi toy Billow. Ibid.. I, 65. 
21. Beaconsfield to Queen yictorla. Moaeypenny amd Buckle, 
Life of Dlsr&eli. 1120. 
22. Ibid. 1128. 
25. Langer, European Alllaaces. 136. 
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Lev&nt. Wherever the place. It should be one tha.t cotald 
be us@d both as a eoaling station and as a troop-aseerebly 
point* It occurred to Beaconefield that h© might a&k# 
us© of th© Turkish need for finaaclal asslstaneo to gain 
this ©n.<i. On So-^effiber 22 h© wpot® a letter to Lajard ask­
ing hl» to In'v^atigate- the possibility of a British pur­
chase of soa# furklih territory •'conduciT® to British 
Intereste.*24 p^j^ehase was aade, but Beaconsfield 
M®pt the plan 1b alad'. During th« erltlcal p®rlod at th© 
@nd of februarj, the Csblti^t waa inforaed of th# project, 
the Brltlgh Cabinet to®w that Russia asd Turkey 
were negotiating a p@a,c® treaty, fhere was no knowledge 
of th© t0r»s, but ruaor had it that th#y were aor® harsh 
than thos© of the aralstio®. B^acoasfield told his Cabinet 
on March 2 that whatsver the teras sight be ther© were 
three point® on which England should f@el anxious: *'the 
Bilitary position of th® courstry, ae affeetiag its comminl-
eations with th© East"; the flQancistl situation; and the 
question of British trade with the Black Sea and 4sla.^5 
With these points la alnd, Beaconsfield proposed the 
foraatlon of a Mediterranean leagoye, which would include 
Italy, dreece, Austria, France, and Ifegland. The object 
of the league would be "to eeeure the trade and eoaaunl-
catlone of Europe with the last froa the oTershadowing 
24. Moneypetiny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1123f. 
25. Sortheote to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1125. 
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lnt«rf@renc© of Russia.At tTals same Cabinet meeting 
various places w®r@ dlsoussed in connection with the plan 
of occupation as proposed bj Beaconsfield at th® end of 
February. Sine® no d®elalon was possible, a eoffiBitt«® 
'*%ras appointed to consult th® fflilltsry and naval authorities 
as to th© best course of action.Both projects, that 
of a league and that of an occupation, were discusaed in 
conjunction with one another in subsequent Cabinet ae@tings, 
and so eafflo to be thought of &« on® plan. 
When it was learned that Turkey and Russia were 
negotiating a peaee treaty, Derby telegraphed to Layard,, 
on Petoruary 27, tbat h® should request of the Porte that 
sh© infora England, **witti as little delay as possible,* of 
the t©r«g toeing TOgotiated.^^ fhe saae request was made 
of Scbouvaloff, but thei^ was no response from either 
party. On March 3 Turkey, under threat of a Russian 
occupation of Congtantlnopls, signed the Treaty of San 
Stefano, As had baezi suspected in England, the teras were 
stiffer than those of the swiistlee, though this fact was 
not known by the British Cabinet until March 23.^ Even 
so, the signing of the treaty caused much anxiety, and 
the Cabinet dally worked on many different projects, one 
of the most important being that of the Conference. When 
26. Ibid. 1125. 
27. Ibid. 1125. 
28. Ibid. 1122. 
29. Hertelet, Map of Europe. 2672-96. 
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Baden-Baden had been proposed as tb® place of aeetlog, 
Britain had aecepted th® invitation.However, an. Mareli 
7 Austria vitMr®w th« proposal for a Conference to b© 
held at Baden-Baden. She sitagg®st«d that a Congrass toe h®ld 
Instead of a Coiif®r@nc®, and that ths Coiig.r«8 8 be attended 
bj the Priffi® MlTiist#rs of th® Powers. Tills Coagrftas wa® 
to take plac® at Berlin at a ti»@ iiaa@d "by th@ Geraan 
Cafeinet, which had already declared Itself In fsiror of tbe 
plan^.51 gngland declared hersalf in favor of Berlin, but 
stated that **no alterstlott in th® condition of things 
previouslj established by fr®aty should he acknowledged 
slb valid until it £hadj r«c®iv®d th® assent of th® Powers. 
After the Cabinet meeting on March 8 Be&conafield iafora^d 
Qu80n Victoria, with rsspeet to Berlin, that every 0overii-
aent, except Great Britain h&d saocepted that eity as the 
scene of the Congress, and if she declined to be r®pr€fseBt«d 
there, the Congress wo«ld probably b» held without her, 
•^which would not b© desirable.fhls fact, plus th© fact 
that Austria assured Eoglaad that she had no secret under­
standing with Russia, hastened the decision. The next day 
England foraally accepted Berlin aa the place of the Conference, 
but she added that it aust b® understood ^that all questions 
30. Ibid. 2668. 
State Papera, V. 69, 797f. 
32. Ibid.. ¥. 69, 798. 
33. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Bisraeli. 1128. 
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dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia aiid Turfesy 
should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Con­
gress 
Otfei®r projeets w®r® discassed in the Cabinet a®®tiiig 
of March 8, The M«dit@rr&n@«n l®agw@ plan, for one thing, 
was further developsd. It was d®eid@d., in relation to tli® 
occAjpation part of tla« plaa, to appoint a comaaittee to 
further ©xaairie tb© barbor of Mjtllene. Pr-aTlously that 
plae© had b®©s. s®leet®d, b»at .®» objeetlon was raieed b«-
caas® of a rocls: in the aain charm«l of the h,artoor. If tli® 
coffiffiitte© could dlsGO¥®r a preferable location thej wer® to 
so report.55 in this plan, Derby did not concur, but sine© 
no oceupation was ordered b© did not offer his resignation. 
As for the rest of the plan, it was decided to launch **th@ 
L@«gu® with Italy and Q-r««ee alone," if the other M®dit®r-
r&nean Powers refused to Join.56 Representations wer@ a»d© 
to Italy on Mareh 13» but a new Cabinst with Count Corti 
as Foreign Minister rejected the British proposal. 
Since Italy refused. It seeaed useless to proceed with the 
plan, and it was aot aentioiaed again. However, the origin­
al portion, dealing with a new military base, was not dropped. 
There was no reaction to th® reservation expressed 
in the British coffimunieation to Austria of March 9» so the 
- - • • . I - - - • ^ n r .r 
5^* State Papers. ?, 69,  798f, 
33. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1127. 
36. Ibid. 112?. 
37. Langer, European Alliances. 137. 
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Foreign Office thought another st@.t@a®nt necessary In 
order that the Povsrs toe perfectly clear as to the condit­
ions andmr which Britain expected to attead th® Congress 
of Berlin. On March 13 Austria was Inforaed that th® 
British 0overa««T3.t '^Kust distinctly understand befor# they 
@at@r into Coasr@ss that ©very Article in. the Trs&ty to®tw«®ia 
Itissla and Turkey will h© placed before the Congress, aot 
fiee-essarlly for accept®,no#, but Ib order that it may b# 
considered what Articl®® r«quir« aeeeptsnce or concurr®nc« 
by th© g@v«ral Powers, and what do not,^^^ th© followiag 
day Russia ioforffisd Soglaisd that the Powers would r»c©lve 
the t#xt of th® Treaty as soo-a fis It -urns ratified, that 
BttBsla had nothing to cottceal.^^ fhls stat®»®!at was not 
acoeptabl® to th© British Foreign Office, whleh deslr®d 
an unequlTOc&l eoneurrence with its teras. Betw©®n th® 
foart@@nth and nla«t®@Bth seveml dispatches wsre exchanged, 
and finally, on March 19, Russia stated her position to b® 
as follows: 
. . . The OoT?©ra»@nt of th® in lik® »aaner 
»s the other drest Power®, reserved to th»as©lve8 
at the Congress their full liberty of appreciation 
and sctioB. this saa® liberty, which she did not 
dispute to oth®r@, Raasia clai®ed for herself. 
Mow, it would be to restrict her, if, alofi© Among 
all th® Powers, Russia contracted a preliminary 
®tigage«®nt. "^0 
3®* State Papera, V. 69, 800. 
39. Hertslet, Map of Europe> 2700. 
State Papers. T. 69, 804f, 
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Thls stat©ffient, too, was considered as evaslv®, so, on 
March 21, Derbj Inforsed Schouraloff that England adherred 
to the position alre&dj defined toy them.^^ Thus, Russia 
and England w©r® deadlocked, fh© fata of the Congress 
•depended upon tb® decisions of th@a® two powers. Of cours®, 
in England it was f®lt that tb@ Congress depended upon the 
Russian r®ply, sin-c© th-#r© was no dlspoeition on the part of 
th© British Qaremment to mske any concession. Th.® cjera&a. 
Aobassador in London, who had he@n keeping hie l3ov®ni®®i4t 
w®ll Inforffied, described th© situation as It existed on 
March 22: 
Sine® ths BrltiBh sld© adaita that a aajority 
decision by the Congress eaaaot In ®ffeet be 
binding, I really fall to .ss® how the Russian 
'Liberie d'nction', which Princ® Qortchskoff 
®«ntlan© in ©very d^spateh, ev#ry telegram, 
can possibly b« disturbed. But it appears 
Inevitable that th® Congress will be called 
upon to mx&mlne th® Treaty now to b© subaitted 
to it in the light of former treaties sanctioned 
by the Powers, if It is to s«ttl© the Eastera 
Question. That is all that England demands, 
Prlnc# Sortchskoff's pretsnslon to subttit for 
discussion only thoa# points, calling. In Ruesla'a 
opinion, for alt®ration, in thd forffi«r Treaties, 
Is quit© untenable,^2 
Ratifications exchanged, the Powers received (March 
23) the full t»xt of th® Tr«aty of San Stafano. t«r«B 
war© such ae would not b« accepted by either Austria or 
England. It is not necessary to analyze that treaty, 
because the major points were repudiated by the Trusty of 
41. Ibid.. ¥. 69, B05, 
42. Geraan Dlploaatlc Docugents. I, 82. 
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B®rlln. HoweverJ sine® th© British attitude toward tb® 
treaty is important In this work, B®aeonsfield's description 
follows; 
The Treaty of San Stefano cospl^tely abrogates 
what Is known as Turtcej-iu-Europ®; It abolishes 
th© dominion of the Ottoaan Empire In Europe; 
it er0at@s a larg© Stat® which, under th« n&me 
of Bulgaria, is inhabited by many races not 
Bwlgarlans. This Bulgaria go«s to the shore® 
of the Black S®a aad a^lmea th® port# of that 
s©a; it 0xt@nds to th# eoa®t of th® l®g®an and 
appropriates th© port© of that eoast. Th# 
treaty proirides for th« gov^raasnt of this rj®w 
Bulgaria, under a priac# who l8 to be selected 
by Russia; its adalnlstr»tion Is to b© org&ni3©<l 
and supervised by a co®mis®«ry of Russia; and 
this n#w Stats Is to b« garrison®^, I say for 
«n Indefinit© period, but at all ©vents for 
two years eertsin, by Eu8sia,^3 
Th© only ©ff«ct of th« r»v#latioii of th® teriss of th® 
tr©aty upon England wsa to stiffen the determination to 
csontlnus a policy of reslstanc® to Russia. Plana, long 
aiaturlng, were soon to be iiitro<Ju®«d in the Cabinet. 
In the British not® of the twenty-first, the follow­
ing question had been directed to Bussla; Was the Qoverti-
®ent willing to treat the cofflatunloation of the entlr© 
Treaty to th© various Power© ^&a a placing of th© Treaty 
befor® th© Congress, lis order that th® whole Traaty, in 
its relation to ©xlstlng fr@att®®, alght be ©xaialned ami 
considered by th© Congressto affiraative answer, 
which could have broken the deadlock, was hoped for but 
not expected by Beaconsflaid. On March 27, one of the aost 
43, Moneypenny and Buokl©, Life of Disraeli. 1130. 
44. State Papers. V. 69, 805. 
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©-ventful dajs of tMa period, the Russian reply was deliver­
ed. The flaal paragraph stated that the Russian Go'v«r»»ent 
"leaves to th® other Powers the liberty of raising such 
q\i©stlons at the Gongress &a they alght think sultabl# 
to discuss, and reserves to Itself the liberty of accepting 
or not accepting th® dlseusslon of th$se questions. 
Saturally, B®mcoiisflsld eonsldered this to b« a eategorlsal 
refusal. His pr#par&tloQ for th® Cabinet aeetlng of that 
day is wall revealed in th© few words h® 8.Mr#s5sed to 
Hardy before th® seetlag; 
'fhe critical time ha» arrived wh®n wa aust deelar© 
th© ©aergeney. ¥® are drifting lato war. If we 
ar© bold and deteralnad w® shall secure peac#, 
and dlctat® It® conditions to Europ®. . . W® 
have to maintain th® Eaplr®, amd secure peac®j 
I think w® can do both.*^^ 
At th© Cabln®t aeetlng, Seaconsfleld proposed that 
a procla»atlon declarlag an eae-rigency b© Issued,a 
a.ee#ssary step, b@cau8# th© Reserves could be called 
o«t only In eas@ of Immlneiit national danger or of great 
©ffiergency,^ and h« wlehad the Reserves to be called. 
fh« Indian {ksverajtent was to be directed "to send out 
a considerable force, thro' the Suez Canal.*^9 They should 
^5. Ibid.. V, 69, 806f. 
46. Moneypemy and Bwckle, Life of Pisraell. 1153. 
IMd. 1136. 
48. SeraaR Dlploaatic Pocuaeats. I, 86. 
49, Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1134. 
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O0capy Cyprus and Scan<5erooa,50 fo^ thm purpose of co®.«mnd-
iag ®th© P«rslan Gulf and all tlie country round Bagdad,** 
and n«utrall!5lng Russien conquests srtd Influeoe© In 
Ar»@nia."51 Only D«rby obJ@et®4 to this thr®®-proaged 
proposal, H® reslgn-ed on Mareh 28.52 
Both Beacotisfield and the Queen were happy'- about 
th© resignation, tii® Qaeen regardlag it as "an unmlxM 
blessing, "53 the decisions of tb@ CaMnet, except for 
calling out th® Rs®®rT«s, wer® k®pt sacret, so th@ p®opl® 
thought that Derby ixsd r@8igB©a on this isaue alon®. Thia 
was unfortuaate for Derby, but eireusstaBe@s w®r® sucfe thut 
notklng could to® done about it. Surely the other deelsioos 
of th« C&bln®t ©ould aot b®. sad® 'knowa, bec&uae their sue-
e®BS d#p®rii®€ upon s©er®cy, Mucto later, Derby hB.4. hie say, 
At th® end of March, it lo0k»^ v«ry «uch as if th® 
plan for a Coagr®ss had failed. War was thought to b@ 
iffl»in®nt. Only B®aeoa8fleld f®lt assured. He, as & matter 
of fact, quit® accurately pr«<aict«<t the futur® {mlamln^ 
only the tiai® ©loaeat) whsn h® informed Queen Victoria that 
''Russia will, in; all probability, laaediately coaaeac® a 
direct negotiation with your Majesty's GoTena»ent.**5^ 
50. Ibid. 1136. 
51. Ibid. 1134. 
52. Derby's resignation is discussed at great length in 
Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Slaraeli. 
53. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Oisraeli. 1135. 
5^. Ibid. 1132. 
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Lord Salisbury was appointed to fill th® vacancy 
created by Derby's resignation, lie, iamedlately on, t&felng 
over the Foreign Minister's post, worked upon the draft of 
a elreular dispatch, contiaulng until thr®® th® next aora-
ing.55 B«acoTj®fi@ld shared with Salisbury the reaponelbillty 
for the forffiulatloji of this lemsthy document. The Gabluet, 
•fter a critical ®xa«inati©n> g&*e it® concurreae© to th® 
content,56 vhich was briefly as follows; a two aonth suieaary 
of the British Ti@g©tlstions r©l»tlve to the proposed Congress| 
a defining of th© British position relativ® to th© Congress 
as b®ing a demand that every provision of th® Treaty of 8&n 
Stefano b« subsittad to tha Congress; a orltleis® of th® 
creation of a. large Bulgaria, a©gl©ct of Greek rights, 
forcibl® s»izur© toy Russia of B#s®srabl&, atequilPttions; in 
Asia Minor, and the virtual deatructloa of furkleh political 
independenc®; and finally: 
But neither the interests which H«r Majesty's 
Qovsmsent ar@ specially bound to guard, nor 
th® well-being of the regions with which th® 
Treaty deals, would be consulted by the &sseffitollng 
of a Congress whose deliberations were to be re­
stricted by such reservations as those which 
hsv© been laid down by Prince Sortehakow in his 
»©at recent commnieation.S? 
55. S«ton-W«t»on, Britain in Europe, 535. Lord Cranbrook 
replaced Salisbury as the Indian Secretary. Moneypenny 
and Buckle, Life of Bjgraell. 115^. 
56. Beaconsfleld to C^een Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Dlaraen, 1154. 
57. Hertslet, Map of Sui^pe« 2698-2706. St&te Papers. 
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TaiB ®xpllclt declaration -warned all Burop® that 
England was firia in her policy and would not yield to 
Russia. Schouvaloff, who believed that there was no longer 
any chanc© to avert war, d@llver«d the Russian reply which 
was not so worded as to alleviate the precarious situation. 
It eofflplained that England revealed, onlj that which she 
did not desire^ and smgseat®d that Salisbury good 
©nottgh" to »ake known that which England desired, **with 
a view to s,rriv© at a clear understanding upon th# situ­
ation. **58 Salisbury ©aid that h® was not ready to present 
th® English demand®.59 jt sem® to have b@@n the intention 
o-f B®aconsfield and his Foreign Minister to wait for Russia 
to approach England, s sov# which they were strongly anti­
cipating.^® 
While they w®r® waiting, ther® was danger in th© 
proxiaitf of the British Fleet and the Russian troops. 
England decided, th«r#fore, to suggest to Qeraany that she 
lend her influence to the solving of this delicate problem. 
Salisbury had reason to b«lleve that Germany would be happy 
to act as mediator, because Hdnster, the Qei^an Aabassador 
In London, had often spoken to hi® of the "danger to peace 
arising from the neighbourhood of the British fleet and 
58. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2?0?. 
5-9• Langer, European Alllancea . 144, 
60. abo^e, 95. 
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tfa© Russian army near th© Maraora.'*^^ H® tbougbt that 
Monster's Insistence was "laore than sceidental** and aeant 
that Bisisarck wished **for peace and therefor© for the ces­
sation of this dangsrous proximity.On April 6 Salisbury 
Informed Russell thatt 
Our fleet Is In the Marmora because the Russians 
ar© at Comstantiaople, The Ruasiaos would say 
th^ir aray was at Constantinople because our 
fleet is la the Maraora. Sach is deterred froa 
b&ing first to propose a simultaneous retreat hy 
f®«r that ^nhs.nc®6. pretensions would th®r«hy b« 
encouraged on. th® other sid«. A frlsndly sug­
gestion fro® Prlne® BisffiareJk to "both that, pending 
negotiations, the fleet should retire below th© 
Dard&n©ll®s, aad th® army retire th® saa® number 
of miles froa Coiistantinopl#, would evade the 
difficulty.63 
Bismarck f®ll In with this aehe««, and, on April 9, proposed 
the following coura® of action to th© two Powers; '*'The 
British Fleet to leave Constantinople and to repass th© 
Dardmelles;—ti^ Rusaian forces to retire fro® the Bosphorus 
to a dlstsne® equlYalest to the tia© required to relnstat® 
the British Fle@t in its present position.' Both Powers 
agread to the proposal, but neither would moT« first. A long 
discusaion eaaued "conccmlng th® nuasbar of days r«qulr»d 
to bring th© British fleat and th® Rusaian Ar»y back to 
th®lr respecti-?® positions la front of Cons t an tl no pi ©.*^5 
61. Salisbury to Russell. Buckle, The Letters, 612. 
62. Ibid. -612. 
63. Ibid. 612. 
6"^ • German Diploaatlc Doeuioents, 1, 91 • 
65. Ibid.. i, 91. 
-99-
fli® result was that neither the ariaj nor fleet were with­
drawn until after the Congress of Berlin. This factor more 
than any other contributed to the extreai® tension during 
April, May, and the first part of June. 
two aoves, indicative of British preparedness and 
determination, were made during April. First, Parlla®®nt 
voted to call out th® Reser-ye, the Bouse of Lords without 
a division, and the House of Cossmons by the ssjority of 
310 to 64.^^ Second, on April 17, it was announced that 
7000 Indian troops were being sent to Malta.These troops 
actually arrived there before th© end of May,^® These moves, 
occurring so shortly after Salisbury's circular dispatch, 
which in itself iapreesed Europe greatly, settled aay doubts, 
still-exlstsat on the Continent, as t-o British fimness of 
policy. Beaconsfield'8 snticipation of the prestige value 
of the Indian troops had been one of the chief purposes in 
originating the move. On April 12, prior to the final de­
cision, he had said: **After all the sneers of our not 
having an.y great military force, the iffiagination of the 
Continent will be much affected by the first appearance of 
what they will believe to be an inexhaustible supply of 
Ben.fhere is no doubt that the determined policy of 
Britain, as revealed by the circular dispatch, the calling 
66. Moneypenny and Buefele, Life of Siar&ell. 1155. 
67.  Laager, European Alliances. 146. 
68. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1159. 
69.  Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1157f. 
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of the Resepvei &nd the deplojffl@nt of the Indian troops, 
greatly influenced Russia. In May that Power »ad« hag® 
concessions. believed England unprepared and un­
willing for action, she may well h&vm saiatained a ®or@ 
stubborn adherence to h@p peaci® treaty with Turkey. 
British policy, however, was act the only factor 
contributing to the eventual Russian corscesslons. Russia 
had hoped that toy coming to aa agreenent with Austria 
she could effectively Isolat© England, and thus force that 
Power to modify its demands. Igriatieff, th« successful 
diplomat of the Constantinople Cohfereace, exerted hl» 
greatest effort toward th®s« end® at ¥l©nm* H® discovered 
a resolut© adversary in Aadrassy, who placed a high prie© 
upon Austrian co-operation. Briefly stated, that price 
consisted of &-;.liM%&tion upon Moatenegrin gains to th« 
®ast, the amlntenaac® of a corridor between Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the exclusion of Macedonia from the new 
Bulgaria. Austrlati predoalaanc© 1h BoBnla-Herzegovlna want 
without saying.70 Clearly—the Austrian aim was to keep th» 
route to Salonika opan, and rasarv© that region for Austrian 
©cononaic axpansion. Ignatleff considered the price much 
too high, so, since he could not laduc® Andrassy to lower 
it, the Russian attempt failed. It was Russia who now 
felt helplessly isolated, fhe fhree Eaperor's League still 
existed, but It provided Russia with little actual support. 
There was no point in approaching Blsaaarck, for,ion February 
70. Langer, Suropeaia. Alliances. 143. 
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19, he had revealed his position in a speech to the Reichs­
tag. On that day he had s&id, ' **what®-v«r will bring a^ut 
a Chang© 1b th® stipulstlons of 1856 will bav® need, un-
douhtedly, of th® sanction of th@ signatory powers.*"?^ 
fhls aeatit, of cours©, that Bisaarck, thomgh remaining 
ffly»path®tic to Ruasia, would n@T®r actively support her 
against Sngl&ad. 
England kia.@w only that Ignatieff and Andrsesy were 
negotiating, not the nature of the aegotiatlons nor the 
results, Y®t it was @asy for her to guess at th® natur®» 
and, rsalising th@ danger of an agreeajsnt between Austria 
and Russia, she was uneasy. During April th© Foreign Offlc# 
sought in vain to ©statollsh to®tt#r illations with Austria. 
Finally, ob th# tw©ati#th, Salisbury ask®d Aadrassy if h® 
would b© willing *to insist on the restriction of th© new 
Bulgaria to th® region north of th© Balkan Mountain®, 
Aadi^asiy did aot eomait hl®««lf on. tb® question of th« 
Bulgarian southern houadary, but defined his prograa in 
a aiessor&nduaj to th© British Foreign Office. It was sueh 
th© saffi© as the one previously euboiitted to Igaatleff, 
except that Bosnia was diseuesed at greater length. Many 
reasons were advanced to explain why Austria regarded the 
occupation of that province as Indispensable. Since th® 
71. Tyler, European Powers, 98. 
72. Langer, European Alliances. 1^5• 
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two countries could not ag^ree on Bulgaria, negotiations 
csasM for a tiae, to b@ resumed later and sucesssfullj 
concluded. 
In ©arly May, after waiting longer than a aonth, 
England finally received word that Russia was desirous ©f 
coming to an a.gr®effi®nt, so that th© Songress could b@ 
eon¥©n@d.'73 Schou^aloff left England on Maj 8 with a 
knowledge of British wishes relative to th© r^-vlslon of 
the Treaty of Ssa Stefsno: (1) Bulgaria had to be reduced 
in sis®, (2) Ruaala'i annexation# in Asia Minor had to be 
reconsidered, and {3) England desired to hav« the Straits 
opened co«pl#t©lj.'^^ Schouvaloff subaitted this list of 
British dasandB to his aovamsent, which, because of th® 
financial lapOBSlbllity of prosecuting a war with England, 
was. desirous of achieving a peaceful aettlesasnt. The Tsar 
told Schouvaloff **to »ake us© of his influenc® with Blsfflarek 
to g®t th® congress arranged for and to ©ff«ct an agre®»®nt 
with England which would Isolate Austria."75 
Schouvaloff returned to England on May 23, prepared to 
accept ^all th© »odifications of the Treaty of San Stefano, 
except on© proposed by England, referring to the military 
73. Loftus, giploaatlc Reainlaceneee, II, 251. Loftus 
claims credit for hairing brought about the Russian init­
iation of talks with Sallebury, but see Moneypenny and 
Buckle, Life of Dlar&elJL, 1160, where Blsaarck Is credited 
with th© original suggestion, fyler, European Powers. In 
a footnote on page 103, states his preference for the 
latter view. 
74. Langer, European Alliances > 146. 
75. Ibid. 147. 
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occupation of Ruaella by Turkey,The Cabinet was un­
willing to refuse to go into th® Conference on this atoor 
point, and was ready to accept th^ Russian, concessional 
but Bsftconsfield was slow in sanctioning the Cabinet •view, 
li© was waiting for information fro® Conetantinopl© relatlT© 
to a plan being urged upon Turkey. When, this wa,s r«c®iired, 
h© author!a@d Salisbury to eonclud® the Britisfe-Russiafi 
sgreeaent. Salisbury and Scbouvaloff signed it on May 
Engird Had# a few ainor coneessions in th© agr©®-
»@nt, but non® that could compare with thos@ made by Russia. 
The latter agreed to a coaplste revision of the Saa Stefauo 
Bulgaria along tb® following lines: Bulgaria wse to b» ex­
cluded froiB the Ji.#gean,; tbe western frontiers were to b® 
redrawn; tb©r« w@re to b« two provinces rather than one, 
with the Balkan rang® as tbe delimitation; only tbe north­
ern proviQC-e would hav® politics! autoiiosy; the Turkish 
right of military action in the southern province was not 
finally decided upon, but was left to the Gongresa. In 
addition, it was agre®d that-England ^ould not coatest 
Russian acquisition of Bessarabia; Russia would return 
Bayazid (In Asia) to Turkey; and she would keep Kar» and 
Batouffi.'^® Concerning th© Asiatic portion of the agree­
ment England used these words in th© aeaoranduo: 
76. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
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In consenting aot to contest th© desire of the 
Eaperor of Russia to occupy th® port of B&towa 
and to guard his coaquests in Jtreenla, th© Govara-
ment of Her Majestj €o not hid® fvom thessel-?®® 
that grave dangers—seaacing the tranquillity of 
th® populations of Turkey-ln-Asla—aay result 
in the futur« by this exteaston of the Eusslaa 
frontisr. But Ker Msjeety's OoT@rEi«@»t ar® of 
opinion that the dyty of protecting th« Ottoaan 
Eisplr© froa this danger, whieh heaeeforth will 
r«st largely i(d*a.ne aeaur® special®) upon England, 
CBM h© effected without e*po8lng Europe to th© 
calamities of m, fr«sh war.<9 
Th@ informstloa for which Besconsfleld had h«#n 
waiting b«for© authorizing the conclusiOB of th# Britlsh-
Susslan agr@«iBeat concerned th« phras® "d'une aesure sped ale" 
contaln«d in the atoov® w&mlBg to Kussla. In all probability , 
B«aconsfleld would hair® m«tgotlat@d further with Russia be for® 
signing th© agreeasnt If th© news fro® Ck>nst&ntlnopl® had 
been that th® Bsgotlatlons for th® "speelal aeasur®" had 
failed. This a@s®ur@ was th® final dSTelopment of th® 
proposal of March 27, whleh called for the occupation of a 
place of arms in th® Letaat. By May 5, Cyprus, which Beaeons-
fleld described aa "the key of Western Asia," had been 
chosen a» the place to occupyLayard was laformed, oa 
May 10, of the British proposals to Turkey conceraing the 
occupation of Cyprus.. He consenced negotiations lattedlately, 
but not with a Tiew of concluding them until he was further 
Instructed. On May 25, when it was evident that Russia 
would insist on keeping far# and Batoua, Laysrd sub»itted 
79. Ibid. 1169. 
80. Beacons field to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1163.. 
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the draft agre©ffi©nt to The secret Convention 
b®tw©en Great Britain and Turkey wa.8 sifted on June 4. it 
provided that Englaaid would join turkey in arms if Russia, 
at Bo»e future tia©, were to take possession of any sore 
Turkish territories in 4sla; that turkey would institute 
reforffls in Asia; and that England would occupy Cyprus.®^ 
An annex to the Convention established the conditions under 
which areat Britain would occupy Cyprus, the aost import­
ant of which was the stipulation that England would pay 
Turkey a certain annual .sum. With this Convention, which 
was to be effective only as long as Russia retained Ears 
and Batoua, Beaconsfield thwarted any Russian plana for 
farther advancement in Asia. The concession to Russia 
concerning Asiatic aequlBitlona did not result in the de-
velopaent of a new threat to the British Eapire. 
The last of the secret, pre-conference agreements, 
entered into by Sngland in order that she ®ight enter the 
Conference with a reasonable chance of achieving her aiaa, 
was signed on June 6 with Austria. Andrassy, learning of 
the Schouvaloff-Sallebury negotiations and fearing that 
its results would be injurious to Austria, suggested that 
he was ready to support the English plan for Bulgaria 
which previously had been rejected, Austria would ask 
81. Laager, European Alliances. 148, See Tyler, European 
Powers. footnote on 105, for an explanation of the document, 
dated May 30, which is in Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2717-20. 
It 1« reasonably certain that this document was merely an 
official follow-up of previous correspondence. 
82. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2722-25. 
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onlj that Sagland support her designs upon Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and plans for Montenegro.®5 bj May 26 tbe British Cabinet 
bad, agresd to support tostrla **in all her declared point® 
of policy, @x0®pt in insisting, tbat the Montenegrins 
([should] not have th® port of totivs^ri."^^ The Cabinet 
did not think that England could mmke a "caeua belli** of 
eueh a question. Th© teras of tb© agreement provided that 
England, at tb® Congress, would support Austrian proposals 
relsti"?© to Bosnla-Hersegovinft. Both Austria and England 
would attempt to liait Russian occupation south of tb© 
Danub® to six ®onths., passage tbroug-b Rumania to nln© ffiontbs, 
and occupation to a force of 20,000 Russian troops. In the 
southern Bulgarian province, tb© Sultan should ba^e ^adequate 
polltleal and ailitarj supreaacy to guard against inTasions 
or insurrections.*' The Balkan rang® was to b© the southern 
boundary of the northsm province of Bulgaria.̂ 5 This 
mgreement concluded British secret dlplo»acy, England was 
ready and anxious to go to Berlin, for success was clearly 
visible. 
England won th® battle of diplomacy which was waged 
during February, March, April and May. three aaln fac­
tors contributing to this victory were: (1) the patience and 
skill of British dlplofflats; (2) a British show of force; and 
83. Langer, European Mllances, l48f, 
84. Beaconsfleld to %i»en Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
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(3) Russia's Isolated position. The diplomatic victory 
consisted of gaining valuable Agreeoents with thre® coun­
tries . With Russia, England gained an agreement disposing 
of the major problems to b© presented at the Congress, 
England*s chief concern was th« large Bulgaria created by 
the Treaty of Saa St»fano. Russia agreed to reduce Bulgaria 
in size and to dlfld® th« San Stafano Bulgaria into two pro­
vinces, onlj the northern one to have a large measure of 
autonomy. With Austria, England reached an agree»ent that, 
in, effect, secured the British gains in the Russian agreeaent, 
and added to those gslns with reapeet to the southern part 
of Bulgaria. Austria would support a British demmnd th&t 
Turkey be allowed to have troops in that provlnee. With 
Turkey, England mad® an agreement that nullified the 
Russian gain in Asia. England was to occupy the Island 
of Cyprus in return for a guarantee of Turkish Aslatle 
poasesslons against say future Russian attacK. In addition 
to theae three agreeaents, England had won the right to 
enter the Congress on her own terast all the stipulations 
of the Treaty of San Stefano were to be submittsd to the 
Congress. This British deaand had been voiced for the first 
time on January 15. During the long period of negotiation#, 
the British statesmen never lost patience. They were rewarded 
by Russia's eventual acceptance of this deaand. Five sep­
arate actions coaiprlsed Britain's show of force, the second 
contributing factor to the English dlploffietlc victoryi (1) 
sending the fleet to Constantinople; (2) voting a ©redlt of 
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six ffillllon poimds; (3) enlarging the anay and navy; (4) 
calling out the Rsaer've; and (5) ordering 7,000 Indian 
troops to Malta, The combined effect of tbes© aeasures was 
to convincs not only Russia but all of Surop© that 0r«st 
Britain would fight rather than submit to a Russian settle­
ment of the Eastern Question. This, in turn, contributed 
to Russia's position of isolation^ the third factor res­
ponsible for the British diplomatic -victory. Blsmarcl: would 
not Join Russia in a military opposition to England in % 
m&tter which he b#ll©vsd to be relatively unimportant. Th© 
conflict of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans isad® 
Russian Isolation inevitable, Bismarck had to choose between 
Austrian and Russian interests. He chose the latter, but 
«Rd®avored to conoiliate both. The Russian concessions to 
England resulted from her inability to proceed against that 
Power alone. The diplomatic victory, won by England at little 
cost, enabled the British delegation to enter the Congress of 
Berlin with an advantage over th© other delegations. 
CHAPTER ¥I 
"PEACE WITH HONOR'* 
As th© negotiations wltb Russia, Austria, and Turkey 
w«r® approachlag a conclusion, th@ British statesisen began 
considering the choice of aa Ingllsh delegation to th® Con-
gr»8a of Berlin. S&llsburj urged Beaconsfield to attend, 
b#c»uee, ainc© Blssarck was requesting that it ^'tos a Congress 
•without ̂  referenduES,** bo one other than Beacons field was 
qualified as the CM#f Bleftip@%«flt4&ryj :Oh1j h«-.could "d®ei«r« 
with authority th® policy of England.Little urging was 
necessai^, because B®acon8fi®ld deemed th© Congresa to be of 
such importanc© that it would require his being there. If 
only for th© first few days. Queen Victoria, however, was 
reluctant to persslt her aged Prime Minister to go as far aa 
Berlin—his health was aot good. If the Congress were to 
convene at ''Brussels, The Hague, or Paris," she would urge 
that he go,^ Yet, when the Prime Minister expressed hie de­
sire for the appolntaent,3 she felt she could not refuse hla. 
1. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life ot Maraeli, ll66f. 
2. Queen Victoria to the Prince of Wales. Lee, Kin?;^ 
Edward VII. I, 434. 
3. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 1178f. 
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The Congrese wa© too far away, though, and sh© would be 
worrieds twt not because of the quality of reprdsentation. 
She wrote her Minister that no one "could carry out our 
vl®w8, proposals, etc., except M®, for no on® ha® such 
w#lght and such power of coaelllatlag men and no one such 
flr®n@ss or has a stronger sens® of the honour and interests 
of his Sovereign and country.®^ Beaconsfleld, Salisbury, 
and Russell, th® British 4aba«s«d,or at Berlin, were ap­
pointed by the Cablaet, on 3un& 1, to act as Plenipotentiaries.5 
Finally, after four dlploBscy-flllsd aonths during 
which war could hav© broken out at any tlae, the last re­
maining obstacle to a Congress was removed with the signing 
of the British-Russian Rgr«@»«nt. Apprised of this f&ct, 
Blsaerck sent invitations to the Powers, slgn.atori@s of th© 
treaties of 1856 &nd 1871. laaae^dlately on receiving th# 
carefully worded Invitation on June 3, Salisbury notified 
irtnster, th© Q®r»an Asbassador in London, that Great Britain 
accepted th© invitation, it being understood that the "Powers 
in accepting this invitation sesent to the terms stated** 
therein,^ This reservation secured to Bngland the right to 
withdraw froa the Congress if all the "stipulations of the 
Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano* were not submitted there. 
4. Queen Victoria to Beeconsfleld. Ibid. 1179. 
5. Ibid. 1179. 
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Thus, England would enter tlje Congress on the terms whloh 
she had foraulat??d in th® very beginning. Thle diplomatic 
•«-lctorj was an advantage which undoubtedly Bsaconefleld 
intended to utilize to the greatest extent possible. 
Beaeonsfleld's poor health caused hi® to plan care­
fully for the coffling Congress. Suspecting that his endurance 
would fall, he intended to roaaln. In Berlin for only the 
first and isost Iffiportant aeetinge, leaving it to Salisbury 
^to complete all the details,"® In order that the British dele­
gation could work harmoniously, Salisbury sent instructions 
to Russell Inforalng hla of "^th© general principles upon 
vhich ... a settleaient should be affected"; certain Artic­
les of the Treaty, such as the arrangeaent of frontiers for 
Serbia and Montenegro and the problea of Bosnla-Hersegovlna, 
would not be considered as of primary interest to England, 
but would nevertheless require "the vigilant attention of 
the Plenlpotentiarlee'*; England, In treating this type of 
question, would '^support any legitimate proposals tending 
to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and, 
as far as possible, would work toward securing "the welfare 
and the good govemBsent of the populations concerned"; in 
such matters, however, Russia would not be opposed so 
strongly ass to break up the Congress.9 fhe points of ®aJor 
iaportance were laid down in the agreements with Austria 
8. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 1178f. 
9. state Papers. ¥. 69, 832-35. 
-112-
and Russia, so that It wse unnecessarj to discuss ttoe® with 
Russell. With respect to lars and Batoum, though Eng­
land had conceded this point to Russia in their seeret 
agreeiaeiit, England would stronglj urge at th# Congress that 
Russia surrender these acquisitions.^'^ It would be b®n@fl-
clsl to hav@ **Interviews with all th© chief statesffien** toe-
fore th« first a®@tlng of th# Congress, In order that Beacons-
field would be well rested and up to the task of conversing 
with Europe's leading statesmen, he would allow four days 
for th© trip, and »t least one for interviews.^3-
Leaving England on Juae 8, Beaconsfleld traveled 
oalj as far as Calais the first day, Brussels the second 
day, Cologne the third day, and Berlin the fourth day, June 
11.^^ Almost on arrival he was inforsied that Blsnarck de­
sired a personal ajeeting. Beaeonsfleld, delighted that 
Bisfflsrck'a plan fell in with his own, went to the CJerman 
Chancellor, fhat which he learned in the interview is beat 
described in his own words: 
The interview was not una&tisfactory, and Lord 
BCe&consfleldJ arrived at the cosclusloa that the 
Prince was anxious for a peaceful settlement. He 
suggested to Lord B(eaconsfieldl that, as, probably. 
President of the Congress, he should, in his initial 
speech on Thursday, group the questions according to 
their importance, and that he should like to begin 
with Bulgaria, as perhaps the aost weighty. 'Tho' 
we need not avoid a single article of the Treaty of 
San Stefano, if we took the® in their regular order, 
10. Beaeonsfleld to Queen Victoria, Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 1180. 
11- IMd. 1178f. 
12. Ibid. 1186. 
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aany days, and the freshness of the Congress, woiild 
b@ expended on siaish Insignificant topics as th© port 
of Antlvari, **« eswm. In a rockj" and th® borders 
of Montenegro and S#rvla, and places of which no 
one ever hoard b®for« this war. 411 these concern 
Austria and h® wished to B&rre Austria, but Austria 
is Bot going to war with Russia. Lst us therefor® 
deal with the great things that concern England, 
for England is quite ready to go to war with Rusais,*^^' 
On the day before th® Congress was to convene Beacons-
field talked with th® ®or« Iffiportant Pleni|>oteritlarl@8 as 
well as with certain a©ah®rs of the aersan Sobllity.Sach 
aeetlng was utilized hy Beaco^nsfield in studying th® «®fi with 
who« h® would ha-?® to deal at th® Goaf®r®nce table. He trl@d 
to ftseertain ®thalr purposes and their pow®r to ©nforc© theiB.**^^ 
Th®e® a#n asking up the delegations, to the Gongr#ss w#r@ for 
th© fflost part th© leading statesmen of Europe, Th® English 
representatives are already known. Fro® Gtermany earn® Bls-
fflarcfe, Hoh@nlohe, and Bftlow; Russia, Cksrtchakoff, Schouv&loff, 
and Oubril; Austria, Andrasey, Kar^lyi, and Hayaerle; France, 
Waddlngton, Saint-Vellier and Deeprez; Italy, Cortl and 
Launay; and froaa Turkey, Caratheodorj Pasha, Sadullah Bey, 
and Meheaet All Pasha.The three men who played the moat 
Important roles at the Congress were Blsroarck, Beaconsfleld, 
and Schouvaloff. The latter two sen carried the greatest 
load in diplomatic fencing, and the former was kept busy 
13. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1187. 
14. Ibid. 1188. 
15. Ibid. 1187. 
16. Langer, Suropeap 4111aaees. 152f. Tyler, European 
Powers. 107. 
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trylng to conelllate tha one or th@ other. Gortchakoff 
seeaed perfectly willing to withdraw from the heated con­
troversy and allow Schouvaloff to fight on in defeat, for 
defeat it was alaost certain, to b®, Andraesy, whil© the 
ffiost Interesting and colorful person at th® Congress, was 
not Influential and was satisfied to act as Beaconsfield's 
echo. Th© other men, although they were leading wen In 
their own countries, played a minor role. Soto, like Salis­
bury, had to work hours at th® boring details and be satis­
fied with a strictly secondary role. All in all, th© assea-
blag® was aa great, man for aan, aa any aiaiilar one in 
previous history. 
At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 13 the many 
Pleaipotentisrieis assefflhled at RadislTill Palace. 
opening the Congress, Bisaarck said that the object of the 
assembly was to discuss freely th® Treaty of San Stefano. 
There were no objections—England's policy had prevailed. 
The meiBbers elected Bismarck aa President of the Congress, 
and he proceeded to act in the role of the "honest broker,* 
a phrase coined by hla in his speech of February 19 when 
he had said that he would be willing to play the part of 
the "honest broker" In a meeting of the Powers concerning 
the Eastern Question.^® Blsaarck outlined the order in 
which the problesis would be discussed, placing Bulgaria 
1?« Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 1189f. 
18. Tyler, European Powers. 98. 
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flrst, on the agenda. Beaconsfleld followed Bismarck with 
th© sugR©stlon that the Congress attack the probl®® pre­
sented by th© proximitj of the British fle«t and the Russian 
army. He represetited this situation as a serious threat to 
the peace and danger to the success of the Congress. 
It was suggested that this was not s matter for the Congress, 
bat for direct negotiation between Russia, and England. Though 
an attempt -was «0,d© to eff©ct a withdrawal of th® fleet and 
the arfflj, th® situatioa was not resolved. Several weeks 
were to pass before the fl^mt »t»&«©d out of th® Sea of 
M»r»ora. 
fhe second weetlmg of the Congress was not echaduled 
to tak® plsce until June 17. Work, however,'"didMiQtceesse 
on t.hls account, and although the week ®nd was filled with 
social eveats and iiaportant receptions, many important 
meetings occurred. Be&consfield ®et with Bisffiarek, Cara-
theodory Pasha (the first Turkish Plenipotentiary), and 
Schouvaloff .20 The aaeetlng with SchouTaloff, on June 14, 
warned Beaconsfield of «. cosing struggle in the Congress. 
Schou-raloff said that Russia would not permit the Sultan 
to employ his araty in the southern province of Bulgnrla, 
A rather heated discussion ensued, from which each party 
gained a knowledge of the determination of the other. 
Nevertheless, Beaconsfield emerged from the meeting without 
19. Langer, European Alliances. 153. 
20. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Moneypenny and Buckl®, 
Life of Disraeli, 1191f. 
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loss of confidence. In reporting the Interview to Queen 
Victoria, he stated simply that th© demand "will be giv«n 
up by St. Petersburg. 
June 14 turned out to be a very disturbing day for 
the English dlplo»»ts» because th® Glob® published the con­
tents ofthe British-Russian- secret-agr©e»©iit.?2'- The .En g--
lish, not toowing th® oth«r half of British diploisacyi.e. 
th© Cyprus conY®ntlon, w®r# aueh perturbed concerning th® 
English concessions to Russia la the portion of the agree­
ment dealing with Asia, lor did they knot? of Bsaconsflaid'® 
intentions to attempt, vis th® other Powers, to indue® 
Russia to giT© Kars and Batoua back to Turkey. Th« positloa 
of th© Qovemaeiit was certainly awkward at this iEO»«nt; 
it could not r©Y©al the text of the Cypms contention, 
nor could it prosise that, st th© proper ffiosent, English 
influence would again be brought against Russia in th© 
Asian question. Beaconsfield and his aids in Berlin had 
to suffer some ©abarrassing aoanents, even though the effect 
on the other Plenipotentiaries of th© Qlobe article (June 14) 
was not really astounding. Maijy, of course, were not e^en 
surprised. Neverthelees, sofflsthing had to be done, at least 
in the opinion of th© Cabinet Members in Snglsnd. A search 
was instituted, and the guilty party was found. Mr. Marvin, 
employed at the Foreign Office as a copyist, had sold the 
21. Ibid. 1191. 
22. fyler, European Powers, 105. glob® is a London newspa|>er. 
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Infor-fflatlon to tfe® newspaper.Marvin was prosecuted In 
eomplianc© with an order froie Salisbury, but this aove, 
n&turallj, had no calaing effect upon the English populace. 
It Is interesting to note how such Beaeonsfield*s view dif­
fered from Salisbury's In respeet to the prosecution of 
Marvin. He wrote to Sir Staffard lorthoote, his Chancellor 
of th® Exchequer, expressing his extreae perturbation In 
words that, coming fro® hlis,, had « husoi^us ring; 
. . , What in the naa® of Heaven, or rather Hell, 
and all the infernal regions of all religions, 
could have Induced you all to. arreat, and prosecute, 
that poor wretch Marvin? This is the dirtiest linen 
that was ever washed in public by any family on 
record. You will not, probably, be #ble to punish 
hiffi, and. If you do, he will have general syapathy— 
this sad wretch entrusted with secrets of State 
with a salary of 8d. an hourl Before this we were 
supposed to be the not conteaptible vlctias of an 
ifflperlal iBlsfortune; i«>w we are ridiculous.24 
A probable result of the affair was the stiffening In the 
attitude of the British delegation toward Russia, which was 
clearly noticeable during the first few days of the Congress» 
Perhaps Beaconsfield and his underlings would have maintained 
the same attitude even If the event had not occurred, but It 
is probable that there was so«e effect.^^ 
23. Ibid. 105. 
2%. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Diaraell. 1175. Beacons-
field believed Marvin waa being prosecuted as a cover for 
someone else. He later learned that Marvin was guilty, 
25. Langer (European Alliances. 15^} states^ without 
reservation that Beaconsfield became "aore and ffiore stiff in 
his attitude** as a result of the Globe article. 
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At the second meeting of the Congress, Jua© 17, 
Article VI of th® Treaty of San Stefano (the Article creat­
ing the large Bulgaria) was read, and thua, the Bulgarian 
problem was submitted to the Congress.The Brltish-
Rassian agreeaent hsd estatolished the principle of a division 
of Bulgaria into a northern and a aouthern provino® with 
the Balkan range aa the deli»ltatlon. Little ©Ise of » 
definite nature had been agreed upon,^"^ Sow that the prob­
lem was before the Congress, England proposed two resolutions; 
"1. That the ehaln of the Balkans should be the new frontier 
of Turkey. 2. fhmt in the country south of the Balkans, the 
Sultan should exercise a real political and military power.*2® 
Hussia argued against the proposals &nd subaitted her desire 
for a longitudinal division of the two pro-flnces. Turkish 
troope were not to be persitted to enter South Bulmrla. 
the naae applied by Buesia to the southern province. Bisaarek 
adjourned the question until June 19, counseling the concerned 
parties to confer with each other in the Interl®.®^ This 
policy of introducing the problea to the Congress and 
26. Hertelet, Map of Europe. 2736, Protocols in short 
English version are contained herein, 2726-2758. The entire 
protocols in the French language ere in Stat© Papers. ?. 69, 
862-1078. Since the aajority of decisions were made out-
aide of the Congress, the story of British dlploaacy at 
the Congress aust be found in sources other than the pro­
tocols. However, they serve as a guide and check on dates 
and events. 
27. Above, 104. 
28. Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, Moneycenny and Buckle, 
Life of Disraeli. 119^. 
29. Ibid. 1194. 
-119-
s@ttllrig it outsld© was adhered to bj Blsaarch; throughout 
tbe duration of the Congress, 
Schouvaloff, Oubril, Andrassy, and Hayiserle m@t with 
Beaconsfleld and Sallsburir on the next daj. Andrassj and 
Hayaerle, living up to the Austro-Britlsh agreament, sup­
ported Beaconsfleld In his presentation of the Bulgarian 
problem. Schouvaloff regretfully accepted th® line of tha 
Balkans, but, aft©r four hours of diecusslon which Beacons­
fleld described as ^nearly the severest four hours I e-sn well 
recall,** the solution of the eeeoiid question was deferred 
until Schouvaloff should have r«f©rred question"-to th® 
Eaiperor.^O When the Co»gr@®s aet oa Jun© 19, Schouv&loff 
had not received word, so the Bulgarian question was again 
deferred. That ©veniag Beaconsfleld told Corti, anticipating 
that he would t«ll Bisasarek and perhaps other Plenipotentisrids, 
that he took "th® gloorsiest view of affairs," and that if 
Russia refused to accept the English proposals, he h&d *r©-
solved to break up the Congress.**51 
There was aueh discussion at another ffieetiag between 
England, Austria and Russia on June 20, but no decisions were 
reached, because news had not yet corae fro» Russia, A special 
envoy, who had been sent to speak with the Eaperor, would not 
be back until the next evenin^^ (June 21). For this reason, 
Russia was granted twenty-four hours in which to have an 
50. Ibid. 1194f. 
51. Ibid. 1195. 
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saswer for England.next aornlng, B®aeori8fl«ld, h®-
llsvltig that tli® time had arrived to prove the sincerity 
of Ms threat to break up th« Congress, ordered his Secretary 
to arrange for a special train to b® in readiness,53 i.at« 
that afternoon Bls«s.rek called on Beacons field, asking hi® 
if h® intended his demand to h© an ultlfflatua, B®lng an-
8wer®d affiraiativelj, Bisaarck asked Beaconsfield to din© 
with hiffl that evening. This eventful aeeting b®twe®n the 
two men Is best d^acrlhsd toy Beaconsfleld hlasaelfi 
After dinner, w@ retired to another room, 
wh@r# h® saoked and I followed his @xftapl«. I 
believe I gave the la.«t blow to «y shattered 
constitution, but I f®lt it absolutely necessary, 
I had an hour and i of th# ssoet interesting con­
versation, ®intir®ly political; h® was convinced 
that the ultiaatu® was not a shaai, and, before 
I went to bed, I had the satisfaction of knowing 
th&t St. Petersburg had surrendered,3^ 
fhe next aomlng Be&consfield telegraphed to Queen 
Victoria and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Inforising 
the® of the Russian acceptance of ^the Englieh scheme for 
the European frontier of the Empire, and its Dsilitsry and 
political rule by the Sultan,"35 f^e sajor points had been 
decided, but four additional aeetings, devoted almost ex­
clusively to the Bulgarian probles, and part of the aeeting 
32, Ibid, 1195* 
33» Corry, Beaconsfield's Secretary, to Lady Ilchester. 
Ibid. 1198. *At on® SKJffient all looked as if Russia could 
not give in, and I had »ade arrangeffients for a special train 
for England 
3^' Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria. Ibid, 1196. 
35. Ibid. 1 1 9 6 .  
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on Jun® 28 w#re required to settle the many minor points. 
England Insisted tbat '*Soutb Bulgaria** {Russia's nam® for 
the southern province) to® called ^'Esatern Ruaella,* The 
actual delialtation, particularly In tb® west, and th© 
problem of garrisoning Turkish troops nseessltsted consid­
erable debate.56 fh© final 8®ttl®»ent called for dividing 
the San 3t«fano Bulgaria into three parts, the northern 
part to b© an autonomous principality undar the suzerainty 
of the Sultan, the southern part to be a Turkish principality 
'^under conditions of adalnistrstlTa autonoffiy^** and the third 
part to be a part of the Turkish Eaplre in Europe, fh® 
northern province, called Bulgaria, was to have a prince 
elected by th© people *aad conflraed by the Sublime Porte, 
with the assent of the Powers.^ The Sultan was accorded th© 
right to maintain troops in Eastern Ruiselia. Russian oc­
cupation of the two provinces was "fixed at nine leonths. 
The Bulgarian settleaent havlns been defined, the 
British delegation could relax until the introduction of 
the lara-Batouffi problem which Beaconsfield considered to be 
th© only reaainlng problea of great importance to England. 
Between June 28 and July 6, aettleiBents were made in con­
nection with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Oreece, 
Rusaanla, the Straits, and the Danube.58 Except for the Straits, 
England had no vital interests in the settlement of any of 
36. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2737— 
57• Ibid. 2764-78. State Papers. V. 69, 7^9"^7• 
38. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 27^3-50. 
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tb.®s© problass, but ®he had sad© coiBBltments ^Mch she ifiterided 
to fulfill, Accofdlagly, on Jun® 28, after Andrassy spok® 
generally on the Austrian of a satisfactory ssttleaent 
for Sosnla-Herz^goTTlaa, Salisbury proposed that th® two pro-
irlnces by occupied by Austria-Hungary .59 fhis proposal was 
®ad« in coapliantce with an agreement isade with Austria in the 
©arly days of th® Coagr®8ss Auatrla wae to support a certain 
English demand relatiT® to Bulgaria, "^in return for which 
the English wers to propose th® occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovlss toy Austria,**^® England, desiring to haw tfe© 
approval of the Turks b®for® aaklag the propoaal, had tried 
unaYailingly to secure Turkish assent. Although all other 
Powers at th® Congress agreed to th« proposal, furkey mairu­
ts in® d a stubborn reslstarto®, A«®tria did not press the 
aatter at that ti»e, probably wishing to maintain some msasur® 
of Turkish friendship. Megotiatlons b©tw®en Austria and 
furkey resulted, on July 11, In a Turkish proposal, which 
stated that Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve the right 
**to COS!® to ati understand lag between themselves on aatters 
of detail" concerning Austrian occupation of Bosnla-Herae-
govlna.^^' Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin restated the 
proposal, adding only that Austria-Hungftry would occupy 
and adalnlater Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, while not wishing 
to "occupy Sovl-Bazar (an ancient Vilayet of Bosnia extending 
59. Ibid. 27^3f. Tyler, lurope&n Powers, 111. 
40. Langer, Baropean Alliances. 155f. 
41. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2755. 
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in a southeasterly direction betv«eB Serbia and Montenegro), 
would reserve th© right "of keeping garrisons and bavlng 
ffillitary and commercial roads in the whole of this part 
»»42 
• • •. 
The British delegation supported all the Austrian 
proposal® relative to a settleaent for Serbia and Montsnegro. 
Both, obtained territorial acquisitions and coaplete inde­
pendence, Montenegro gained scc®ss to th© se©,- via the port 
of Antlvarle^3 Eumnle received independence, but had to 
surrender B®ssaraMa In return for Dobrudja.^^ On Jian© 29 
Beaconsfleld bad protested in Congress against tb.® retro­
cession of B0S8»r«bia as b«lng a violation of the Treaty 
of 1856.His speech was apparently laer© oratory for the 
record, sine© th© pre-Congress agreement b«twa«n England 
and Russia contained a stipulation that England woiild not 
^2. Ibid. 2780, Holland, Earopeftti Coneert. 292f. 8tate 
Papers, ?. 69 , 758. On Juiy"~2S"7 iS78 Aiistrla-Hungary issued 
a Prociaaatlon to the inhabitanta of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an­
nouncing th® Austrian intention to occupy the provinces. 
Hertslet, M&p of Europe.. 2800f. State Papers, V, 69» 1107ff. 
The inhabitants of Bosnia-Heraegovlna resisted th© entrance 
of Austrian troops and peace was not restored to the pro­
vinces until the end of Septeaber. On November 9 Austria-
Hungary issued a Proclaaatlon of Aianesty to the inhabitants 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had taken part in the Insur­
rection against luetrlan troops. State Papers, Y, 69, 1124f. 
43. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2781-90. Serbian independenee 
was dependent upon the institution of equality among aaeabers 
of all religious creeds in respect to civil rights. 
Ibid. 2790-93. Rumanian Independence was dependent 
upon the saae condition applied to Serbia. The condition 
to independence for Serbia and Ruaanla was proposed by 
Salisbury. 
^5. Ibid. 2745. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 
1205. 
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protest against Russian acquisition of Beaearatola.. It 
ffilght be claioed that Beaconsfield was instrtiaental in 
obtaining Dobrudja as eompensation, but evldene® for thle 
is seanty.'^^ England waa a littl® aor© interested in G^reeoe 
than in Serbia, Montenegro, or Ruaanla. Even before th® 
convsning of th# Congress sh® had us®d her influence in be­
half of the Qr«©k lingdos's request to b® represented at th© 
Congress.The Question of a revision of CJr©«k frontiers 
was introduced on June 29, aud th® Qr@@k r^presentatl-yes 
requested annexation of the provinces of Eplrus and Thes-
saly."^® Beaconsfield, still endeavoring to retain Sngllah 
influence at Constantinople, proposed on Julj 11 that tl^ 
Governments of furk®j and {lr«®e» arrive at an agr@@«#nt, 
out of the Congress, on th-e north*»rd rectification of th# 
frontier. Mediation of th« Powers would b© granted if the 
two Qoir@rna©nts so desired,Article 24 of the tv&aXj of 
Berlin, b@ing only a restatement of Beaconsfield'« pro­
posal, did not provide a satisfactory aettloaent.^O 
On July 6 th® protolsa of the territories In Asia 
(th® long awaited Ears-Batoua problea) was brought before 
the Congress. Russia ifflffiediately conceded **Er2eroma. B&yazld. 
46. The only statement to this effect, discovered by the 
author, la in Koneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1205. 
State Papers. ¥. 69, T95ff, 799. 
48. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2744. 
^9. Ibid. 2756. Langer, European Alliances. 161. 
50. Hertslet, Map of Europe. 2779f. 
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and the Valley of AlasMcerd, containing principal Co«®erelal 
Houtes towards Persia.**51 These eonesssions lisd been sasie 
pr^viouslj in th© Anglo-Rusalan agreement, tout the remainder 
of the agreemeat was rather vague. Sngland liad consejited 
"'not to contest the desire of the Eaperor of Bassia to 
oco«pj the port of Batoua and to guard Me conquests in 
Ariaenla,' **52 Beaconsfield, after the Ruaeian coneesslon 
had been announced, begsa a struggle to liait the Russian 
occupation of Batou®. H« desired that Batoom he »ad© a free 
port,This seeaed agreeable to the Russians, but the other 
deaands relative to a limitation of the other Russian g&laa 
in Asia provoked a strong reaistance. Just as the Bulgarian 
problem had been decided outside the Congresg, so now the 
Asian proble® was decided. 
Unfortunately, the delegations did not work together 
as they had on the previous occasion. ?his time Beaconsfield 
and Gortohakoff ««t together while Salisbury and Schouvaloff 
carried on separate discussions. It seeas that, during the 
negotiations, Beaeonafield and Salisbury did not keep each 
other informed as to the course of the negotiations anyaoire 
then did Qortchakoff and Schouvaloff. Naturally, this re­
sulted in a very confused picture with neither side knowing 
Just where it stood in relation to the other. At one point 
51. Ibid, 2750, 
52, Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1208, 
55. Beaconsfleld to Queen Victoria. Ibid. 1204. 
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Blsaarck had to Intervene to prevent an extremely bad 
situation from developing. 
The Sftllabury-Schouvaloff discussions asBuaed a 
hostile tone fro® the beginning, because Sallsburj, unlike 
Beaconsfleld, desired a complete surrender of Batoua. Up 
to this tla® there had been no aeutlon In Congress of the 
Straits, so Salistourj thought It might be advantageous to 
aiscyss this problea la conjunetlon with the Asian problem. 
He thought that tim Straits might be a convenient Isver with 
which to prj lose the Russian, hold on Batoua, for it was 
known that Russia desired a sodifacatlon of the Straits 
clauses in the forser treaties if that aodiflcation were 
favorable to Russia. If this could not be accoaplished, she 
wished the Straits clauses to re«aln unchanged, Salisbury 
threatened Russia with a change In the Straits clauses if 
she did not give up Batous. He even approached Turkey with 
a proposition that Turkey allow the English fleet to enter 
the Black Sea If Russia retained Batoua, but furkey rejected 
this plan,5"^ More than this, Salisbury infornsed Schouvaloff 
that England would not keep her proalse *'not to resist the 
Russian possession of Batou«.*55 Vhen Schouvaloff insisted 
that England was bound'by Salisbury's signature, the latter 
replied that "he would resign and be replaced by another 
5-%. Langer, European Alllanoes. 15?. 
55. Tyler, Sut̂ pean Powers. 109. 
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foreign secretary who would be free fro® any obligations 
incurred by the agreement of Way 30.**56 
In the ®©anitl»0, after Bisaarek had intervened in 
favor of Russia, Besconsfield and Gortchakoff had reached 
an agreement with respect to Batouffij Russia agreeing that 
it was to be a free port, essentially eoB«®reial.57 fhe 
establishing of the boundary eaused further trouble^ but a 
settleaent was finally achieved when both parties agreed to 
a line midway between the two extreaes.^ 
Following the Aslatie settlement Salisbury read a 
British declaration relative to the Straits, the concluding 
paragraph, stated; 
I declare on tee&alf of England that the obllgatioas 
of Her Brltanaie Majemty relating to the closing of 
the Straits do xiot go further than an engagement 
with the 3ult«.n to respect in this aatter His 
Majesty's independeat deter»lttatloiis in conformity 
with the spirit of existlag freaties,59 
Obviously such an interpretation aeant that Turkey would be 
free to permit any countfT^ at war with Russia to enter the 
Black Sea even though Turkey were at peace. This interpreta-
tlOTi waa not in harmony with the clauses of the foraer 
Treaties which prohibited th® use of the Straits to ships 
of war when turkey wa® at peace. Consequently, on July 12, 
56, Ibid. 109f. 
57« Langer, European Allianees» 158, 
58. Articles 58-60 in the ffreaty of Berlin. Hertslet, Map 
of Europe. 279^—lars was retained by Russia. 
59. Ibid. 2727. 
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Russla r®ad a counter deelaratloa to %h» Congress, whleli 
concluded as follows; 
. . . the prinelpl® of th® closing of th# Straits 
Is an European principle, and . . , th® stipulations 
concluded in this respect In l84l, 1856, and 1871, 
confiraed ©t present toy the Tr«stj of Berlin, ar« 
binding on th® part of all th® Po-w#rs, in accordance 
with th® spirit and l@tter of th© ©xisting Treaties, 
not onlj aa regards th® Sultan but also as regards 
all th@ .Powers signatof^ to th@s® transactions.60 
kf%^T th® reading of the«@ two d@claratlonB, th® Straits ques­
tion was not d®tosited in th® Congress. The Treaty of Berlin, 
und«r Article 63» l®ft th© Straits und#r th® regulations 
preseritoied toy the Treaties of 1856 and 18?1. Thus, it may 
toe considered that the Russian Tlew prevailed. 
On July 6, while the Congress w&a concerned with 
th© problem of Battous!, Englsaid occupied Cyprus.This 
fact was announced to the Power®, of which only France and 
Italy reglatered a eosplalnt, Salisbury is supposed to have 
suggested to Fr&nc© that funis be occupied toy her. To Italy, 
he remarked that the ^Mediterranean was large enough for all,*^^ 
Many congratulationa were received by Queen Victoria, and 
Beaconsfleld was highly acclalaed. The Powers, for the most 
part, looked upon the aove aa a brilliant feat of diploaacy, 
the British people, except for the Sladstonians, were elated 
that their (hovernmmnt had not betrayed thea, as had been 
suspected when the 01otoe putoliehed the contents of the 
60, Ibid. 2728. 
61, Langer, European Alliances. 159f. 
62, Ibid. 160, 
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Anglo-Russisn agreement. For the Government, th® long 
drawn-out Cyprus affair, which had caused mueh dissension 
in the Cabinet and two resignations, had a satisfactory con-
elusion. 
Exactly on© month after the convening of the Congress 
th© work was finished and th® Treaty of Berlin signed. B@acon®-
field and Salisbury returned to England in th® same leisurely 
manner in which Beaconsfield had eome to Berlin. Th©y were 
greeted by crowds at Doirsr and London on July 16,^^ In I>own-
Ing Street, Beaconafleld happily announ.c@d that they h®d 
brought b&ck "'pg&c® with Honour I 
Looking back oir#r th© three-year period" it becomes ap­
parent that British policy, starting In 18T5 on© of caution 
and inactivity, gradually grew into a policy of boldness and 
action. It is imderstandabl© that Disraeli advocated *non-
Intertrentlon'* at the outbreak of th® Boano-Herzegovlnlftn 
insurrection. In the previous decAde similar occurrences 
in the Turkish B»pire had not produced an uncontrollitble 
situation. It was not unwise to assuae that Turkey, If 
left alone, would be able to suppress th© insurgents. More­
over, It is entirely possible that Disraeli was eueplcioue 
concerning the actual cause of the Insurrection. He prob­
ably knew, considering the reports froa the consul In Bosnia, 
about the intolerable conditions under which the peasants of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina lived. It Is not certain, however, that 
he believed this to be the cause of the insurrection. He 
63. Moneypenny and Buckle, Life of Plsraell. 121?. 
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was recelTing reports from 11Hot at Constantinople that 
told of help being given the insurgents by th« Russian consul 
in the area. Also, Eaperor Praaels Joseph of Austria had 
Just been visiting bis Dalastion province and there w@r@ 
ruasors concerning the purpose of his Tislt. If Disraeli 
©ntertalsed the slightest suspicion that either Austria or 
Russias or bothj, wer© partiallj responaibl© for having stir­
red the peasants to revolt, h® naturally would try to dis­
courage interyention. on th© part of th© Powsre. fh® last 
thing that he wished to see was a reopening of the Eastern 
Question, for if that happ@ned it was reasonably certain 
that th© final settlement would be contrary to England's 
Interests, 
By autuan of 1875, Disraeli knew that he could not 
prevent the reoy^nlng of the Eastern ^©stlon. Yet, in 
January, 1876 he favored non-adherence to the Andrasay Not®, 
which, drafted by Qermany, Austria, and Russia, was designed 
to compel Turkey to grant certain refonas to Bosnia-Herze-
govlna. Disraeli did not believe that presenting the todraa-
8y Note to Turkey would resolve the situation. He did be­
lieve that, by presenting the Mote, the principle of inter­
vention by the Powers would be firaly established and not 
relinquished thereafter. In both of these contentions, 
Disraeli wa« correet.. The Andrasay Note,.though accepted by 
Turkey, did not provide a fiettleaent. In May the Three Powora 
exercised the established principle of intervention by for­
mulating another note known as the Berlin Meaorandua. It 
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differed fro® th® todrassy Bote onlj In that the language 
used was ®or@ seTer© and the reforas demanded were aor© 
©xtensiv©. Disraeli deellned adherence to the Berlin 
Meaorandtt®, M»aj writers have taken the view that this action 
was & ffilstaMe. They believe that the concert of Stirope was 
broken^ and that the only ehanee of solving the prohlea 
was lost. The author 1© much Inelined to agree with the 
view held by Disraeli, that certain of the stipulations of 
the Mefflorandut-ffl were quit© beyond, the ability of furkey to 
perform. Consequently, the end result of the Keaoraiiduo 
could only have been that the Powers would have broaght 
iBeas^res of force agfeinst Turkey. In any sueh an action, 
England stood to lose, for the interests of the other 
European Powers were unlike those of England. Disraeli 
believed that the English ai» eould be better achieved 
outside the eoneert of Powers than within. It was a con­
troversial point in England at that tiae, and, a®ong the 
historians devoted to the subject, it is equally eon-
trovereial. It la often stated that England should have 
offered a counter proposal, since she refused to adhere to 
the Meaorandua as it stood. The author subalts that Disraeli 
would hardly propose anything that was designed to bring the 
Powers into the settlement of Turkish probleais. This is 
supposed to have been his great aistake and the cause of 
the wars that followed. That fact aay be, but looking at 
the probles with Disraeli's eyes it would aeea difflcult to 
state that he should have known the ultimate result of his 
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action. He knew only that in any settlement devised toj tJa© 
Powers Englamd would hav® to aake concessions. TMs she later 
did, both St th© Confer©nc@ of Constantinople and at Berlin. 
The episode of the Berlin Meaor&n4«» ®ad@ known to the Powers 
that they would not b© able to act without consi^Serlng -Eng­
land, as they alght formerly have thought as a result of a 
long period of British isolation fro« European power politics, 
War between Serbia and Turkey broke out in July, 18T6, 
further coBplie&ting the Balkan situation. Disraeli believed 
that Serbia was wholly unjustified in commencing this war, 
that it was siaply an opportunist measure. Serbia wanted, in 
his opinion, to take advantage of the supposed Turkish weak­
ness to acquire additional territories. The author believes 
that ffiuch of this was true, taut wishes to point out that, in 
respect to the Serbian people, their emotions, relationships, 
aims, and desires, Disraeli was woefully ignorant. It was 
beyond hi® to believe that the Serbians really and truly de­
sired to help their oppressed brothers In Bosnla-HerEegovina. 
However, even had he understood the Serbians, his policy 
would have been unchanged, for in this war he adopted a 
policy of '*non-interference and neutrality.** 
The Bulgarian atrocities, occurring at about this 
time, caused a great stir in England. Gladstone came out 
of retirement to lasbaet the Govemaent at every opportunity. 
His following was treaendous at first, but as time passed it 
gradually dlalnished. It was extremely unfortunate for Eng­
land that this prevented Disraeli's putting forth as bold a 
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pollcy as b® deemed essential. It is certain that Russia 
was undeslrablj influenced by the agitation in England. 
Russia fflay not have declared war on Turkey had it not been 
for her belief that Dlsra®ll would b© pr®Yent«d by the pop­
ular will fro® taking counter measures. Be that &s it »ayj 
th@ Busso-Turkish war occurred. 
Prior to this, howe'Sferj th© Powers had convened at 
Constantinople for the purpose of bringing peace to the 
Balkans, fh© event hardly merits more than ©entlon, since 
it turned out to b@ «. failure* Th® interesting thing to 
note Is that Disraeli's prediction that an interreatlon by 
the Powers would ultimately result In English concessions 
was proven correct. Salisbury, for England, made the con­
cessions at Constantinople. The Conference was of aoae 
value to Engl»od as a rehearsal of the later Congress of 
Berlin. At least, when the Congress of Berlin -was in the 
foraatlve stage, Disraeli laad® certain that it would be held 
on his terms, thus gaining for England as auch advantage as 
possible. 
The Russo-TuriEish War, as it developed in favor of 
Russia, brought forth a deteriBined policy In England. The 
people gradually gave support to the Governaent, so Disraeli 
could gradually expand the policy along desired lines. How­
ever, thei^ was a knotty problem to be solved. His Cabinet 
contained a peace faction headed by his Foreign Minister. 
This resulted In a long battle In the Cabinet, which was 
finally won by Disraeli when the Foreign Minister reslf^ed. 
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Soffi© say that J had, it not b®en for the opposition in th® 
Cabinet, Disraeli would hav® pl?ing#d England into war. Ttoe 
author does not ahare this view. He h^lie-v®® that Disraeli 
wantdd p@ac© at all times an^ would have endeavored to keep 
the peace ev^n had there been no opposition. 
On Mareh 3 th# preliaiaarj Peace of San Stefano was 
signed bj Turkey and Russia. Th® ®ain feature of th® tre&tj 
was the creation, of a large Btilssriaj which w&e not acoeptsble 
to either Ingland or J^ustria. Sngland reiterated a for®er 
atat@«ent aade to Russia that no Peace would be final until 
agreed to by the Powers. Austria co-operated with England 
in this respeet and the Congress of Berlin was bom. It did 
not convene, howe's-er, until Sngland had three secret agreeaenta 
coaclttdedj one with gwssia, eoneeraed aostly with Bulgaria,' 
one with Austria, ©stahllshlng a basis of Austro-Snglish eo-
operation at the Congressj and attother with Turkey allowing 
England to occupy Cyprus in return for an English guarantee 
of the Turkish territories in Asia. 
The Congress convened on June 13, 1878, and proceeded 
along lines laid down in the SSiglieh secret agreeisent®. One 
month of negotiation waa required to draft the Treaty of 
Berlin. The great significance of the freaty fro® th® Sag-
lish view was the re-estatolishaent of a Turfeey-in-Surope. 
Actually, it was-a stronger Turkey than had existed in 1S75. 
The territorial loaaes served to tighten the Turkish line of 
defense, and released troopa that had been employed in former 
tiaes in the outer provinees. The line of the Bslkaaa was a 
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defensifel® position as showa th@ battle for PlsTna In 
th© Russo-Turkish Wsr. It la said that thla did not repre­
sent a Turkish victory sine# Turkey never mmde us® of her 
right to fortify the pass®©. To this, th® author e&n only 
ask—how could Beaeonsfl©ld kaow that Turkey would QOt take 
full advantag® of h©r right to fflllitarlse Eastern Ruaeliat 
With th® settle®®nt provided by th® fr«aty of Berlin, Russia's 
ad^aric® toward Constsjatiaopie was postponed. With the oceu-
patlon of Cyprus- and the Anglo-Turkish defensive alli&no® In 
Asia, Husgla's Of®rlan<l threat to India was nulliflea. 
British alffls h®5 be©n achieved without reeours® to 
war. In July, 1878 British Mploaaey emerged victorious. 
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